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Wanneer je aan mensen vertelt dat je beroep “onderzoek” is kijken ze eerst wat
raar op. Wanneer je vervolgens zegt dat je aan de universiteit werkt, wordt je
geassocieerd met drie maand vakantie in de zomer. Niets is minder waar. Een
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de vakkundige steun van schipper Van Aarle van het LICOS- de "master of
science in economics" te water gelaten. Na nog wat verder finetunen in de
Antwerpse haven, begon de lokroep van de nieuwe havenmeester in de Gentse
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afwerking zorgden de internationale experten, Campos en Roland. Omdat er
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niet de laatste aanpassingen geweest zijn. Dank aan Koen, Jef, Bas, Gerdie,
Glenn, Nauro en Gérard voor de begeleiding en het deskundig advies.
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personeel, zonder hen zou het leven minder aangenaam zijn. Ook de vele
aangename collega’s-klankbord op het bureau en op de gang zijn een onmisbaar
ingrediënt bij het urenlange nadenken en schrijven. Dank ook aan de vrienden
uit Antwerpen, ik heb er veel geleerd en hun deur staat steeds open als ik er
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nieuwe mensen leren kennen op congressen. Ook al worden taxi’s soms duur
betaald, is gefouilleerd worden door een militair geen sinecure, is het altijd
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sine qua non voor de reizende researcher.
Vrienden en familie zorgden voor welkome afwisseling tussen de formules
door. Tenslotte gaat ook een groot woord van dank naar mijn ouders voor de
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aan de knappe dame langs de kade, zij maakt alles de moeite waard.
Bruno Merlevede
Mei 2005
Niet-technische Nederlandse
samenvatting
De val van het communisme op het einde van de vorige eeuw bracht een aan-
tal belangrijke veranderingen van zowel sociale als geopolitieke aard teweeg.
Het communistisch systeem had ook een belangrijk economisch luik waarbij
de centrale overheid de rol van het marktmechanisme overnam. De val van
het communisme betekende dan ook de start van een scala van institutionele
en economische hervormingen zoals prijsliberalisatie, privatisering van staats-
bedrijven, en het creëren van financiële markten. Algemeen werd verwacht
dat na een initiële terugval bij de omschakeling van plan- naar markteconomie
de implementatie van het marktmechanisme zeer snel zou resulteren in sterke
economische groei. Deze hoge verwachtingen werden echter allesbehalve in-
gelost. Dit toont aan hoe onrealistisch de verwachtingen waren. De vier bij-
drages in het doctoraat situeren zich binnen het kader van de transitie. De
bevindingen overstijgen in vele gevallen echter dit kader en zijn relevant voor
elk proces van grootschalige hervormingen of voor elk ontwikkelingsland.
In een eerste bijdrage analyseren we de relatie tussen economische groei
en vooruitgang in hervormingen. Hervormingen hebben een negatieve impact
op groei op het moment dat ze doorgevoerd worden, maar hebben nadien een
positief eﬀect dat het eerdere negatieve eﬀect overtreft. Er is dus een aan-
passingskost, maar deze wordt gecompenseerd door het latere positieve eﬀect.
In ongeveer de helft van de transitielanden zijn op een bepaald moment één of
meerdere hervormingen teruggeschroefd. In de eerdere empirische literatuur
had dit impliciet een positief eﬀect op economische groei, wat indruist tegen de
theoretische literatuur. Bijdrage één maakt gebruik van een nieuw empirisch
kader en toont aan dat terugschroeven wel degelijk gepaard gaat met hoge
kosten in termen van economische groei.
x
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Het belang van de kosten verbonden aan het terugschroeven van hervormin-
gen wordt behandeld in bijdrage twee. In de vele theoretische modellen die de
ideale snelheid van hervormingen behandelen, spelen deze kosten een cruciale
rol. Indien er geen kosten verbonden zijn aan het terugschroeven van her-
vormingen is het optimaal om meteen alle hervormingen uit te proberen (big
bang). Indien er wel kosten zijn is het zaak om "foute" hervormingen te ver-
mijden. Als er onzekerheid is over welke hervormingen de juiste zijn, neemt
de kans op terugschroeven toe. Deze kosten, gecombineerd met onzekerheid,
maken een stapsgewijze aanpak (gradualisme) interessanter. Een stapsgewijze
aanpak heeft dan als voordeel dat ongepaste hervormingen tegen beperkte kost
ongedaan gemaakt kunnen worden. Onze simulaties bevestigen de theoretische
verwachting dat zelfs een relatief kleine kans op terugschroeven volstaat voor
beleidsmakers om de stapsgewijze aanpak te verkiezen.
Aan grootschalige economische hervormingen en herstructurering zit ook
een kostenplaatje vast. Omdat de binnenlandse financieringsbronnen beperkt
zijn, is er nood aan externe middelen. Verschillende types financiële stromen
brengen verschillende eﬀecten teweeg. Vooral de mate waarin de financiële in-
breng al dan niet gemakkelijk teruggetrokken kan worden is van belang. Vanuit
dit oogpunt zal een gastland directe investeringen preferen boven andere kapi-
taalstromen. In bijdrage drie gaan we na welke factoren de aantrekkingkracht
van een transitieland bepalen. We vinden dat zowel de meer vertrouwde fac-
toren als marktgrootte, handelsintegratie, en loonkosten, als specifieke transitie-
factoren zoals de snelheid van de hervormingen en de manier van privatiseren
van voormalige staatsbedrijven een rol spelen.
Directe investeringen fungeren niet alleen als financieringsbron, maar ook
als kanaal waarlangs binnenlandse ondernemingen met nieuwe technologieën en
managementpraktijken in aanraking komen. Buitenlandse directe investerin-
gen kunnen dus ook de economische groei en welvaart bevorderen. Hoewel
dit adagium in beleidskringen algemeen aanvaard is, zijn de wetenschappelijke
bewijzen ervoor beperkt. Door middel van een empirische analyse op bedrijf-
sniveau gaat bijdrage vier de eﬀecten van de aanwezigheid van buitenlandse on-
dernemingen op de productiviteit van binnenlandse ondernemingen (’spillovers’)
na. Onze analyse probeert verschillende tekortkomingen uit eerdere literatuur
weg te werken. Spillovers blijken veeleer een inter-sectorieel dan een intra-
sectorieel gegeven zoals tot op heden werd aangenomen. Daarnaast tonen we
NIET-TECHNISCHE NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING xii
aan dat positieve spillovers voorwaardelijk zijn en wijzen we op het bestaan
van belangrijke niet-lineariteiten.
General Introduction, Summary,
and Conclusions
0.1 The setting
Probably the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 is the most symbolic event that
characterizes the end of the communist era. Historians even refer to "the short
twentieth century" that starts with the murder on archduke Franz Ferdinand in
1914 and ends with the disintegration of the Eastern bloc and the destruction
of the Iron Curtain (see Hobsbawm, 1994). The fall of communism brought
along numerous important socio- and geopolitical changes. It implied the end
of the cold war, the end of the CMEA, and the end of the Warsaw pact. For-
mer Warsaw Pact countries joined the NATO, the Central European countries
sought alliance with the European Union, etc.
The communist system also had an important economic component. The
government was the administrator and the organizer of the economy, replacing
the market as equilibrating mechanism. The failure of communism is partly
due to its inability to keep up with the living standards of capitalist coun-
tries (see Estrin et al., 2001). The fall of communism therefore kickstarted
a transition from a planned economy to a market economy. This involves
reform of numerous institutions such as price and trade liberalization, priva-
tization of state-owned enterprises, the creation of financial markets, etc. (see
Campos and Coricelli (2002) and Merlevede (2001) for a more detailed ac-
count). It was generally predicted that output and welfare would initially fall
at the start of transition. It was also expected that the newly installed mar-
ket mechanism would drastically improve the allocation of production factors
and quickly boost economic growth after the initial drop in output. This has
xiii
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Figure 1: Real GDP paths in local currency - 1989 =100 (source: World
Economic Outlook)
been referred to as the J-curve eﬀect. In most countries however, the U-shaped
output paths (see figure 1) did not live up to these high expectations. Stiglitz
(1999) argues that these unrealistic expectations reveal just how poorly we
understand the foundations of a market economy as well as the dynamics of
institutional reform processes. The lessons of transition are thus important for
economics as a science. Transition initiated theoretical research in search for
a better understanding of the institutions that lie at the heart of the market
economy. Because transition countries started from scratch in their transition
to the market economy, they also make an ideal ’laboratory’ to confront theory
with empirical evidence. In the words of Kinoshita and Campos (2003):
“The transition to a market economy has been initiated more or
less simultaneously in more than 25 countries that diﬀer substan-
tially in terms of inherited institutions, initial conditions, income
levels and reform paths. This richness in variation allows compara-
tive analysis in a unique situation akin to a natural experiment. In
a large number of diﬀerent dimensions the former centrally planned
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economies set out to implement economic and political reforms, ap-
plying diﬀerent strategies and experiencing dramatically diﬀerent
outcomes”
At the same time the economic profession at this side of the Iron Curtain
was called upon for policy advice. A heated debate arose, and economists were
divided in two broad streams of thought, namely shock therapists, who advo-
cated radical reforms and rapid transformation, and gradualists, advocating
a more cautious and piecemeal approach to reform. The proponents of a big
bang strategy stressed the importance of using the window of opportunity to
implement as much reform as possible and make use of the complementarity
of reforms. An additional advantage, they argued, was that it would be more
diﬃcult to reverse those reforms. Those advocating a more gradual approach,
on the other hand, stressed the need to build constituencies for further reform.
By first implementing popular reforms, the public at large would be willing to
accept more painful reforms afterwards. This then would give more legitimacy
to the government for enacting further reforms. This is the background for the
first chapters in this dissertation. In chapter one we analyse the relationship
between growth and reform empirically.1 We contribute to the literature by ex-
plicitly introducing the eﬀect of reform reversals, i.e. a return in the direction
of the centrally planned economy. Chapter two uses this empirical framework
to investigate policy choice in the presence of reform reversals and aggregate
uncertainty.
Such a process of large-scale economic reform and restructuring is costly
and needs to be financed. As domestic sources for financing were limited,
external financing was needed. Clearly, diﬀerent types of capital flows entail
diﬀerent externalities and diﬀer in terms of the degree to which they are subject
to sudden reversal. In this respect the eﬀects of foreign direct investment (FDI)
are completely diﬀerent from the eﬀects of other sources of financing such as
direct lending or portfolio investment. FDI is less reversible and in addition
acts as a channel for the transmission of technology and managerial know-how.
Therefore it can deliver a crucial contribution to foster economic development
and welfare (Sinn and Weichenrieder, 1997). This provides the background
1Note that the traditional growth literature with a focus on long term growth and an
underlying assumption of a market mechanism in place, is of little use in the transition
context.
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for chapters three and four. Chapter three provides an equilibrium analysis of
the stock of FDI. In chapter four we investigate whether or not FDI acts as a
channel for the transmission of technology and other know-how from foreign
to domestic firms.
0.2 Growth, reform reversals, and policy choice
Chapters 1 and 2 deal with the empirical analysis of the interaction between
reform and growth during transition, and the implications for policy choice. In
chapter 1 we specifically contribute to the literature by analysing the impact
of reform reversals during the transition from a planned to a market economy.
Although theoretical work (cf. infra) attributes a crucial role to reversal costs
in determining policy choice, this issue has been completely neglected by the
earlier empirical literature. The debate on the choice of reform speed is the
topic of chapter 2. We then employ our empirical results to analyse policy
choice. The focus is on the role of reversal costs in determining the choice
between gradualism and big bang. Below we provide a theoretical background
on the importance of reversal costs in determining policy choice.
The large-scale reform process in the transition countries stressed the need
to better understand the political economy of policy choice and yielded a num-
ber of models in this field. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) discuss the imple-
mentation of large-scale reform when only the distribution of gains and losses
from reform is uncertain. An individual therefore only finds out whether he
is a winner or a looser once the reform has been implemented. Fernandez
and Rodrik (1991) show that, in a dynamic setting, reforms with ex ante
positive expected outcomes but ex post hurting the majority, can initially be
accepted by the electorate only to be reversed in the next period provided the
first period benefits exceed the reversal costs. Clearly if there were no reversal
costs, all reforms with ex ante expected positive outcomes would be adopted.
Higher reversal costs thus can -ceteris paribus- lead to the rejection of more
reforms with ex ante expected positive outcomes, provided that there is un-
certainty about the distribution. Rodrik (1995) builds a model of sectoral
reallocation to analyse the dynamics of preferences over economic policy. The
model is more closely tailored to transition than the one in Fernandez and
Rodrik (1991). In the model reform is a decrease of the subsidy to workers
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in the low-productivity state-sector that is financed by a tax on workers in
the high productivity private-sector. Reform then allows faster development
of the private sector. Rodrik (1995) shows that a reform2, initially opposed by
state-sector workers, may eventually gain support for continuation from these
state-sector workers. In his model a vote between continuing the transition
and returning to the status quo (a reversal), can only lead to a reversal in the
early stages of transition. Whether a reversal actually occurs then depends on
the way preferences are transformed into policy.
Our contributions in chapters 1 and 2 are most closely related to Dewa-
tripont and Roland (1995). They illustrate the impact of reversal costs on the
choice between a gradualist and a big bang approach to large scale institu-
tional reform in the presence of aggregate uncertainty. Aggregate uncertainty
can be thought of as simply reflecting the fact that a process of large-scale
institutional reform involves coordination among diﬀerent economic agents.
This gives rise to multiple equilibria and it is not known in advance which
equilibrium will eventually be selected. Given that our data in chapter 1 and
2 are macro-economic in nature and that we are unable to identify winners or
losers, a model of aggregate uncertainty in a representative agent framework is
appropriate. In the case of transition, uncertainty regarding the final outcome
reflects that market economies are characterized by a set of core characteristics,
but that many varieties exist. In this sense more reform is not always better
if it is of the wrong type and a reversal is needed. We develop the model and
illustrate the importance of reversal costs in more detail in section 0.2.1 below.
The links with chapters 1 and 2 are discussed at the end of that section.
0.2.1 The importance of reversal costs: Dewatripont
and Roland (1995)
We follow Dewatripont and Roland (1995) and consider a basic model with
two reforms, i = 1, 2. The outcomes of both reforms are uncertain and
depend on the respective realized states of nature O1j (j = 1, 2, ..., J) and
O2k (k = 1, 2, ..., K). Implementing one reform ("partial reform") delivers a
2The reform is a decrease of the subsidy to state-sector workers in the low-productivity
sector. This subsidy is financed by a tax on private-sector workers in the high productivity
sector, therefore a reduction of the subsidy allows for faster development of the private
sector.
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net-present-value of P (Oim) for the representative agent. When both re-
forms have been implemented ("full reform"), the net-present-value for the
representative agent is F (O1j, O2k), independent of the sequencing of reforms.
For simplicity payoﬀs are assumed to be time-invariant. The time-invariant
flow payoﬀs are given by f (O1j, O2k) = (1− δ)F (O1j, O2k) and p (Oim) =
(1− δ)P (Oim).
Assume that observing P (.) sheds some light on F (., .). In particular when
implementing reform i, the resulting payoﬀ P (Oi) conveys a signal Sin that
reveals some more information about the likely payoﬀ from full reform. We can
now rank the signals in terms of the expected payoﬀs of full reform conditional
on the information content of the observed signal so that the expected payoﬀ
is increasing in n:
n > n0 ⇒ E
j,k
[F (O1j, O2k) |Sin] ≥ E
j,k
[F (O1j, O2k) |Sin0 ] (1)
The model’s baseline payoﬀ is normalized to zero, and represents the evo-
lution of the economy when the reform package under consideration is not im-
plemented (another can). Inappropriate reform will result in P (.) and F (., .)
being negative. Reversing reforms can then be optimal. A reversal of the re-
form package brings the economy back at its baseline payoﬀ. Call ξi the cost of
reversing reform i -when it has been implemented alone- and experiencing the
baseline afterwards3; and ξ the cost when both reforms have been implemented,
where
0 < max (ξ1, ξ2) < ξ < ξ1 + ξ2
This implies that reversing one reform is less costly than reversing both. Re-
versal costs are assumed to be borne by the representative agent. The idea of
complementarity is captured by assuming P (.) << F (., .) and P (Oim) < −ξi.
This makes partial reform never attractive per se, so that it is always followed
either by a second reform or by a reversal to the default payoﬀ. Including
complementarity in the model clearly favours the big bang strategy and rules
out that results depend on not including complementarity in the model. Fig-
ures 2 and 3 illustrate the big bang and the gradual approach to reform in this
stylized model.
3Reversals costs are thus also defined in net-present value terms. Since the baseline payoﬀ
is normalized to zero, it is also the cost of reversing to the baseline.
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reform 1,2 
continue 
reversal ξ 
(1-δ)F(O1,O2)
Figure 2: Big bang strategy
reform 1 
reform 2
reversal ξ1 
reversal ξ 
(1-δ)P(O1) 
(1-δ) 
F(O1,O2)
continue 
Figure 3: Gradualist strategy
A big bang strategy (BB) is defined as implementing both reforms simulta-
neously. The expected payoﬀ is a combination of experiencing F (O1j, O2k) for
one period and then deciding whether or not to continue the reform package.
The latter decision boils down to a comparison of F (O1j, O2k) with −ξ,the
cost of a reversal to the baseline.
BB = (1− δ)E
j,k
F (O1j, O2k) + δE
j,k
max {−ξ, F (O1j, O2k)} (2)
Figure 3 illustrates the strategy and sequencing under gradualism, call it
GR12. Gradualism implies trying reform 1 for one period. After learning
P (O1m) and observing signal S1n, there can either be a reversal to the baseline
at cost ξ1 or a move to implement reform 2. Recall from the above that both
these options dominate partial reform, i.e. implementing only reform 1. Once
both reforms have been implemented the payoﬀ of the full reform package is
experienced for one period. At the end of the period the reform package can
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be continued or reversed at cost ξ just as in the big bang case.
First focus on the last stage. After reform 1 has been implemented and sig-
nal S1n has been learned, continuing with reform 2 has the following expected
payoﬀ
R2 (S1n) = (1− δ)E
j,k
[F (O1j, O2k) |S1n] + δE
j,k
max {−ξ, F (O1j, O2k) |S1n} (3)
where the full reform payoﬀ is experienced for one period and where after that
period a choice is made between continuing the full reform package or reversing
both reforms and returning to the baseline.
In the first stage the expected payoﬀ defined in (3) is to be compared with
an immediate reversal of reform 1. Since the expectation of F (., .) is increasing
in n (cf. (1)) it is possible to define en such that
R2 (S1n) ≥ −ξ1 if and only if n ≥ en (4)
Early reversal thus only takes place when the signal is worse than S1hn. The ex
ante payoﬀ of the gradualist package, GR12, is then
GR12 = (1− δ)E
j
P (O1j)+δPr (n < en) (−ξ1)+δ Pr (n ≥ en) E
n≥hn
[R2 (S1n)] (5)
If pn represents the probability associated to a signal S1n, with n = 1, ..., en, ..., Ni,
we have Pr (n < en) ≡Phn−1n=1 pn and En≥hn [R2 (S1n)] ≡PNin=hn piphn+...+pNiR2 (S1n).
Note from (2) and (3) that we can write
BB = Pr (n < en) E
n<hn
[R2 (S1n)] + Pr (n ≥ en) E
n≥hn
[R2 (S1n)] (6)
Rewriting and substituting Pr (n ≥ en)En≥hn [R2 (S1n)] in (5) we have
GR12 = (1− δ)E
j
P (O1j) + δBB + δPr (n < en)µ−ξ1 − E
n<hn
[R2 (S1n)]
¶
(7)
The first term on the right hand side of (7), (1− δ)EjP (O1j) , reflects a
period of partial reform. This period can be costly in itself (P (O1j) < 0) and
is because of complementarities certainly worse than the first period of the
BB-case (cf. (2)). The second term reflects the cost of delay in comparison to
a big bang. Obviously delay is bad when BB > 0, but not so when BB < 0.
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Finally, the third term reflects the option value of early reversal. The option of
early reversal allows to save on costs when the prospects for further reform look
disappointing. If en exists, (−ξ1 − En<hn [R2 (S1n)]) is > 0. Indeed by definition
of en, R2 (S1n) < −ξ1 for n < en. It is easy to see then that En<hn [R2 (S1n)] <
−ξ1. If Pr (n < en) > 0, the option value of early reversal will be positive.
Dewatripont and Roland (1995) show that for F (., .) and P (.) given, if
δ → 1, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for gradualism to dominate big
bang is that the early reversal option is exercised with positive probability:
GR12 > BB if and only if 0 < Pr (n < en) < 1. If instead δ < 1, gradualism
dominates if 0 < Pr (n < en) < 1 and EjP (O1j) is not too negative.
The choice between the two strategies is still not univocal. It will also
depend on the type of government. The above analysis relates to a benevolent
social planner facing an optimal decision-making problem under uncertainty.
Gradualism then makes reforms easier to start because it gives an additional
option of early reversal at a lower cost after partial uncertainty resolution. It
allows for a flexible approach and experimenting with smaller costs of trial and
error.4 A reform-minded government committed to reform for ideological or
other reasons that faces constraints of political acceptability may still prefer a
big bang. A big bang entails high reversal costs that constitute an advantage
ex post because they reduces reversibility, thereby securing reforms. Clearly,
from an ex ante point of view high reversal costs make a big bang approach
infeasible in the light of the risk of a negative aggregate outcome.
What is now the importance of reversal costs? To investigate the issue
assume that there are no reversal cost, that is ξ = ξi = 0. Replacing ξ with
zero in (2), the expression for big bang becomes
BB = (1− δ)E
j,k
F (O1j, O2k) + δE
j,k
max {0, F (O1j, O2k)} (8)
which for δ → 1 is always ≥ 0. The same logic applies to the continuation
4The additional option of ’early’ reversal under gradualism may, one could argue deter
investment compared with the BB-approach, and early reversal may be the lack of investment
response. However, the option value of waiting to invest is quite high, and investment
response tends to be small in any case. Under those circumstances, Dewatripont and Roland
(1995) show that GR may in fact generate more investment response before uncertainty
resolution, thereby reducing ex post reversibility of enacted reforms.
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payoﬀ under gradualism
R2 (S1n) = (1− δ)E
j,k
[F (O1j, O2k) |S1n] + δE
j,k
max {0, F (O1j, O2k) |S1n} (9)
which for δ → 1 is also always ≥ 0. Because R2 (S1n) ≥ 0 and −ξ1 = 0 (there
are no reversal costs!), @en with n < en for which R2 (S1n) < −ξ1. The result is
that the option value of early reversal, δPr (n < en) {−ξ1−En<hn [R2 (S1n)]} in
(7), is always equal to zero. (7) then reduces to
GR12 = (1− δ)E
j
P (O1j) + δBB (10)
from which it is trivial to see that BB will always dominate since BB ≥ 0 and
P (Oij) < −ξi = 0 because of complementarity. Intuitively, when there are
no reversal costs, there are no costs of learning and experimenting, and thus
never any advantage to early reversal.
Our empirical framework in chapter 1 is based on the standard in the
literature and is only loosely related to the model. However, the idea of testing
reversal costs is fully inspired by Dewatripont and Roland (1995) and attempts
to bring empirics somewhat more in line with theory. The empirical framework
relates yearly growth rates to new reform and the existing stock of reform and
other variables. We think of the following mechanism that translates reform
into growth (∼ the welfare payoﬀ). The closer a country comes to a market
economy, the more benefits from better resource allocation and, hence, the
higher the growth rate after an initial adjustment cost. While the theoretical
model considers only two reforms, the empirical framework treats reform as
a continuum between 1 (situation comparable to planned economy) and 4.3
(situation comparable to market economy). Diﬀerent reform packages then
give rise to a sequence of flow payoﬀs. It is as if the timelines in figures 2
and 3 are extend to more periods with multiple possibilities to reverse reform.
In the empirical framework reform adds to the stock of reform and -after an
initial adjustment cost- contributes positively to growth during the remainder
of transition. Hence, a positive net present value of reform. Implementing
the wrong reform is costly in the period it is implemented because of the
adjustment cost and in the next period when it is reversed. A negative net
present value results.
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In chapter two we try to establish a tighter link between Dewatripont and
Roland (1995) and our results. We think of a reform package as the entire
transition process: a reform package that takes the economy from plan to
market or in the empirical framework takes the average EBRD indicator from
1 to 4.3. A reform package then consists of numerous reform steps that can be
implemented faster or slower.5 Because various ’types’ of a market economy
exist there is still uncertainty about the type best fit for a particular country.
Reversals did occur in reality, so uncertainty is present. Although only about
10% of our observations based on the average EBRD indicator is a reversal,
reversals occurred in 12 out 25 countries or 48% of the countries. In a new
dataset by Campos and Horvath (2005) there is not even a single country
that did not experience a reversal! The ex post observed probability of a
reversal during transition is thus very high and aggregate uncertainty as a
key feature of transition is warranted. We simulate economic growth under
diﬀerent reform paths reflecting both the gradualist and big bang approaches
to reform as they are commonly thought about. We create scenarios both with
and without reversals and determine the probability a policymaker ex ante
should attribute to a reversal in order to prefer gradualism over big bang.
0.2.2 Reversals and output growth
In chapter 1 we test whether reform reversals during transition carry an eco-
nomic cost. Reform is measured by an average reform index, while reform
reversals are characterized by a drop in the average reform index. In the stan-
dard empirical framework the level of reform, measured by RI, enters a growth
equation in the following way: αRIt + βRIt−1, where the expectation is that
α<0, β>0 and |α|<β. The negative eﬀect of current reform reflects an ad-
justment cost. The positive eﬀect of lagged reform (’stock’ eﬀect) reflects idea
that an economy closer to a market economy will benefit more from the market
mechanism, in particular through better resource allocation. This leads to im-
proved growth performance. It is expected that the stock eﬀect will dominate
if it has reached a suﬃciently high level (∼ |α|<β). Rewriting this expres-
5Admittedly, the entire transition may be more of a container ship of reform packages in
diﬀerent areas, but focussing on one indicator and the transition process as a whole allows for
a clear account of the diﬀerences between gradualism and big bang. Moreover, most research
and policy advice was/is in the framework of the entire transition process and arguments
based on specific reforms are often carried through to the entire transition process.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY, AND CONCLUSIONS xxiv
sion as α∆RIt + (α+ β)RIt−1, we observe that new reforms (∆RIt) carry an
immediate cost in terms of growth but also a lagged positive eﬀect through a
higher level of reform (RIt−1) that aﬀects growth positively (recall that |α|<β
is expected). However with α<0 a reform reversal, defined as ∆RIt<0, gener-
ates an instantaneous positive growth eﬀect in period t, slowing down growth
only the following year because of the lower stock of reform (RIt−1 is ∆RIt
lower than in the no reversal case). Depending on the relative magnitude of
α and α+β, the cumulated eﬀect of a reversal becomes negative only a few
years after the reversal occurred. The non-linear eﬀect of reform thus implies a
counterintuitive, short-lived positive eﬀect of a reversal. Therefore we explic-
itly introduce a reversal parameter in the empirical framework. Since policy
choices result from a politically constrained process aﬀected by economic vari-
ables, reform cannot be considered as a fully exogenous decision (Campos and
Coricelli, 2002). Therefore we consider a simultaneous equation system where
growth and the level of reform act as dependent variables and concurrently
influence one another.
The results for the parameters taken from the standard framework confirm
earlier findings. The positive stock eﬀect dominates the adjustment cost. With
respect to reversals, our results suggest that a reversal generates an immediate
negative contribution to real output growth, contrary to the implied positive
eﬀect in the standard framework. The immediate contribution of a reversal of
average magnitude to the growth rate is -2.65%-points. In the standard frame-
work the same reversal increases the growth rate with 0.8%-points. Only two
years later the lower stock of reform starts to dominate and the overall eﬀect
of the reversal becomes negative. Further tests suggest that a reversal is more
harmful at higher levels of reform. A reform reversal of average magnitude at
a high level of reform costs about 3%-points extra in growth terms compared
to the same reversal at a low level of reform.
From the theoretical model above, we know that reversal costs are crucial
for gradualist strategies to dominate big bang strategies in the presence of
aggregate uncertainty. Our empirical framework implies that reversals are
more costly under a big bang strategy than under gradualism, which boosts
the case for gradualism. Comparing the limited impact of a reversal in the
standard framework with our results, the strongly negative impact of a reversal
strengthens the case for gradualism.
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0.2.3 Reversals and policy choice
In chapter 2 our main interest is the relation between the choice of reform
speed and economic growth and its eﬀect on the policymaker’s choice between
gradualism and big bang. In comparison to chapter 1 we extend our system
of equations for economic growth and economic reform with an extra equation
for FDI inflows. The latter equation is a highly stylized model of FDI inflows.
We find that new reforms aﬀect economic growth negatively but that the level
of past reform leads to higher growth and attracts FDI. FDI is also attracted
by improvements in the growth rate, but with a lag. This means that the
immediate adjustment cost of new reforms is counterbalanced by a future surge
of FDI inflows and higher future growth through a higher stock of reform. The
sum of these eﬀects makes the result consistent with the results from chapter
1. Reform reversals result in lower growth rates. A further novelty is that, at
the time of a reversal, we allow for an asymmetric eﬀect of growth on reform.
We cannot reject that in case of a reversal, growth does not influence reform.
We use the empirical results to simulate the impact of big bang and grad-
ualist reform on economic growth, both with and without reversal in the re-
form process. Based on the simulations we can derive the optimal choice for
a benevolent policymaker that maximizes long term economic welfare. If it
is known whether a reversal will occur or not, the choice between big bang
and gradualism is trivial for the benevolent policymaker: without a reform
reversal, the big bang strategy will be applied, with a reversal, the gradual-
ist strategy is preferred. We translate the concept of aggregate uncertainty
into our framework as the probability that a reversal will occur. Aggregate
uncertainty means that policymakers have imperfect information about the
type of reform best fit for their country. Some reform steps may turn out to
be inappropriate or inconsistent with other reforms. Reversals are then inter-
preted as a normal component of the trial and error process in search of the
appropriate market economy model. If aggregate uncertainty is important, the
probability of reversal will be high. Using the coeﬃcients from the empirical
model we calculate the minimum ex ante reversal probabilities that suﬃce to
tilt the balance in favour of gradualism. We find that -given the complexity of
the transition process- the case for gradualism is rather strong for the average
transition country and it may take hard-nosed reformers to opt for a big bang
strategy.
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When we modify the policymaker’s criterion from long term welfare to wel-
fare within the standard political cycle, the case for gradualism is strengthened
to such an extent that big bang strategies seem to belong to the realm of the
unreal. However, diﬀerences in the level of economic welfare may be the wrong
political criterion. Voters are unable to compare both strategies because only
the outcome of the chosen strategy is observed. Because it is clearly observed,
the turning point from negative to positive growth might be a better criterion
for voter behaviour. This criterion does not bring good news for incumbent
policymakers in an average transition country either. Gradualist policymak-
ers are never re-elected and big bang policymakers only are able to maintain
power when they gamble for a big bang without reversal. Therefore it should
not come as a surprise that political instability has been a typical feature of
transition, for the political fruits of economic reform may be bitter.
0.3 Foreign direct investment
Because of the optimism about the economic consequences of foreign invest-
ment, coupled with heightened awareness about the importance of new tech-
nologies for economic growth, many countries see attracting FDI as an impor-
tant element in their strategy for economic development. What is more, in the
case of transition countries FDI also provides external resources for financing
the transition. This is far from luxury, given the limited domestic sources for
financing. In this respect FDI has the additional advantage that it is probably
the least reversible type of capital flows. FDI is also perceived as a catalyst
for domestic development because it is an amalgamation of capital, technol-
ogy, marketing, and management know-how that can spill over from foreign
to domestic firms. Sinn and Weichenrieder (1997) call FDI "an indispensable
ingredient in a successful strategy for economic growth and prosperity". It is
therefore important for policymakers to know which factors attract FDI.
In chapter three we analyse the determinants of the level of bilateral FDI
stocks held by the old EU-members in the ten accession countries, eight of
which now have joined the EU. We present a partial adjustment approach to
the equilibrium FDI stocks. Again, transition economies oﬀer almost a nat-
ural control since FDI in the region was negligible prior to 1990. Furthermore,
the impact of current policy variables is not obscured nor overcome by a long
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history of past policies, for which it is diﬃcult to control. Finally, in chapter 4
we perform a microeconometric analysis of FDI as a channel for the transmis-
sion of technology and other know-how from foreign to domestic firms. This
complements the macroeconomic evidence of chapter 2, where we established
a positive link between FDI inflows and economic growth for the average tran-
sition country.6
0.3.1 A partial adjustment model of FDI stocks
Chapter three presents a partial adjustment approach to FDI. In particular
we focus on the bilateral FDI stocks of the old EU-members in the ten CEE-
countries. Given the state of institutional and economic development, there is
an equilibrium level of foreign involvement in an economy. The collapse of the
central planning system initiated a flow of foreign investment to the CEECs.
We think of FDI flows as an adjustment process towards the equilibrium level of
the FDI stock. The observed FDI stock then reflects the impact of two driving
forces. First, the stock is pulled towards its equilibrium level, even without
policy changes. Second, during the course of transition the determinants of the
equilibrium level of FDI have changed. As a result the equilibrium level itself
has shifted over time. A partial stock adjustment model nicely encompasses
these features and gives rise to a dynamic panel estimation.
We find that adjustment towards equilibrium is rapid. As equilibrium is
quickly reached a focus on the determinants of the equilibrium FDI stock is
warranted. We combine a group of traditional factors with a group of institu-
tional factors induced by the transition process. With respect to the traditional
determinants, market potential and trade integration with the source country
are positively related to the equilibrium FDI stock. Higher relative unit labour
costs vis-a-vis the source country are associated with a lower equilibrium level
of foreign presence. Lower perceived riskiness is associated with more FDI.
In the case of transition countries perceived riskiness to a large extent reflects
progress in institutional development. We find that progress in almost all re-
form areas, as measured by the EBRD liberalization indicators, is associated
with a better FDI record. Non-banking reform is the only exception. The rela-
6Note that in chapter 4 we limit our analysis to the spillover-eﬀects from foreign to domes-
tic firms only, while in chapter 2 the macroeconomic evidence does include the contribution
of FDI-inflows to real GDP.
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tionship between FDI and privatization is investigated more thoroughly. Our
results suggests that current direct privatization has an immediate concurrent
positive eﬀect on the equilibrium level of FDI, whereas non-direct privatiza-
tion schemes slow down adjustment to the equilibrium. Finally, privatization
history positively aﬀects the equilibrium level independently of the method
applied.
0.3.2 FDI as a catalyst for domestic development?
During the last two decades, many emerging economies have dramatically re-
duced barriers to FDI, and countries at all levels of development have created
a policy infrastructure to attract multinational firms. Standard tactics to
promote FDI include the extension of tax holidays, exemptions from import
duties, and the oﬀer of direct subsidies. Since 1998, 103 countries have oﬀered
special tax concessions to foreign corporations that have set up production or
administrative facilities within their border. (Hanson, 2001)
All these policy eﬀorts build on the idea or rather the belief that technol-
ogy and know-how will spill over from foreign to domestic firms. These strong
beliefs are however in stark contrast with the sobering empirical evidence (Ro-
drik, 1999). Chapter four argues that previous research i) has been looking
for spillovers in the wrong place; ii) to a large extent has neglected condition-
alities; and iii) failed to take into account interactions and non-linearities. We
extend the analysis beyond eﬀects operating within industries to the eﬀects
operating across industries for the most important spillovers may run across
sectors. Foreign firms not only compete with local firms in the same sector, but
also interact with local firms that are upstream or downstream in the produc-
tion chain. We identify backward spillovers (originating from contacts between
a foreign firm and its upstream local suppliers) and forward spillovers (origi-
nating from contacts between a foreign firm and its downstream local buyer
of inputs). We consistently find that intersectoral spillovers are economically
much larger than sectoral spillovers.
Recently the literature has come to the understanding that the existence,
direction and magnitude of spillovers may depend on sectoral, regional and
firm-specific characteristics. If this is true, aggregate studies are bound to find
insignificant or biased results. This leads us to focus on characteristics that
make domestic firms sensitive to spillovers. We consider absorptive capability,
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openness, sectoral competition and concentration, majority versus minority
foreign ownership, and firm size. Rather than considering them in isolation
we analyse possible interactions and non-linearities. Our results suggests that
spillovers must be studied between sectors, taking into account non-linearities,
interactions, and conditionalities The debate in the literature on the direction
and magnitude of spillovers from foreign firms to local firms therefore has only
one good answer: it all depends. Reassuringly we find that it depends in a way
that makes economic sense.
0.4 Lessons learned
What can we learn from our results?
Benevolent social planners that are interested in maximizing welfare when
they are confronted with large scale institutional reforms, are advised to opt
for a gradual approach. Because large scale institutional reforms typically
come with uncertainty surrounding the reform steps best fit for a particular
situation, policymakers are faced with a high probability of making mistakes.
We show that in such cases a gradual approach is best from a welfare point
of view. The basic intuition is simple: if you don’t know which way to run,
it may be wise to walk in order to limit the cost of having to return on your
steps.
Policymakers, however, are also concerned with maintaining power and
thus face political constraints. The message from our research is sobering for
big bang enthusiasts. The ex ante case for gradualism, on the other hand, is
extremely strong when we focus on welfare eﬀects delivered within the stan-
dard political cycle of four years. Ex post one may argue that it has become
clear whether a reversal occurred or not. If not, one may argue that grad-
ualism will turn out to be the wrong choice. However, taking into account
confidence intervals it is not possible to discriminate between both strategies
in the first four years, so choosing a big bang will not automatically guaran-
tee better results within the standard political framework. This is due to the
fact that early in transition a big bang entails important adjustment costs. In
case of a reversal welfare will be considerably lower under the big bang strat-
egy. Because voters lack the information to judge the policymaker based on
economic welfare, they can focus on the switch from negative to positive real
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GDP growth, which is observable. Policymakers that care about re-election
will then gamble for a big bang and hope to stay clear from reversals. This is
their only chance to maintain power because this strategy has a high likelihood
of delivering positive growth rates within the standard political cycle of four
years if no reversal occurs. Unfortunately, this turning point criterion does
not imply welfare maximisation. From a welfare point of view the big bang
gamble is a dangerous strategy, because if a reversal urges itself, the result will
be devastating. Politics and welfare could be reconciled when the policymaker
would be able to convey to voters the welfare implications of alternative policy
choices.
Our second set of results implies some conclusions with respect to FDI
policy. From the results in chapter two we know that FDI contributes positively
to GDP growth which suggest to tailor policies to attract as much as FDI as
possible. The results in chapter four warrant this optimism based on aggregate
data. First, foreign firms are probably more productive and contribute to
higher growth rates. It is not clear, however, whether the host country gains
much by it, because foreign firms may repatriate the bulk of their profits.
Whether or not domestic firms benefit from positive spillovers, depends on
their characteristics. It depends on their position in the production chain:
we find that foreign investment in sectors where local firms source their inputs
yield the highest positive eﬀects. It also depends on their absorptive capability,
the competition they face in their sector, the competition from imports, and
the presence on export markets. This suggests that it is important to ’prepare’
domestic firms for foreign entry and enable them to capture positive spillovers.
It might be argued that the fact that domestic firms that cannot cope with
foreign entry are driven out of the market is not necessarily bad. Indeed,
foreign entry can initiate a process of creative destruction. The question then
is whether it is optimal to achieve this by competition from multinationals?
In our view it is not. The suggested preparation stage for domestic firms can
achieve this and may bring more domestic firms to a level allowing them to cope
successfully with foreign entry. As such a complete wipeout of the domestic
firms is prevented. Foreign investment after the preparation stage then allows
domestic firms to further lift their performance.
How then to attract foreign investment? Overall our results suggest that in
the end it all boils down to sound policies. By policies, we mean both macro-
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economic policies aimed at stabilisation and long term growth, and reform
policy in the transformation from a planned to a market economy. We found
that foreign investment on the one hand reacts to the traditional determinants
such as market size, labour costs and quality, trade integration, and riskiness.
On the other hand foreign investment also reacts to a set of institutional deter-
minants specific to the transition process. From chapters one and two we also
know that institutional progress positively aﬀects market size, so both sets are
intertwined. Therefore a successful strategy for attracting FDI boils down to
sound policies at all levels and in all reform areas.
The implications of our results on the eﬀects privatization schemes on
FDI deserve some special attention. In the long run the specific privatiza-
tion method applied is of less importance because it is often only a first step
in a series of ownership changes, allowing foreigners to participate sooner or
later.7 Obviously in the short run, some methods are more inviting to foreign
investors than others. We find that direct sales (the state-owned firm is sold to
the highest bidder) have an immediate positive impact on foreign investment.
Non-direct methods do not decrease the equilibrium stock of FDI, but rather
serve as a signal that makes potential investors postpone their transaction and
slows down adjustment to the equilibrium FDI stock. As a consequence, direct
sales are preferred from a short-run FDI perspective if they are fair and open.
Finally, throughout our work we find important eﬀects of institutional de-
velopment and indications that progress in all reform areas is required for
durable welfare eﬀects. This confronts the so-calledWashington consensus that
reflects the policy recipe adhered by the IMF, the World Bank, and other in-
stitutions alike when their expertise was/is called upon. The consensus implies
swift reform with stabilisation and liberalization as key terms. The Washing-
ton consensus passes over the need for adequate underlying or accompanying
institutional development. For example, the advice to privatize former state-
owned enterprises should be accompanied by the advice to install a sound
competition policy. Otherwise former state monopolies merely transform into
private monopolies. Hardening the budget constraint requires a bankruptcy
law, but one must be able to enforce the law as well.
7It has been shown that ownership is what ultimately matters for firm performance.
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0.5 Further research
In chapters 1 and 2 we use an average indicator of reform because we are
mainly interested in the choice of reform speed. The use of a single indicator
allows for a clear and easy to interpret analysis of the optimal reform speed.
A lot of research and policy advice has been based on single indicators and
arguments based on specific reforms have often been carried through to the
transition process as a whole. Staehr (2003) performs a principal component
analysis of the individual EBRD indicators and finds that the first principal
component (PC1) explains about 80% of the total variation. All the individual
indicators have about equal positive loadings (between 0.32 and 0.37) on this
component. Therefore our average indicator is likely to do a good job in cap-
turing total reform eﬀorts. In the words of Staehr (2003):“PC1 captures 79.5%
of total variation in the initial eight reform variables and, hence, it is not with-
out merit that many studies use an overall reform variable simply calculated as
the sum of the EBRD reform indices.” Nevertheless, a disaggregated analysis
with individual reform indicators would be a valuable exercise. Especially in
the light of a new dataset developed by Campos and Horvath (2005) that be-
came recently available. They construct objective indicators of privatization,
internal, and external liberalization. The correlation between these subindica-
tors is positive, but far from one. The correlation coeﬃcient of internal and
external liberalization is 0.48, the coeﬃcient of internal liberalization and pri-
vatization is only 0.39, and the correlation between external liberalization and
privatization is 0.66. Given these figures, a disaggregated analysis is certainly
worthwhile.
Our results demonstrate the importance to think about reversals and to
take them into account. A detailed study of the causes of reversals is left for
further research. Since theoretical models as well as our own results point to
the interaction of reform and politics, a good starting point can be an analysis
of the political situation at the time of the reversal. Tommasi and Velasco
(1996) give some descriptive evidence of the impact of election outcomes on
the subsequent reform strategy. For a sample of 16 highly studied reforming
countries (including three CEE countries) they report election outcomes and
their impact upon the reform process. In only one out of the sixteen countries
reforms were reversed by the new government, in a small share of countries
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a change in political circumstances led to a slowdown in reform and in sev-
eral countries reforms were continued even after the opposition to the initial
reforming government came to power. Their starting point, however, is an
election outcome, whereas the reversals themselves rather should be taken as
starting point in our case.
Our partial adjustment approach to the equilibrium stock of FDI in chapter
3 does not allow for agglomeration eﬀects. It is not unimaginable that FDI
attracts further FDI. Theories of economic geography that suggest that firms
are drawn to the same locations because of positive externalities or ‘agglom-
eration eﬀects’ (see e.g. Krugman, 1991). Agglomeration economies are said
to emerge when new investors mimic past investment in choosing a location
in order to exploit positive externalities. Earlier investment may serve as a
signal of favourable conditions and reduces uncertainty. More importantly the
market potential of a specific location increases with the number of (foreign)
firms locating there. By locating close to other firms, new firms locate close to
their market since some other firms may require their products and the work-
ers of the other firms will buy their products. This obviously suggests the use
of regional data rather than country level data for testing the agglomeration
eﬀect. Barrel and Pain (1999) show that even only temporary diﬀerences in
national or regional characteristics can have permanent eﬀects on the location
of activities. A strategic asset motive further adds to the agglomeration ef-
fect. Since firms cannot take the risk of not being present in a specific location
when their competitors are they will also invest in that location. Other pos-
sible spillovers include technology spillovers and the availability of inputs and
specialized labour (cf. chapter 4). An agglomeration eﬀect would reveal itself
in our approach through its impact on equilibrium FDI. Today’s equilibrium
stock of FDI should then depend on yesterday’s stock of FDI. Temporary dif-
ferences would then have permanent eﬀects. In order to perform such a test
we need to apply an unobserved component model for FDI.
The first sections of chapter 4 suggests that results for spillovers from for-
eign firms may diﬀer across countries. A straightforward extension of our analy-
sis is therefore to analyse other countries in order to compare results. An inter-
esting question in this respect is whether there are systematic diﬀerences along
the level of development of a country. There are also some more fundamental
questions that still need to be addressed in the literature. First, the dynamic
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aspects of spillover eﬀects deserve some further research. The eﬀect of a multi-
national entrant will probably not last forever, as well as the eﬀect might not
manifest itself immediately, but only with some lag. A more detailed dataset
that includes the linkages firm by firm rather than the sector by sector ap-
proach based on input-output tables would be welcomed by the literature. We
assume equality of spillovers from all upstream and downstream sectors, but is
this assumption warranted? Finally, a related but equally important research
question is whether firms from developing countries become multinationals to
absorb technology in developed countries. And in the same line of thought:
Do multinationals repatriate ‘knowledge’ from their subsidiaries to their home
country?
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Chapter 1
Reform Reversals and Output
Growth in Transition Countries1
––––––––––––––––––
In this chapter we test whether reform reversals during transition carry an eco-
nomic cost. Reform is measured by an average reform index, while reform reversals
are characterized by a drop in the average reform index. In the standard empirical
framework the current level of reform aﬀects growth negatively, while the lagged
level aﬀects growth positively. We show that this non-linear eﬀect implies a counter-
intuitive, short-lived positive eﬀect of a reversal. In a simultaneous equation system
with growth and the level of reform as dependent variables we explicitly introduce
a reversal parameter. Empirical results suggest that reversals have an immediate
negative impact on real output growth. Controlling for the level of reform shows
that reversals are more costly at higher levels of reform.
––––––––––––––––––
1An adapted version of this chapter appeared in Economics of Transition, vol. 11(4),
pp. 649-69.
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1.1 Introduction
Since the start of the reform process in the early 1990s, economic performance
has varied widely among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE),
the Baltic States and the other countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU).
It was generally predicted that output would initially fall at the start of tran-
sition. It was also expected that the newly installed market mechanism would
drastically improve the allocation of production factors and quickly boost eco-
nomic growth. In most countries however, the U-shaped output paths did not
live up to the high expectations. Stiglitz (1999) argues that these unrealistic
expectations reveal just how poorly we understand the foundations of a market
economy as well as the dynamics of institutional reform processes.
Several empirical studies have analysed the variation in economic perfor-
mance. Most studies conclude that three categories of explanatory variables
account for most of the cross-country variation in output paths, namely macro-
economic stabilisation, initial conditions, and structural reform. This paper
adds to this literature by analysing the eﬀect of reform reversals. Reform re-
versals are measured by a drop in an average reform index (RI). This reform
index is calculated as a weighted average of the levels of the transition in-
dices developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD). The level of the index reflects the average policy stance with respect
to price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange liberalization, privatization,
restructuring and financial market reform. In a sample of 237 observations
there are 21 reversals. The non-linear eﬀect of reform found in the standard
empirical framework implies that -ceteris paribus- a reversal is associated with
a short-lived positive eﬀect. Only two to three years after the reversal its cu-
mulative contribution to growth becomes negative. This empirical implication
is in stark contrast with economic intuition.
In the theoretical literature reversal costs are attributed an important role
in several models. The presence of a negative net present value of a reversal is
crucial for gradualist strategies to be preferred over big bang strategies when
aggregate uncertainty is taken seriously (Roland, 2000). Should there be no
reversal costs, big bang strategies will always be optimal because there are no
costs of learning and thus never an advantage to early reversal.
We think that this contradiction is due to the fact that the empirical lit-
CHAPTER 1. REFORM REVERSALS AND OUTPUT GROWTH 3
erature fails to consider reversals. In this paper we test explicitly whether
reversals have an immediate negative impact on real output growth.2 We do
this by estimating a system that includes the impact of reversals. The system’s
specification, with real output growth and reform as endogenous variables, is
comparable to specifications found in recent literature (see e.g. Falcetti et
al., 2002). We find that reversals have an immediate negative impact on real
output growth, while earlier findings with respect to initial conditions, stabil-
isation, and the non-linear eﬀect of reform are confirmed. The impact of the
average reversal on economic growth amounts to 2.65%-points in lost growth.
Further results suggest that reversals are more costly in terms of lost growth
at higher levels of reform. Reversals at high levels of reform cost 3%-points
more in terms of lost growth than reversals at low levels of reform.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2 we review the relevant
theoretical literature. Section 1.3 discusses the empirical literature and shows
that in the standard empirical framework a reversal results in an insignifi-
cant eﬀect or even a short-lived positive eﬀect. Section 1.4 describes the data
and presents the empirical framework. Section 1.5 presents empirical results
and interprets the implied eﬀect of reversals on growth. Finally, section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Reform and Reform Reversals in the The-
oretical Literature
The large-scale reform process in the transition countries stressed the need to
better understand the political economy of policy choice and yielded a number
of models in this field. Rodrik (1995) builds a model of sectoral reallocation
to analyse the dynamics of preferences over economic policy. He shows that a
reform3, initially opposed by state-sector workers, may eventually gain support
for continuation from these state-sector workers. In his model a vote between
continuing the transition and returning to the status quo (a reversal), can only
lead to a reversal in the early stages of transition. Whether a reversal actually
2Throughout the chapter the ’immediate’ impact on real output growth is defined as the
impact of a reversal in the same year as it occurs.
3The reform is a decrease of the subsidy to state-sector workers in the low-productivity
sector financed by a tax on private-sector workers in the high productivity sector to allow
faster development of the private sector.
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occurs then depends on the way preferences are transformed into policy.
In the context of transition, there was consensus about the list of needed
reforms4, but the speed and sequencing of reform was heavily debated. Many
transition policy models focus on the choice between gradualism and big bang.
Transition as a process of large-scale reform does not only involve individual
uncertainty, but also a great deal of aggregate uncertainty. It is far from clear
whether the outcome of transition necessarily will be a copy of the West Ger-
man miracle. In Dewatripont and Roland (1995) the role of reversals is based
on the idea of aggregate uncertainty (cf. section 0.2.1). In their model, it
can be beneficial to return to a conservative platform in case of a negative
aggregate outcome of market-oriented reform. The cost of a reversal equals
the expected pay-oﬀ of reversing the reform and returning to the conserva-
tive platform. Since reversing a big bang to the conservative platform requires
a larger amount of reform to be undone, the reversal costs are higher than
in the gradualist case. Comparing big bang and gradualist strategies, these
high reversal costs are often considered an advantage ex post since they reduce
reversibility. However, considering the possibility of a negative aggregate out-
come may make the big bang strategy with its high reversal costs politically
infeasible. Gradualism on the other hand makes it easier to start reform be-
cause the cost of reversing after partial uncertainty resolution is lower. In the
presence of aggregate uncertainty gradualism allows a flexible approach to re-
forms with smaller costs of trial and error. Strong complementarities of reform
may harden instead of weaken the case for gradualism, since they give scope for
gradually building constituencies for further reform. Indeed, if initial reforms
have been successful the electorate may be more willing to accept less popular
reforms. More generally, Murrell (1992) makes an argument for gradualism in
the spirit of evolutionary economics. The process rather than the destination
is emphasized. Since there is little to say about the end point of transition,
the focus should be on learning about possible outcomes through the transition
strategy chosen. Roland (2000) develops diﬀerent models of transition, incor-
porating political constraints, aggregate uncertainty and complementarities.
4The essential elements of the structural reform process are described in Kornai (1994):
the move from a sellers’ to a buyers’ market by price liberalization and trade and foreign
exchange liberalization, and the enforcement of a hard budget constraint by means of priva-
tization, elimination of subsidy programs, and the creation and liberalization of a financial
market; Blanchard (1997) adds restructuring within surviving firms and reallocation of re-
sources from old to new activities to this list.
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In these models the presence of reversal costs is crucial for gradualism to dom-
inate a big bang strategy. Roland (2000) points to the crucial role of reversal
costs as costs of learning to be weighted against the benefits of learning: ”If
reversal costs are important for large-scale experiments, uncertainty will lead
to slowing down reform. Otherwise uncertainty can lead to accelerating it.”
Note that aggregate uncertainty about the outcome of reforms is not a
necessary condition to find reversals. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) discuss
the implementation of large-scale reform when only the distribution of gains
and losses from reform is uncertain. In a dynamic setting, reforms with ex
ante positive expected outcomes but ex post hurting the majority (uncertain
distribution), are initially accepted by the electorate only to be reversed in the
next period if the first period benefits exceed the reversal costs. Clearly if there
were no reversal costs, all reforms with ex ante expected positive outcomes
would be adopted. Higher reversal costs thus can -ceteris paribus- lead to the
rejection of more reforms with ex ante expected positive outcomes, provided
that there is uncertainty about the distribution.
1.3 Reform in the Empirical Literature
There is a vast amount of empirical work on the output performance of transi-
tion countries.5 These studies focus on three categories of explanatory variables
namely initial conditions, structural reform, and macroeconomic stabilisation.
Macroeconomic stabilisation in the form of consumer price stabilisation, of-
ten achieved through an exchange rate peg or budgetary discipline, is found
to be beneficial to economic growth (see De Melo et al., 1996, Fischer et al.,
1996a,b, and Loungani and Sheets, 1997). Although initial conditions account
to a substantial degree for the variation in economic performance at the start of
transition, recent panel data studies conclude that their importance diminishes
over time (see Berg et al., 1999, and Falcetti et al., 2002).
Concerning structural reform, De Melo et al. (1997) argue that the abil-
ity of transition countries to reallocate resources toward their best use and
to establish institutions conducive to this reallocation has been a major de-
5See a.o. Åslund et al. (1996), De Melo et al. (1996), Fischer et al. (1996a,b), De Melo
et al. (1997), Loungani and Sheets (1997), Krueger and Ciolko (1998), Berg et al. (1999),
Heybey and Murrell (1999), Wolf (1999), Popov (2000), and Falcetti et al. (2002).
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terminant of transition patterns. The idea is that the closer a country is to
a market economy, the more it benefits from the market’s growth generating
allocational eﬃciency. The speed of reform was heavily debated. Some were
proponents of a big-bang strategy (e.g. Sachs, 1993), while others advocated
a more gradual approach (e.g. Dewatripont and Roland, 1992a, b). De Melo
et al. (1996) constructed an aggregate reform index (RI) measuring reform
achieved in diﬀerent areas. Many studies analysed the impact of the cumula-
tive reform index (CRI) on output growth, interpreting it as a measure for the
speed of reform. Most of these studies find a significant positive impact of the
CRI on economic growth, interpreting this as evidence in favour of a big bang
strategy. Heybey and Murrell (1999) criticize the use and interpretation of the
CRI as indicator of ’speed’. They define the speed of reform as the average
growth in the level of the reform index (RI) since the start of transition. In
their cross-section estimation the speed of reform has no significant impact.
This reflects two opposing eﬀects: the gains from liberalization of entry of new
firms and the cost of dislocation in the existing state sector. They expect the
former to start dominating the latter as transition progresses. This is in line
with Berg et al. (1999) who show that a smaller negative impact of liberaliza-
tion on state sector performance is oﬀset by a larger positive impact on private
sector growth.
Since policy choices result from a politically constrained process aﬀected
by economic variables, they cannot be considered as fully exogenous decisions
(Campos and Coricelli, 2002). Clearly, the failure to take into account the feed-
back of growth to reform and the impact of initial conditions on reform will
bias the estimated impact of reform on growth. To tackle this problem Wolf
(1999) uses an instrumental variables approach. Heybey and Murrell (1999)
propose to estimate a system with both growth and the speed of reform as
endogenous variables. Falcetti et al. (2002) use a comparable system in a
panel framework, but focus on growth and the level of reform as endogenous
variables. The use of panel data also allows to test for dynamic eﬀects of re-
form. Selowsky and Martin (1997) and De Melo et al. (1997) find a robust
positive impact of lagged cumulated reform and a negative impact of the cur-
rent cumulated reform, reflecting an adjustment cost. Wolf (1999) and Falcetti
et al. (2002) find a significant impact of the lagged level of reform, while the
impact of current reform is insignificant. In general terms, the level of reform,
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measured by RI, enters a growth equation in the following way: αRIt+βRIt−1,
where the expectation is that α<0, β>0 and |α|<β. The negative eﬀect of cur-
rent reform reflects an adjustment cost. The positive eﬀect of lagged reform
(’stock’ eﬀect) reflects the idea that an economy closer to a market economy
will benefit more from the market mechanism, in particular through better re-
source allocation. This leads to improved growth performance. It is expected
that the stock eﬀect will dominate if it has reached a suﬃciently high level
(∼ |α|<β).6 Rewriting this expression as α∆RIt+(α+β)RIt−1, we observe
that new reforms (∆RIt) have an immediate cost in terms of growth but also
a lagged positive eﬀect through a higher level of reform (RIt−1) that aﬀects
growth positively (recall that |α|<β is expected). However with α<0 a reform
reversal, defined as ∆RIt<0, generates an instantaneous positive growth eﬀect
in period t, slowing down growth only the following year because of the lower
stock of reform (RIt will be ∆RIt lower than RIt−1). Depending on the relative
magnitude of α and α+β, the overall or cumulated eﬀect of a reversal becomes
negative only a few years after the reversal occurred. Should α be insignificant,
then there would be no eﬀect on growth the year the reversal occurs. In the
empirical part of this paper we explicitly address the case of a reform reversal
in a system explaining growth and reform simultaneously.
1.4 Data and Empirical Framework
The usual caveats about data on transition countries apply. Especially early in
transition the decline in output is believed to be overestimated. Since statis-
tical systems were originally designed to collect information from state-owned
enterprises they probably failed to capture large parts of the emerging private
sector. Additionally, the use of pre-transition relative prices resulted in low
weights for newly emerging activities (Berg et al., 1999). Furthermore, both
newly emerging activities and existing firms had an incentive to underreport
output and sales to avoid taxes and regulation (Havrylyshyn et al., 1998).
6Consider the following example to clarify this statement. Suppose α = -5 and β = 8. If
the lagged level of reform is 1, while the current level is 2; then the contribution to growth
of reform is -5*2 + 8*1 = -2. The overall contribution is thus negative. Now, should the
lagged level of reform be 2, while the current level is 3; then the contribution to growth
is -5*3 + 8*2 = +1. Hence the assertion that the stock eﬀect dominates provided it has
reached a suﬃciently high level.
CHAPTER 1. REFORM REVERSALS AND OUTPUT GROWTH 8
Studies such as Loungani and Sheets (1997) and Selowsky and Martin (1997)
that use adjusted GDP data conclude that their results on growth determi-
nants are not sensitive to the corrections to the data. Bearing these caveats
in mind, we proceed using oﬃcial data. Detailed data definitions and data
sources are given in Appendix 1.A.
The aggregate reform index (RI) is constructed as a weighted average of
eight transition indices as found in the EBRD’s Transition Report. The indices
can take values between 1 and 4.3 with steps of about 1
3
. A score of 4.3 is a
situation comparable to a market economy; a value of 1 denotes a centrally
planned system. These indicators reflect the progress of reform with respect to
i) price liberalization (weight 0.3), ii) trade and foreign exchange liberalization
(weight 0.3), and iii) privatization, restructuring and financial market reform
(weight 0.4) (see also De Melo et al., 1996). The former two are directly
available from the EBRDTransition Report, the latter is the average of another
six indices. A reversal is defined as a drop in the aggregate reform index, i.e.
RIt-RIt−1<0. In our dataset covering about ten years of transition experience
for 25 countries, there are 21 reversals in a sample of 237 observations. In
about half of the countries considered at least one reversal took place during
the course of transition up to now. Appendix 1.B provides more details on the
indices and the reversals.
The EBRD transition indices are not perfect because they are subjective
ratings. The ratings reflect the EBRD’s assessment of both the eﬀectiveness
and extensiveness of policy measures, based on sometimes incomplete or im-
perfect information.7 Moreover macroeconomic performance has often already
been observed at the moment of assessment, which is a source of possible endo-
geneity. Campos and Horvath (2005) list four potential problems: i) outsiders
do not know exactly the underlying variables, ii) outsiders do not know how
the underlying variables transform into the indices, iii) the underlying vari-
ables consist of both policy inputs as well as outcomes, and iv) the indices
have sometimes been revised without obvious changes in the underlying data.
Until recently, no alternatives were available. However, Campos and Horvath
(2005) made a major eﬀort in establishing a rich dataset that allows them to
compute more objective measures of reform that overcome some of the prob-
7See Annex 2.1 in the 2000 edition of the Transition Report for a detailed discussion of
the issues related to the indicators, with special attention for the early period 1989-93.
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lems of the EBRD indices. In appendix 1.C we reran the regressions presented
in table 1.1 with the Campos-Horvath data. These regressions confirm our
findings based on the EBRD-indicators.
All data were rearranged in ’transition timing’. In order to identify com-
mon elements across countries of the post-communist economic cycle, we have
to take into account the cycle’s diﬀerent starting points. Transition year 1 (t)
is then defined as the year in which communism and central planning were
definitively abandoned. This is 1990 for Croatia, Hungary, FYR Macedonia,
Poland and Slovenia; 1991 for Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Re-
public and Romania. For the Baltic States and the countries of the Former
Soviet Union 1992 is taken to be the first year of transition.
Since both reforms and growth follow a clear time pattern, it is possible
that the correlation between them is spurious. We control for the common
time pattern by introducing a uniform quadratic time trend. Country specific
eﬀects are used rather than the initial condition clusters. The correlation be-
tween them is however fairly high (cf. infra). Time-varying eﬀects of the initial
conditions are accounted for, since their impact can be expected to decrease
as transition progresses. We use the initial condition clusters of De Melo et al.
(1997) who reduced a set of eleven conditions to two clusters by means of a
principal component analysis. The first cluster (IC1) is interpreted as an index
of macroeconomic distortions at the beginning of transition and unfamiliarity
with a market environment, while the second cluster (IC2) is interpreted as an
index of the level of socialist development and associated distortions prior to
transition (IC2). The clusters express cross-country diﬀerences and the values
of IC1 and IC2 do not have a direct interpretation. In general, the macro-
economic distortions were much larger in FSU-countries and the Baltic States
than in CEE-countries. The picture on socialist development and associated
distortions is less clear.
To deal with the endogeneity bias, we resort to a 3SLS estimation of the
following systemwhere growth and reform are jointly determined and aﬀect one
another. The framework is only loosely related to the model in Dewatripont
and Roland (1995) (cf. section 0.2.1). However, the idea of testing reversal
costs is fully inspired by their model and attempts to bring empirics more in
line with theory.
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∆GDPi,t = α0 + αi + α1RIi,t + α2RIi,t−1 + α3∆RIi,tDi,t
+α4t+ α5t2 + α6tIC1 + α7tIC2 + α8STABi,t + εi,t
(1.1)
RIi,t = β0 + βi + β1∆GDPi,t + β2∆GDPi,t−1 + β3FSi,t
+β4tIC1 + β5tIC2 + ηi,t
System (1.1) is closely related to the panel specification in Falcetti et al.
(2002). If α3 is set to zero, we obtain the ’standard’ empirical framework. Real
GDP-growth (domestic currency) is related to a constant, a country eﬀect,
a quadratic time trend, IC1 and IC2 multiplied by a linear time trend, a
stabilisation variable, current and lagged reform and finally a reversal variable
constructed as ∆RIi,tDi,t. The dummy variable Di,t takes the value 1 if a
reversal occurs and 0 otherwise and∆RIi,t is the change in the aggregate reform
index, implying that the cost of a reversal in terms of lost growth is related
to the reversal’s magnitude. Next to having an eﬀect by itself, the reversal
variable corrects for the fact that part of the positive stock eﬀect at the time of
the reversal originates from an inappropriate reform. As stabilisation variable
we choose the fiscal balance. Campos and Coricelli (2002) argue that inflation
is rather a policy result, whereas the fiscal balance refers more to the policy
itself. This is in line with Fischer et al. (1996b) who show that smaller fiscal
deficits are especially important in reducing inflation. An empirical argument is
given by Berg et al. (1999) who show that the fiscal balance is more diﬃcult to
reject than inflation in modelling transition countries’ output paths. Falcetti
et al. (2002) also use the fiscal balance as stabilisation proxy; the use of
diﬀerent stabilisation measures does not significantly aﬀect results. The level
of the reform index is specified as a function of a country specific eﬀect, current
and lagged real GDP growth, initial conditions interacted with a time trend,
and the freedom status (FS). The freedom status is calculated as the average
of the ratings on the Freedom House political liberties and the civil rights
indices. The rating of the original indicators was inversed so that the value of
our variable increases as political liberties and civil rights increase. Therefore
we expect a positive value for β3.
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1.5 Results and interpretation
Table 1.1 presents the results of the 3SLS estimation of system (1.1). We treat
GDP growth, reform and the measure of stabilisation as endogenous and use
lagged values as instruments.8 For instruments to be useful we require them to
be correlated with the endogenous variables, but at the same time they should
be uncorrelated with the error terms. At the bottom of table 1.1 we present
the R2 of the first stage regressions and an F test for joint significance of the
included variables. Given the use of lagged values as instruments, we also
specify for each equation a test for serial correlation. We present the familiar
Durbin-Watson statistic, generalized to fixed eﬀect model by Bhargava et al.
(1982).
Specification [1] presents the estimates of (1.1) without reversals and will
serve as a benchmark.9 Results confirm the results of Falcetti et al. (2002), who
use a closely related specification. The impact of the current level of reform is
negative and insignificant, whereas the impact of lagged reform is positive and
strongly significant. As measure of stabilisation the fiscal balance is correctly
signed and significant. An improvement in the fiscal balance (’stabilisation’)
leads to a better growth performance. The common time pattern, identified by
the quadratic time trend is also significant and accounts for part of the U-shape.
Turning to the initial conditions, the level impact of IC1 and IC2 is reflected in
the country specific eﬀects. In particular the correlation of the country eﬀects
with IC1 in the real growth-equation is as high as -0.92, while the correlation
with IC2 is only 0.10. Only IC1 has a significant time-varying impact. Since the
values of IC1 range from -1.47 to +1.27 and larger values reflect worse initial
conditions, the increasing impact over time indicates that countries with a
worse starting position are catching up later (convergence eﬀect). There is no
evidence of a time-varying impact of IC2. Turning to the reform equation we
observe a strongly significant positive impact of contemporaneous growth on
the level of reform. The impact of lagged growth is negative but smaller in
absolute value and not significant. With respect to the initial conditions, again
8Berg et al. (1999) use dates when agreements with the IMF on stabilisation programs
have been concluded as instruments. They indicate that instrumenting makes little or no
diﬀerence.
9In Merlevede (2000) we show that results are unaﬀected if subsamples of CEE countries,
including the Baltic States, and FSU countries are considered.
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 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
∆GDP      
trend 3.202 
[2.16] 
4.014 
[2.09] 
4.035 
[2.21] 
5.228 
[2.40] 
3.744 
[2.13] 
trend² -0.128 
[-1.90] 
-0.163 
[-1.92] 
-0.168 
[-2.00] 
-0.231 
[-2.23] 
-0.151 
[-1.94] 
trend*IC1 0.706 
[4.65] 
0.782 
[4.83] 
0.493 
[2.51] 
0.365 
[1.58] 
0.766 
[4.86] 
trend*IC2 0.138 
[0.63] 
0.110 
[0.49] 
0.045 
[0.19] 
0.003 
[0.01] 
0.122 
[0.55] 
RI -5.139 
[-0.59] 
-8.347 
[-0.77] 
-14.239 
[-1.17] 
-17.860 
[-1.40] 
-7.460 
[-0.73] 
RI(-1) 9.334 
[2.46] 
10.788 
[2.24] 
11.885 
[2.43] 
12.666 
[2.56] 
10.514 
[2.31] 
reversal*∆RI  
 
25.470 
[1.88] 
32.239 
[2.12] 
37.593 
[2.26] 
 
reversal* 
∆RI* RI(-1) 
    7.982 
[1.97] 
fiscal balance 0.231 
[2.46] 
0.223 
[2.30] 
  0.221 
[2.35] 
inflation   
 
 -3.449 
[-2.34] 
-3.597 
[-2.43] 
 
inflation(-1)  
 
  -0.976 
[-1.62] 
 
      
R-square 0.63 0.62 0.58 0.55 0.63 
Chi-square 426.63 411.85 373.72 346.84 420.45 
Panel-DW 1.88 1.92 1.91 1.96 1.91 
      
RI      
trend*IC1 -0.034 
[-3.75] 
-0.035 
[-3.78] 
-0.035 
[-3.72] 
-0.035 
[-3.64] 
-0.035 
[-3.78] 
trend*IC2 -0.012 
[-0.93] 
-0.013 
[-0.96] 
-0.013 
[-0.99] 
-0.012 
[-0.93] 
-0.013 
[-0.96] 
∆GDP 0.056 
[13.91] 
0.057 
[13.83] 
0.058 
[13.70] 
0.059 
[13.39] 
0.057 
[13.89] 
∆GDP(-1) -0.003 
[-1.38] 
-0.003 
[-1.34] 
-0.005 
[-1.72] 
-0.007 
[-2.06] 
-0.003 
[-1.33] 
freedom status 0.813 
[2.53] 
0.788 
[2.43] 
0.834 
[2.54] 
0.834 
[2.57] 
0.793 
[2.45] 
      
R-square 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.71 
Chi-square 770.15 764.45 739.14 712.53 766.94 
Panel-DW 1.83 1.84 1.87 1.82 1.83 
 
First stage regressions: R² / F test  
∆GDP 0.63/11.0*** 0.64/11.0*** 0.64/11.0*** 0.66/11.5*** 0.64/10.9*** 
RI 0.95/117.4*** 0.95/117.4*** 0.95/117.4*** 0.95/117.4*** 0.95/114.8*** 
Stabilization 0.62/10.2*** 0.62/10.2*** 0.67/10.7*** 0.67/12.3*** 0.62/9.9*** 
N 237 237 237 236 237 
Note. i) Fixed country effects are included in all regressions but not reported; ii)Z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses; iii) The Chi-square statistic indicates the overall significance of the model; 
 
Table 1.1: Growth and reform determinants - 3SLS results
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 r r+1 r+2 r+3 r+4 
reversal      
-0.025 0.13 0.02 -0.08 -0.19 -0.29 
 -0.43 -0.49 -0.55 -0.61 -0.67 
-0.050 0.26 0.05 -0.16 -0.37 -0.58 
 -0.86 -0.98 -1.10 -1.22 -1.34 
-0.100 0.51 0.09 -0.33 -0.74 -1.16 
 -1.71 -1.96 -2.20 -2.44 -2.69 
-0.155 0.80 0.15 -0.50 -1.15 -1.80 
 -2.65 -3.03 -3.41 -3.79 -4.17 
-0.300 1.54 0.28 -0.98 -2.23 -3.49 
 -5.14 -5.87 -6.60 -7.33 -8.07 
-0.700 3.60 0.66 -2.28 -5.21 -8.15 
 -11.99 -13.69 -15.40 -17.11 -18.82 
 
Table 1.2: Cumulated contribution to growth of a reversal based on the esti-
mations without and with (bold figures) a reversal variable
only IC1 has a significant time-varying impact. The impact is negative in this
case, implying a divergence between countries with good and bad (negative and
positive) initial conditions. IC1 thus continues to influence growth negatively
through its impact on reform, while the direct impact is diminishing over time.
Finally the freedom status has the expected eﬀect, i.e. countries with more
civil liberties and political rights achieve a higher level of reform.
Specification [2] explicitly introduces the reversal concept. Coeﬃcients are
fairly stable both with respect to magnitude and statistical significance. The
coeﬃcients on current and lagged reform in the real growth equation increase
somewhat in absolute value; current reform remains insignificant. The reversal
parameter itself is positive and significant (z-statistic 1.88). Specifications [3]
and [4] investigate the sensitivity of the estimates to the stabilisation proxy.
Using inflation, or a combination of current and lagged inflation, results in a
further increase in the absolute value of the coeﬃcients on current and lagged
reform, the reversal coeﬃcient increases as well. The reversal coeﬃcient is
significant at the 5%-level.
Table 1.2 presents a first look at the reversal eﬀect and gives an idea of
how the impact of a reversal varies with diﬀerent magnitudes of it. We per-
form a partial analysis here and focus solely on the ∆GDP-equation in (1.1).
Simulations of the full system under diﬀerent assumptions of policy speed and
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reversal occurrence are analysed in chapter two in more detail. Row headings
in table 1.2 then denote the magnitude of the reversal. Column headings list
the ’reversal timing’, with r the year of reversal. The table entries give the
cumulative eﬀect of a reversal up to n years after the reversal. This eﬀect is cal-
culated as follows. First current and lagged reform in the real growth equation
of (1.1) are rewritten as α1∆RIi,t+(α1 + α2)RIt−1+α3∆RIi,tDRI,i,t. This allows
the decomposition in an immediate impact α1∆RIi,t+α3∆RIi,tDRI,i,t, and an
impact over time through the stock of reform (α1 + α2)RIi,t−1. This implicitly
assumes that a reversal is ’lost forever’, since in every future period the stock
of reform would have been higher without the reversal of reform. The entries
in table 1.2 are then calculated as α1∆RIt+n(α1 + α2)∆RIt+α3∆RIi,tDRI,i,t
where n is the number of years since a reversal occurred10. The first line
accompanying every reversal magnitude in the row headings in table 1.2 are
based on the estimated parameters from the baseline specification [1], with
α3=0. Bold figures on the second line accompanying a reversal magnitude are
based on the parameters from reversal specification [2] of table 1.1. The entries
show contributions in %-points of a reversal to the real growth rate. In the
baseline specification, a reversal is associated with a short-lived positive eﬀect,
lasting two periods. The average reversal of -0.155 increases the growth rate
with 0.8%-points. From two years after the reversal (r + 2) the lower stock of
reform starts to dominate and the cumulative eﬀect of the reversal becomes
negative. In the reversal specification (the bold lines) reversals have an imme-
diate negative impact in period r. The contribution of the average reversal of
-0.155 to the growth rate is now -2.65%-points instead of +0.8%-points. The
diﬀerence in the immediate impact of reversals on growth between the baseline
specification and the reversal specification depends on the magnitude of the
reversal and ranges from ±0.5 to ±15%-points. Since α1 + α2 in specification
[1] exceeds α1 + α2 in specification [2], the cumulative eﬀect of a reversal in
the baseline specification will eventually catch up with the cumulative eﬀect
of a reversal in the reversal specification. This takes however fourteen years to
happen. The main conclusion is that if reversals are explicitly included in the
specification, they have an immediate negative impact on economic growth.
Column [5] in table 1.1 tests whether reversals are more costly in terms
10e.g. at r + 2, n = 2; at r, n = 0.
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stock of reform 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 
until r -0.70 -1.32 -1.94 -2.56 -3.17 -3.79 
until r+1 -1.17 -1.79 -2.41 -3.03 -3.65 -4.27 
until r+2 -1.65 -2.26 -2.88 -3.50 -4.12 -4.74 
until r+3 -2.12 -2.74 -3.36 -3.97 -4.59 -5.21 
until r+4 -2.59 -3.21 -3.83 -4.45 -5.07 -5.69 
 
Table 1.3: Cumulated contribution to growth of a reversal: eﬀects of the at-
tained stock of reform
of lost growth at higher levels of reform.11 We test this by interacting the
reversal dummy both with the magnitude of the reversal (∆RIt) and with the
level of reform (RIt−1). The coeﬃcient on this variable is significant at the 5%
level12 and is correctly signed. All other coeﬃcients remain stable. Table 1.3
shows how an average reversal of 0.155 aﬀects real GDP growth at diﬀerent
levels of achieved reform. The assumed level of reform at the time of reversal
is indicated in the column headings. Comparing the first and the last column,
we see that a reversal at a reform level of 4.00 costs 3.1%-points more in terms
of lost growth than at a reform level of 1.50.13
How do these empirical results relate to the theoretical discussion concern-
ing the choice between gradualism and big bang in section 1.2? In terms of
our empirical framework, this choice is determined by the comparison of their
cumulative eﬀects on real output growth. Roland (2000) indicates that the ex-
istence of reversal costs is crucial for gradualist strategies to dominate big bang
strategies in the presence of aggregate uncertainty. In our framework transition
is measured as the evolution of a reform index from 1 to 4.3. If there would be
no uncertainty about the reforms, the first best is always to have a big bang,
whether you include a reversal or not. Indeed an immediate maximal reform
jump of 3.3 dominates all other transition paths with respect to real output
growth, because this strategy maximizes the positive stock eﬀect. Irrespective
of whether one allows for reversals or not, a big bang is always better than
gradualism. This holds for [1] to [5].14
11Negative confidence eﬀects are likely to be larger in more advanced countries where more
agents are more actively involved in the economy.
12Comparing results in [5] with those in [2] (both use the fiscal balance as proxy for
stabilization), the z-statistic is considerably higher.
13As transition continues, this diﬀerence remains constant since in all cases the stock is
0.155 lower than it could have been.
14Note that in the absence of aggregate uncertainty, a reversal is unlikely to occur since the
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However, if there is uncertainty the interpretation changes. Market economies
are characterized by a set of core characteristics but many varieties exist. A
score of 4.3 can be interpreted as ’a score equivalent to a market economy’,
but is does not tell you which market economy exactly. In this sense more
reform is not always better if it is of the wrong type. This line of thought
brings us closer to the interpretation of reform as finding out about possible
alternatives. A reversal during the transition is then part of a trial and error
process in the search for the most appropriate type of market economy. When
we interpret the return to a conservative platform put forward in Dewatripont
and Roland (1995) as a reversal to a specific level of the reform index, then
the magnitude of the reversal and hence its cost will be larger under a big
bang than under gradualism. Since a big bang strategy at a certain point in
time is characterized by a higher stock of reform than a gradualist strategy,
this is only reinforced by the finding in specification [5] that a reversal is more
costly at higher levels of reform. In short, our analysis implies that rever-
sals are more costly under a big bang strategy than under gradualism, which
boosts the case for gradualism. Comparing the limited impact of a reversal
in the standard framework with our results, the strongly negative impact of a
reversal strengthens the case for gradualism.
1.6 Conclusions
Previous analysis showed that the evolution to a market system is one of the
central elements in the transitional phase. The closer to a market system,
the more beneficial eﬀects on growth are expected. In the literature it is
found that current reform aﬀects growth negatively, while lagged reform aﬀects
growth positively and eventually dominates. We showed that the non-linear
eﬀect of reform in the standard empirical framework implies -ceteris paribus-
that a reversal generates a short-lived positive, or at best an insignificant,
contribution to growth. We think this may be due to the inadequacy of the
standard empirical framework.
In our empirical framework we explicitly account for reform reversals in a
superior end point is known. Furthermore, since gains are probably high enough, possible
losers can be compensated if there is individual uncertainty (cf. Fernandez and Rodrik
(1991)). In this case, the big bang strategy has also the additional advantage that the high
reversal costs make a reversal politically less feasible.
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simultaneous equation system with real GDP growth and the level of reform
as endogenous variables. Our sample contains 21 reversals upon 237 obser-
vations, pointing to the relevance of reversals during transition. Generally,
earlier findings are confirmed. With respect to the reversal case, our results
suggest that a reversal generates an immediate negative contribution to real
output growth, contrary to the implied positive eﬀect in the standard frame-
work. The immediate contribution of a reversal of average magnitude to the
growth rate is -2.65%-points. In the standard framework the same reversal in-
creases the growth rate with 0.8%-points. Only two years later the lower stock
of reform starts to dominate and the overall eﬀect of the reversal becomes neg-
ative. Further tests suggest that a reversal is more harmful at higher levels of
reform. A reform reversal of average magnitude at a high level of reform costs
about 3%-points extra in growth terms compared to the same reversal at a low
level of reform.
From a theoretical point of view, the importance of reversals lies in the
existence of reversal costs. These costs are crucial for gradualist strategies to
dominate big bang strategies in the presence of aggregate uncertainty. Our
empirical framework implies that reversals are more costly under a big bang
strategy than under gradualism, which boosts the case for gradualism. Com-
paring the limited impact of a reversal in the standard framework with our
results, the strongly negative impact of a reversal strengthens the case for
gradualism. In chapter two we continue with a more detailed analysis of the
choice between big bang and gradualism in the light of our empirical findings.
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Appendix 1.A Variables description and data
sources
Description
∆GDP Real GDP growth, domestic currency, annual percentage change
FB Fiscal balance, consolidated balance of general government,
variable is negative if the balance is in deficit
INF End year inflation, transformed as ln(1+(Inflation/100))
RI Reform index, see paper/Appendix 1.B for construction
D Reversal dummy =1 if RIt-RIt−1<0
IC1,2 Initial condition clusters
FS Freedom Status, average of political rights and civil liberties indexes;
index ranges from 1 (free) to 7 (not free), original rating is inversed and
rescaled (1=free; 0.14=not free)
see also www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology.htm
Data Sources
∆GDP IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (October 2002)
FB EBRD Transition Report
INF EBRD Transition Report
RI Own calculations based on indicators in EBRD Transition Report
D idem
IC1,2 De Melo et al. (1997)
FS Freedom House
CHAPTER 1. REFORM REVERSALS AND OUTPUT GROWTH 22
Appendix 1.B Reform reversals
A reversal is defined as a downgrading of a country’s score on our reform indi-
cator (RIt-RIt−1<0). Following De Melo et al. (1996) the reform indicator is
constructed as a weighted average of three subindexes reflecting the progress of
reform with respect to i) price liberalization (weight 0.3), ii) trade and foreign
exchange liberalization (weight 0.3), and iii) privatisation, restructuring and
financial market reform (weight 0.4). The former two are directly available
from the EBRD Transition Report and the latter is the average of the follow-
ing indices: small- and large-scale privatisation, enterprise reform, competition
policy, banking sector reform, and reform of non-banking financial institutions.
The EBRD reports scores for the single indices, which can take values between
1 and 4.3 with steps of about 1
3
. Our sample contains 21 reversals upon a total
237 observations. The value of a reversal varies between -0.02 and -0.70, the
average magnitude is -0.155, and the median is -0.090. Our reversal definition
implies that a reversal can be due to a reversal in one or more subcategories.
It is also possible that a small reversal in one subcategory is compensated for
by progress in other subcategories. The latter is the case in Azerbaijan (1999),
Latvia (1997), Lithuania (1997), and Romania (1997).
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Country year EBRD-index
Belarus 1996 large scale privatisation, banking sector reform
1997 forex and trade liberalisation, enterprise reform
1998 price liberalisation
1999 price liberalisation
Bulgaria 1995 price liberalisation
Kazakhstan 1999 forex and trade liberalisation
Kyrgyzstan 1999 banking sector reform
Latvia 1998 banking sector reform
Romania 1996 forex and trade liberalisation
1998 banking sector reform
Russia 1998 price liberalisation, forex and trade liberalisation,
banking sector reform, non-banking fin. institutions
1999 enterprise reform, banking sector reform
Slovak Republic 1997 forex and trade liberalisation, enterprise reform
Tajikistan 1993 price liberalisation
Turkmenistan 1998 large scale privatisation
2000 enterprise reform
Ukraine 1998 forex and trade liberalisation
Uzbekistan 1997 price liberalisation, forex and trade liberalisation
1998 price liberalisation
1999 forex and trade liberalisation
2000 enterprise reform
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• Belarus 1996 - index private entry in markets (large scale privatisation,
banking sector reform)
Already in 1993 Belarus launched a privatisation program for large state-
owned enterprises. In 1996 however, only 20% of the program’s total
number of enterprises had been ’transformed’ into joint stock compa-
nies, in which the government initially owned 100% of the shares. Gen-
uine privatisation with majority ownership and decision-making powers
transferred to private investors had not really been taking place. The
1996 privatisation program stated that shares were to be sold to the
population for vouchers that had been distributed in 1994. Early 1996
registration of enterprises was suspended, however, so that a change in
the ownership structure could not be registered. This measure eﬀectively
suspended the privatisation process. Additionally new companies could
also not be registered any longer.
In 1996 the four largest banks were still controlled by the state. Although
foreign and joint-venture banks were allowed to operate, the regulatory
regime was not well defined and few foreign banks had applied for a li-
cence. Bank supervision was also weak. In this context the government
continued to intervene in the banking sector. In 1996 the National Bank
of Belarus (NBB) and some commercial banks were requested to ear-
mark credits to some sectors of the economy, in particular agriculture
and housing. During this year directed credits provided to agriculture
at half of the monthly refinance rate accounted for 77% of total directed
credits.
• Belarus 1997 - index of private entry in markets (enterprise reform) and
index of trade and exchange rate regime
Progress with privatisation remained cumbersome (cf. 1996). Five large
enterprises, explicitly targeted for privatisation in 1997, were not priva-
tised. Successive annual privatisation programmes approved since 1993
had always fallen short of their targets. Most of the privatisations of large
state-owned enterprises had been to management and employees. Ma-
jority ownership and the transfer of decision-making powers to private
investors did not take place. The government intervened in firms’ capital
and investment decisions and in the setting of price and production tar-
gets. In 1997 the government borrowed BRB 500 billion from the NBB
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to write oﬀ energy arrears accumulated by state-owned enterprises. Nev-
ertheless, enterprise arrears to the budget increased in 1997, with profit
tax arrears more than doubling during this year. Early 1998 commercial
banks were ordered by the government to open a BRB 2 trillion sub-
sidised credit line to agricultural enterprises on top of the allocation of
BRB 0.5 trillion of soft credits.
In April 1996 the Minsk Interbank Currency Exchange (MICE) was na-
tionalised and put under the direct control of the NBB. January 1997
a directive issued by the NBB limited purchases of hard currency and
Russian roubles at the MICE. Furthermore the NBB reintroduced con-
vertibility restrictions. Exporters were now required to surrender 40% of
their foreign exchange earnings to the state at a highly overvalued ex-
change rate. During 1997 there was also a 107% increase in net domestic
credit by the National Bank of Belarus. The currency corridor vis-à-vis
the dollar (established in January 1996, since April 1996 the nominal
exchange rate was allowed to depreciate within a pre-established band)
had to abandoned in 1997. Additionally government eﬀorts to maintain
artificially low interest rates (interest rates in commercial banks were
controlled by the government through the NBB) contributed to large
capital flight to Russia, where interest rates were higher (in Belarus in-
terest rates were negative in real terms).
• Belarus 1998 - index of price liberalisation
Following the 1997 increase in domestic credit, the Belarussian rouble
plunged by 30%in March 1998. Lacking adequate foreign reserves, the
National Bank of Belarus was unable to stabilise the Belarussian rouble.
This led the government to pursue a range of administrative interventions
in the market (replacing existing informal price controls) to prevent fur-
ther price increases (and further devaluation). The government ordered
both public and private enterprises to return prices to their pre-crisis
level and banned any further price increases above 2% a month. Dur-
ing 1998 numerous regulations and restrictions on currency trade were
imposed and subsequently lifted at the discretion of the authorities, e.g.
exporters required a special permit from the authorities for a number of
goods, including some basic food and consumer products.
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• Belarus 1999 - index of price liberalisation
During 1999 price controls were further tightened in an attempt to curb
still accelerating inflation. In May 1999 a presidential decree banned
any price increase that was not compensated for by measures of social
protection, and mandated the Council of Ministers and the NBB to set
annual limits for price indices. The decree also re-introduced state price
regulation for a wide range of goods and services, including products
and services supplied by monopolies, rents and basic foods and spirits.
The state thus continued to rely on price controls as means of limiting
inflation and allocating resources. Although this resulted in a slow-down
of inflation, inflation in Belarus remained the highest in all CIS countries,
increasing far above the 2% monthly target.
• Bulgaria 1995 - index of price liberalisation
After an initial sweeping liberalisation of prices in 1991 covering about
90% of the consumer basket, price controls were reintroduced. In 1995,
prices covering only about 54% of the consumer basket were free of ad-
ministrative controls. Fixed prices applied to energy products15, post
and telecom, and tobacco products, and ceiling prices to most fuels. The
monitoring of profit margins of both producers and traders applied to
goods declared to be of vital importance to the living standards of the
population (this includes basic food products, passenger transportation
and certain non-food products as e.g. pharmaceuticals). Most impor-
tantly, a Price Law was passed by parliament enabling the government
to introduce (further) price controls at its own discretion. The admin-
istrative structure for price controls was strengthened further in a 1996
initiative envisaging local structures and a larger number of controllers
(500 inspections in July 1996 alone).
• Kazakhstan 1999 - index of trade and foreign exchange liberalisation
In early 1999 Kazakhstan imposed an import ban on selected Russian
goods and 200% tariﬀs on similar items from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbek-
istan. Late 1999 the restrictions were lifted for the former two countries,
whereas they remained in place for Uzbekistan. This backtracking in
15e.g. electricity prices remained among the lowest in the world, even after an increase of
25-38% in September 1995.
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trade liberalisation created however tensions with neighbouring coun-
tries. The introduction of product norms, such as a dual Russian and
Kazakh language label, are also considered an implicit trade barrier by
importers. Additionally, as part of the April 1999 devaluation package,
a 50% export surrender requirement was temporarily introduced (the
requirement was lifted again end 1999).
• Kyrgyzstan 1999 - index of private entry in markets (banking sector re-
form)
An exchange rate depreciation and bank failures led to the collapse of
the fragile Kyrgyz financial system (a.o. due to weak bank supervision
and under-capitalisation (e.g. very low minimum capital requirements)).
Five of the largest banks were either placed under conservatorship by
the central bank or were liquidated in the first half of 1999. Two more
banks were added to this list later on. Several banks had a large expo-
sure to the state gas company that was aﬀected by a large-scale fraud at
the beginning of 1999. The failure to recognise and to respond to this
problem revealed the weak supervision capabilities of the Central Bank.
As a result of the collapse of the financial system, access to new credit by
the private sector became virtually non-existent. During 1999 the share
of loans classified as substandard, doubtful or losses also rose from 7%
to 25%.
• Latvia 1998 - index of private entry in markets (banking sector reform)
The high Russian exposure of some Latvian banks led to sharp losses
in the aftermath of the Russian crisis. Operations of two smaller banks
were suspended, while the ninth largest bank went bankrupt. Early
1999 the operations of the Rigas Commercial Bank (the fifth largest
bank) also were suspended and a court declared the bank insolvent. In
March the third largest bank, Rigas Komercbanka, was declared insolvent
and closed. In response to the crisis, the central bank strengthened
regulatory requirements for banks (e.g. consolidated reporting, loan loss
provisioning, and maximum permissible exposures to borrowers in non-
OECD countries).
• Romania 1996 - index of trade and foreign exchange liberalisation
Enterprises’ access to foreign exchange became more restricted in 1996.
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The lei, which was floating, had been oﬃcially convertible for the purpose
of foreign trade transactions and for repatriation of capital and profits
of foreign investors. In August 1994 an interbank foreign exchange mar-
ket was launched. From July 1995 onwards, foreign banks with local
branches were granted permission to operate as dealers on this market.
Exposure was limited both for dealers and brokers. In an attempt to
control the downward tendency of the lei the authorities started to im-
pose increasingly tight restrictions on enterprises’ access to conversion of
lei into foreign currency and on the foreign currency operations of com-
mercial banks in 1996. From March 1996 onwards only four banks could
participate in the market; none of which was foreign and only one was
not state-owned. In August, the government announced new surrender
requirements for more than 100 firms; although these requirements were
later given a more liberal interpretation in oﬃcial announcements, the
original decree remained in place.
• Romania 1998 - index of private entry in markets (banking sector reform)
In 1998 the Romanian banking sector was still dominated by five large
state-owned banks, accounting for about three quarters of total banking
sector assets. These banks extended credit to loss-making state enter-
prises and thus accumulated large amounts of bad loans. Though the
regulatory framework for bank supervision was improved with the adop-
tion of three new laws in 1998, political interference constrained eﬀective
supervision. A decision by the central bank (NBR) to revoke two bank
licences was overruled by the courts in December 1997. The NBR also
took on its books five-year bonds worth about USD 1 billion, issued by
the Ministry of Finance to cover bad debts of the two largest state-owned
banks. This indicates the weak central bank independence and the use
of inflationary bailout operations.
• Russia 1998 - index of price liberalisation, index of trade and foreign ex-
change liberalisation, and index of private entry in markets
In 1998 Russia faced a severe currency crisis. On August 17 the rouble-
dollar corridor was widened substantially and a 90-day moratorium on
foreign debt service by domestic banks and enterprises was imposed.
Shortly afterwards additional pressure forced the central bank (CBR) to
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let the currency float beyond the new corridor. With surging prices and
declining imports many regional governments introduced price controls
(ranging from ceilings on profit margins to administered price-setting).
To prevent food shortages restrictions were placed on the movement of
selected locally products. Driven in part by budget revenue considera-
tions export tariﬀs were reintroduced for oil, gas, metals, petrochemicals
and some other goods. The foreign exchange liberalisation was reversed:
a range of currency restrictions was introduced, leading to a serious de-
crease in the degree of convertibility of the rouble. The currency market
became segmented with a de facto multiple exchange rate regime. The
surrender requirement for exporters was raised from 50% to 75%, access
of foreign banks to the foreign exchange market was limited and a de-
posit/advance payment system was introduced for import transactions.
A new bankruptcy law was enacted in March 1998. Though much im-
proved, it was biased against private creditors, overemphasising restruc-
turing at the expense of liquidation and it provided extensive rights to
local authorities with respect to the bankruptcy procedure for large en-
terprises. Moreover eﬀective implementation did not match the improve-
ment in the legal framework, weakening the bankruptcy threat. By back-
tracking in a number of high-profile bankruptcy cases, the government
showed a lack of political will to allow the market to select enterprises
for survival.
Due to a weak regulatory structure commercial banks developed large for-
eign currency exposure. The currency crisis would have plunged nearly
the entire banking system into insolvency if the government had not de-
clared the moratorium. The crisis led to a run on the banks, a breakdown
in the payments system, disruptions in tax collection and the collapse of
financial intermediation. The initial response of the CBR exacerbated
the problems through indiscriminate liquidity injections and inconsistent
eﬀorts to provide guarantees for household deposits.
• Russia 1999 - index of private entry in markets (banking sector reform,
enterprise reform)
The restructuring of the banking system has been slow, uncoordinated
and ineﬃcient. The CBR e.g. provided ’stabilisation credits’ to troubled
banks, but there was little control over the use of the money, and the basis
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on which the selection of banks was made was never defined. In general
the CBR and the Organisation for Restructuring Credit Organisations
(ARCO, founded following the banking crisis) lacked the necessary skills
and resources to accomplish an eﬃcient and succesful restructuring pro-
gramme. The central bank turned out to be reluctant to protect the
rights of bank creditors and to ensure that bank shareholders absorb
losses, seriously impairing the eﬃcacy of the regulatory and supervisory
system, moreover the CBR failed to act rapidly to define clear rules for
the restructuring programme.
Although the number of bankruptcy filings increased seriously, the out-
comes were not clear and part of them were induced by political motiva-
tions and reflected attempts by insiders to strip assets rather than cor-
porate restructuring processes. Early 1999, a number of legislative acts
were passed to protect specific groups of enterprises (firms of strategic
significance, regional energy distribution companies, agricultural firms)
from bankruptcies and to stop the initiation of bankruptcies against tax
debtors. Budgetary constraints for the enterprise sector remained soft.
• Slovak Republic 1997 - index of trade and foreign exchange liberalisation,
index private entry in markets (enterprise reform)
Partly as a result of a persistent current account deficit, the government
introduced a range of protectionist measures in the spring of 1997. These
included an import deposit scheme that forced importers to deposit 20%
of the imported value for 180 days in an interest free account. Later, this
measure was replaced by the reintroduction of a 7% import surcharge. It
applied to some 80% of all products. Other new import barriers included
laws against subsidised and ’excessive’ imports. Additionally, mid-1997
the government reintroduced a wage regulation that limited wage growth
of public and private firms to productivity gains.16
The law on ’Revitalisation of Enterprises’, which came into force mid-
1997, further weakened market discipline. A committee made up of gov-
ernment oﬃcials and bank executives would identify companies eligible
for state aid in the form of tax deferrals and debt forgiveness, conditional
on criteria related to employment, social and regional development, as
16Wage controls were abolished late 1994.
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well as exports. These companies were also exempted from bankruptcy
proceedings. The law induced over 1000 companies to apply for tax and
debt relief.
December 1997, the third largest bank -IRB- collapsed with estimated
losses of about USD 100 million. It was put under forced administration
of the central bank and received a significant liquidity injection.
• Tajikistan 1993 - index of price liberalisation
Limited price liberalisation was introduced in April 1991. In January
1992 the government lifted price controls on 80% of goods. Further
liberalisation of prices reduced the number of goods and services under
price controls to about 2% of the total. Price controls mostly applied
to the staple consumer goods such as flour and milk. In 1993 price
controls were reintroduced. Prices in industry were regulated under the
monopoly law, and 17 basic consumer goods (including bread, rents and
public transports) were controlled by executive order.
• Turkmenistan 1998 - index of private entry in markets (large-scale pri-
vatisation)
In 1998, the private sector outside of agriculture still accounted for less
than 10% of GDP and all large enterprises were in the public sector. Jan-
uary 1998, a new privatisation centre was created at the State Agency for
Foreign Investment (SAFI). Its immediate aim was to privatise 18 large
enterprises through international investment tenders. Only one of them,
however, was sold to a domestic investor. The failure was due to the
framework for privatisation that was created. In particular the practice
of setting a reservation price equal to book value made the sale of firms
very diﬃcult because the true value of firms tended to be much less than
their book value, resulting in unrealistically high reservation prices. The
value of enterprises on oﬀer was further reduced by the social obligations
placed upon owners of privatised firms and the limited ownership rights
regarding the land under enterprises.
• Turkmenistan 2000 - index of private entry in markets (enterprise re-
form)
Oﬀ-budgetary investment funds, the President’s control over most for-
eign currency reserves, the creation of a new President Bank and nu-
CHAPTER 1. REFORM REVERSALS AND OUTPUT GROWTH 32
merous tax concessions made for a highly discretionary business environ-
ment. Projects that received presidential backing were rarely submitted
to a market test, with all ensuing problems of endemic soft budget con-
straints. The government used the natural resource sector and its foreign
exchange earnings to subsidise the largely outmoded domestic enterprise
sector. A survey conducted in 2000 by UNDP and the government’s sta-
tistical oﬃce revealed the diﬃcult situation of most domestic enterprises.
Only 28% of the 2014 enterprises reported positive growth prospects, 24%
were close to bankruptcy and 48% were in financial diﬃculties. Taxation,
limited access to foreign exchange, interference by the State Commodity
Exchange and lack of access to aﬀordable bank credit were cited as the
biggest obstacles to private business. Despite the improved liquidity in
the enterprise sector and the better revenue collection overall, arrears to
the budget increased by 17% and arrears to suppliers increased by 25%
over the first half of 2000.
• Ukraine 1998 - index of trade and foreign exchange liberalisation
The collapse of the Russian rouble in August 1998 led to strong pressures
on the Ukrainian hryvna. At the beginning of September the US Dollar
currency band was widened. In order to keep the currency within the new
band, the central bank introduced a number of restrictions on the foreign
exchange market. These included e.g. a 50% export revenue surrender
requirement, a ban on foreign exchange trading in the interbank market
and the introduction of various licences and permits that were required
to engage in foreign trade. A uniform 2% import surcharge was imposed
for six months from the beginning of July (primarily to raise revenues).
Many trading partners expressed their concern at the increase in import
tariﬀs and trade barriers, especially to agricultural trade.
• Uzbekistan 1997 - index of price liberalisation and index of trade and
foreign exchange liberalisation
Though most formal price controls had been abolished in 1996, admin-
istrative price controls were applied to energy, rents, communal services,
public transport and telecommunications. Additionally, the government
determined prices of a large number of monopoly products. Procurement
prices for cotton and wheat -for whom the state order system was still
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in place- were also administratively set.
At the end of 1996, a general requirement for ex ante registration of im-
port contracts, which basically functioned as an import-licensing system,
was put in place. This reflected the priorities of the authorities at that
time and gave them eﬀective control over imports. Additionally prepay-
ment requirements were introduced. During 1997 customs duties and
export licenses were abolished, but tariﬀs were increased.
At the beginning of 1997, an explicit multiple exchange rate regime was
institutionalised (to support activities and investment in the govern-
ment’s priority sectors). The oﬃcial rate was used mainly for account-
ing and customs purposes and for export proceeds under the obligatory
surrender requirement. The auction rate was applied to importers and
transactions enjoying privileged access to foreign exchange (e.g. debt ser-
vice payments or imported investment goods for high priority companies
or projects). A special commercial (bank) rate was applied to imports
of certain consumer goods and services. Both the auction and commer-
cial bank rate were highly overvalued. The foreign exchange bureaux of
the eligible banks used the cash market rate in their transactions with
individuals. Finally, there was an expanded black market with a widely
(though illegally) used black market rate. The diﬀerence between the of-
ficial and the black market rate widened sharply since late 1996, with
the latter oscillating around 40-50% of the oﬃcial rate.
• Uzbekistan 1998 - index of price liberalisation
Further price controls were introduced. The process of price reform re-
mained burdened with i) widespread use of preferential prices for selected
customers, ii) new price distortions caused by the multiple exchange rate
system and iii) non-transparent regulations for price formation of many
products and enterprises.
• Uzbekistan 1999 - index of trade and foreign exchange liberalisation
In a move targeted to protect reserves, foreign exchange surrender re-
quirements on exports were increased from 30% to 50% in January 1999.
The surrendered foreign exchange was converted at the overvalued oﬃcial
exchange rate. Additionally Uzbekistan imposed high import duties on
Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani imports and introduced barriers to shuttle
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trade.
• Uzbekistan 2000 - index of private entry in markets (enterprise reform)
The import substitution policies failed to boost industrial output. Ac-
cording to the index of industrial production at constant prices, output
fell by more than10% during the two previous years. The decline was
most pronounced among industries with a high share of foreign joint
ventures, originally attracted as part of the country’s industrialisation
drive. Although some companies decreased their output because of re-
duced subsidies, most reduced their production because of increasingly
distorted prices and attempted government interventions in production
plans.
The authorities also transfered 15% of GDP out of agriculture into the
import substituting industries through a system of implicit and explicit
taxation. As a result wages for farmers were a quarter of those in industry
and there was underinvestment in the sector’s infrastructure.
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Appendix 1.C Empirical results with Campos-
Horvath reform measures
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
∆GDP      
trend -0.990 -0.623 -0.093 0.145 -0.746 
 [3.17] [1.79] [0.27] [0.44] [2.20] 
trend² 0.109 0.093 0.065 0.044 0.099 
 [5.80] [4.65] [3.24] [2.27] [5.00] 
trend*IC1 -0.003 -0.001 0.026 0.046 -0.006 
 [0.06] [0.03] [0.60] [1.09] [0.12] 
trend*IC2 -0.086 -0.148 -0.080 -0.086 -0.128 
 [1.17] [1.96] [1.15] [1.33] [1.68] 
RI -34.433 -56.349 -58.931 -51.893 -56.601 
 [3.77] [4.44] [4.89] [4.56] [4.47] 
RI(-1) 40.721 62.921 60.686 53.674 63.987 
 [4.97] [5.34] [5.27] [4.94] [5.37] 
reversal*∆RI  122.912 117.672 107.116  
  [4.56] [4.45] [4.34]  
reversal*     220.577 
∆RI*RI(-1)     [4.42] 
fiscal balance 0.321 0.305   0.294 
 [4.18] [3.75]   [3.58] 
inflation   -3.033 -1.857  
   [6.24] [3.36]  
inflation(-1)    -1.797  
    [3.58]  
      
R² 0.46 0.41 0.49 0.56 0.49 
Chi² 154.44 148.35 687.90 682.96 582.79 
Panel-DW 1.87 1.86 1.95 1.88 1.89 
      
RI      
trend*IC1 -0.003 -0.001 0.026 0.046 -0.006 
 [0.06] [0.03] [0.60] [1.09] [0.12] 
trend*IC2 -0.086 -0.148 -0.080 -0.086 -0.128 
 [1.17] [1.96] [1.15] [1.33] [1.68] 
∆GDP 0.021 0.021 0.016 0.015 0.021 
 [7.86] [7.49] [7.40] [7.10] [7.61] 
∆GDP(-1) -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 [0.56] [0.74] [0.43] [0.73] [0.74] 
freedom 0.331 0.337 0.298 0.290 0.332 
status [3.25] [3.12] [3.04] [3.00] [3.13] 
      
R² 0.59 0.59 0.70 0.71 0.59 
Chi² 626.71 564.28 200.45 241.55 149.12 
Panel-DW 1.86 1.89 1.89 1.86 1.88 
Observations 231 231 231 231 231 
Note. i) Fixed country effects are included in all regressions but not reported; ii)Z-statistics 
are reported in parentheses; iii) The Chi-square statistic indicates the overall significance 
of the model 
 
Chapter 2
Reform Speed, FDI,
and Economic Growth:
Tale of the Tortoise and the
Hare
––––––––––––––––––
We analyse how the choice of reform speed and economic growth aﬀect one
another. We estimate a system of 3 equations where economic growth, economic
reform and FDI are jointly determined. New reforms aﬀect economic growth neg-
atively, whereas the level of past reform leads to higher growth and attracts FDI.
This means that the immediate adjustment cost of new reforms is counterbalanced
by a future increase in FDI inflows and higher future growth through a higher level
of past reform. Reform reversals contribute to lower growth. We use the model to
simulate the impact of big bang reform and gradualist reform on economic growth.
This is only meaningful in the presence of reform reversals, which requires aggregate
uncertainty about the appropriate reform path. Using the coeﬃcients from the em-
pirical model we find that even relatively small ex ante reversal probabilities suﬃce
to tilt the balance in favour of gradualism. The case for gradualism is even stronger
if policymakers are short-sighted, but weaker if voters are myopic.
––––––––––––––––––
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2.1 Introduction
The optimal speed of policy reform has been the subject of heated debate.
The World Bank (WB) and even more so the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) have been promoters of swift reform. The IMF’s conditionality of short
term stand-by agreements has often demanded quick reform of the receiving
government. The crises of the last 10 years have, however, shaken this belief
in quick reform and brought home the message that sequencing may be more
important than previously thought. The old adage of quick and unconditional
capital account liberalization for example, has not been without its problems.
It is now widely recognized that successful capital account liberalization re-
quires at least a well-established and stable domestic financial market. The
experience of developing and emerging market economies has stressed with in-
creasing success that gradual reform might be preferable to shockwise reform.
There is, however, disturbingly little evidence on the specific relation between
reform and growth, as noted by Skogstad and Everhart (2001). They study
a set of developing countries and find empirical indications that the sequence
and the magnitude of policy reform is related to economic growth.
In this chapter, we go one step further by looking at the interaction between
economic reform, economic growth and FDI. This allows us to disentangle
some of the mechanisms through which reform aﬀects growth. Rather than
analysing the traditional set of developing countries, we focus on a panel of
25 transition countries. Transition countries exhibit a high, but varying speed
of economic reform. They also experienced substantial, but volatile inflows of
FDI. This makes them perfectly suited to study the impact of the reform speed
on economic growth. The paper, however, is not so much about transition but
about the relation between reform speed, FDI, and growth.
The debate on the speed of economic reform surged at the start of tran-
sition when the economic profession was called upon for policy advice. Two
broad streams of thought emerged, namely shock therapists, who advocated
radical reforms and rapid transformation, and gradualists, advocating a more
cautious and piecemeal approach to reform. Roland (2000) brings some of
the theoretical work together and develops diﬀerent models of transition. He
shows that gradualism dominates a big bang strategy with respect to welfare
in the presence of aggregate uncertainty and reversal costs (cf. section 0.2.1).
CHAPTER 2. TALE OF THE TORTOISE AND THE HARE 38
The empirical growth-in-transition literature initially neglected the cost of re-
form reversals. The standard empirical framework even imposed a short-lived
positive eﬀect of a reversal (see among others Åslund et al. (1996), De Melo
et al. (1996), Fischer et al. (1996a,b), De Melo et al. (1997), Krueger and
Ciolko (1998), Berg et al. (1999), Heybey and Murrell (1999), Falcetti et al.
(2002)). This implied that economic growth was always higher with big bang
reforms than with gradualist reforms. According to this line of work, some of
which has been done by the IMF and the WB, more reform is always better.
This was in stark contrast with theory and with the stylized fact that most
policymakers did not opt for big bang policies. Merlevede (2003) showed that
reversals are indeed costly and brought the empirical literature back in line
with theory and stylized facts (cf. chapter 1).
In this chapter we contribute to this line of research in two distinct ways.
First, the eﬀect of growth and reform on FDI and vice versa has been largely
neglected. We address the potential endogeneity of FDI and reform eﬀorts
in the growth equation by estimating a 3SLS-system with growth, reform,
and FDI as dependent variables that are allowed to influence one another
contemporaneously. Second, the estimated coeﬃcients of this more general
model are employed to investigate the eﬀect of a reform reversal on economic
growth for an average transition country that either follows a big bang or
a gradualist reform path. This allows us to draw conclusions on the choice
between gradualism and big bang in the real world. We find that for an
average transition country, the choice for gradualism is more likely than the
choice for big bang. We also show how political cycles and voter myopia might
influence the policymaker’s choice between big bang and gradualism.
In the next section we build and estimate the econometric model. Section
2.3 simulates and discusses the economic eﬀects of big bang and gradualism in
the presence of reform reversals. Section 2.4 provides policy implications and
concludes.
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2.2 Reform Speed, Growth and FDI
2.2.1 Methodological approach
In our view of the world, reform choices are the result of a politically con-
strained decision process aﬀected by economic variables. They are not inde-
pendent decisions (see Campos and Coricelli, 2002). The failure to consider
the feedback of growth and initial conditions on reform will bias the estimated
impact of reform on growth. Equivalently FDI are an important determinant
of economic growth, but may in turn be influenced by economic growth and
reform. In short, reform, FDI and growth may be endogenous to one an-
other. We will therefore estimate a system of 3 simultaneous equations where
economic growth, economic reform and FDI are jointly determined.
As regards the growth and reform regressions, the literature on empiri-
cal growth in transition (see introduction) has employed three categories of
explanatory variables, namely macroeconomic stabilisation, initial conditions
and policy reform. Macroeconomic stabilisation in the form of consumer price
stabilisation, often achieved through an exchange rate peg or budgetary disci-
pline, is found to be beneficial to economic growth. Initial conditions account
to a substantial degree for the variation in economic performance at the start
of transition, but their importance diminishes over time. Finally, policy re-
form brings economic growth through improved allocational eﬃciency. Most
authors agree that the lagged level or the ’stock’ of reform has a robust positive
impact on growth and that new reforms have a negative impact on economic
growth, albeit not always significant. In general, the level of reform, mea-
sured by a reform index RI, enters the growth equation in the following way:
αRIt + βRIt−1, where we expect α < 0, β > 0 and |α| < β. Rewriting this
expression as α∆RIt + (α+ β)RIt−1, reveals that new reforms (∆RIt) entail
an immediate adjustment cost in terms of lower growth but also bring future
positive (|α| < β) growth through a higher stock of reform (RIt−1). But if
α < 0, a reform reversal (∆RIt < 0) generates an instantaneous positive eﬀect
on growth, slowing growth only the following year through the lower stock
of reform. This was precisely the problem of the early growth in transition
literature, because the positive eﬀect of reversals is in contradiction with the
theoretical literature that requires costly reversals to retain gradualism as a
policy option. We therefore allow that reform reversals have a separate coeﬃ-
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cient in the growth equation, as in Merlevede (2003).
FDI is of particular importance in developing countries, but its joint re-
lation with growth and reform has remained largely unstudied. The recent
growth literature has highlighted the dependence of growth rates on the state
of domestic technology relative to that of the rest of the world. In a typical
model of technology diﬀusion, the rate of economic growth of a backward coun-
try depends on the extent of adoption and implementation of new technologies
that are already in use in leading countries (Borensztein et al., 1998). FDI
is for developing countries a crucial channel to generate technology spillovers.
Although there is ample theoretical work on the relation between FDI and eco-
nomic growth, empirical confirmation has been scant. Borensztein et al. (1998)
showed that the eﬀect of FDI is conditional on a suﬃcient level of absorptive
capacity. In contrast to the result of Borensztein et al. (1998), Lensink and
Morrissey (2001) find a consistent positive impact of FDI and a negative impact
of the volatility of FDI on economic growth. They find that the positive eﬀect
is not sensitive to other variables. Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) explore
the relationships between FDI, economic freedom and economic growth for a
panel of Latin American countries. They find that economic freedom increases
FDI inflows (as percentage of GDP) and that both economic freedom and FDI
have a positive impact on growth. Part of the impact of economic freedom on
growth is therefore indirect, namely through increased FDI inflows. Campos
and Kinoshita (2002) argue that transition provides a good context to test
the eﬀects of FDI. Transition countries were typically far from the technolog-
ical frontier, but, in contrast with most developing countries, started with an
industrial structure and a relatively educated labour force. This makes the
transition countries more receptive to technology diﬀusion by means of FDI.
Campos and Kinoshita (2002) find a significant positive impact of FDI on eco-
nomic growth that is not conditional on any level of human capital, but they
do not consider possible interactions with economic reform.
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2.2.2 Data and empirical framework
We estimate specification (2.1) below:
∆GDPi,t = α0 + αi + α1RIi,t + α2RIi,t−1 + α3RIi,t−1∆RIi,tDi,t
+α4tIC1 + α5tIC2 + α6GGBi,t + α7fdii,t + εi,t
RIi,t = β0 + βi + (β1 + β2Di,t)∆GDPi,t + β3∆GDPi,t−1 (2.1)
+β4FSi,t + β5tIC1 + β6tIC2 + β7fdii,t + ηi,t
fdii,t = γ0 + γi + γ1∆GDPi,t + γ2∆GDPi,t−1 + γ3t
+γ4RIi,t + γ5RIi,t−1 + γ6NATRES + υi,t
Real GDP-growth (domestic currency) in (2.1) is related to a constant, a
country-specific eﬀect, two indicators of initial conditions IC1 and IC2 (these
are taken from De Melo et al., 1997) multiplied by a linear time trend1, the
general government balance, the logarithm of foreign direct investment inflows,
current reform, lagged reform and finally a reversal variable RIi,t−1∆RIi,tDi,t.
The dummy variable Di,t takes the value 1 if a reversal occurs and 0 otherwise
and ∆RIi,t is the change in the aggregate reform index (new reform). The
specificationRIi,t−1∆RIi,tDi,t reflects the assumption that the cost of a reversal
is related to the reversal’s magnitude and to the magnitude of the stock of
reform at the time of the reversal. The more reform has been achieved the
more costly reversals become. As stabilisation variable we choose the general
government balance. Campos and Coricelli (2002) argue that inflation is a
policy result, whereas the fiscal balance refers more to the policy itself. The
second equation specifies the level of reform as a function of a country-specific
eﬀect, current and lagged real GDP growth, initial conditions interacted with
a time trend, FDI inflows and the freedom status (FS). By analogy we also
allow the immediate feedback eﬀect of growth on reform to be diﬀerent when
a reversal occurs. By including FDI inflows we test whether these inflows
carry an extra independent eﬀect on reform, other than their impact through
increased GDP growth. The freedom status is calculated as the average of the
1The level eﬀect of IC1 and IC2 is captured by the country-specific eﬀect.
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ratings on the Freedom House political liberties and the civil rights indexes.
For the sake of clarity, we use the inverse of the original indicator to have a
variable that increases with political liberties and civil rights. Hence, we expect
a positive value for β4. The third equation specifies a highly stylized model of
the log of FDI inflows. Inflows are modelled as a function of a country-specific
eﬀect, current and lagged real GDP growth, the current and lagged level of
reform, and an indicator of the availability of natural resources in the country
(rather than the clusters of diﬀerent initial conditions). The country-specific
eﬀect will capture average relative market size and other unknown country-
specific eﬀects. As indicator of reform RIi,t, we use the average EBRD index
of structural reform that is kept for 25 transition countries. Detailed data
definitions and data sources are given in Appendix 2.A (see also chapter 1,
section 1.4).
We estimate (2.1) by a three stage least squares estimator (3SLS). Due to
possible correlations in shocks and because of the endogeneity of some of the
variables, the OLS assumptions are violated. 3SLS then uses an instrumental
variables approach to produce consistent estimates and a generalized least
squares estimation to account for the correlation structure in the disturbances
across the equations. Since we use lagged values as instruments, we also report
the Durbin-Watson statistic for autocorrelation generalized to the fixed eﬀect
model by Bhargava et al. (1982).
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2.2.3 Results and interpretation
The results are presented below (we do not report the country dummies):
∆GDPi,t = −12.60
(−1.51)
RIi,t + 12.08
(2.80)
RIi,t−1 + 8.01
(2.27)
∆RIi,tDi,tRIi,t−1
+0.94
(3.91)
tIC1 − 0.22
(−0.73)
tIC2 + 0.18
(2.00)
GGBi,t + 5.53
(2.55)
fdii,t
R2= 0.49; χ2 = 326.9∗∗∗; n = 253; panel DW = 1.89
RIi,t =
µ
0.059
(4.28)
− 0.073
(−2.39)
Di,t
¶
∆GDPi,t − 0.004
(−1.21)
∆GDPi,t−1
+0.007
(0.15)
fdii,t + 0.79
(2.39)
FSi,t − 0.03
(−1.99)
tIC1 − 0.006
(−0.33)
tIC2 (2.2)
R2=0.72; χ2 = 851.4
∗∗∗
; n = 253; panel DW = 1.90
fdii,t = −0.025
(−1.09)
∆GDPi,t + 0.016
(2.05)
∆GDPi,t−1 + 0.05
(0.18)
RIi,t
+0.64
(1.99)
RIi,t−1 + 0.69
(2.17)
NATRES + 0.16
(5.34)
t
R2= 0.83; χ2 = 1232.3
∗∗∗
; n = 253; panel DW = 1.69
As regards the eﬀect of reform on growth, current reform has a negative
eﬀect, while lagged reform aﬀects real output growth positively: -12.60RIi,t +
12.08RIi,t−1. At first sight the negative current eﬀect seems to dominate the
positive lagged eﬀect slightly. However, taking into account the positive im-
pact of current and lagged reform through FDI, we obtain2: −12.32RIi,t +
15.62RIi,t−1, which shows that the positive ’stock’ eﬀect of reform dominates
the short term adjustment cost. This is in line with earlier findings in the
growth in transition literature. Rewriting yields −12.32∆RIi,t + 3.30RIi,t−1.
This would imply that reform reversals (∆RIt < 0) generate a counterintuitive
instantaneous positive growth eﬀect in period t, were it not for the independent
reversal eﬀect 8.01∆RIi,tDi,tRIi,t−1 that ensures a negative impact of a rever-
sal if RIi,t−1 is 1.5 or higher3. The growth rate is strongly and significantly
2i.e. -12.60RIi,t + 12.08RIi,t−1 + 5.53 ∗ (0.05RIi,t + 0.64RIi,t−1)
3This negative immediate eﬀect of a reversal occurs as soon the stock of reform reaches
the value of 12.32/8.01=±1.54. In practice nearly all countries reached this level of reform
after the first year of transition. A reversal therefore always has a negative impact. Pure
technically, since a single component of the average RI-index takes values from 1 to 4.3 with
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influenced by an increase in FDI inflows: 5.53fdii,t. Further results are in line
with expectations. Better initial conditions, in particular a higher value of
IC1, contribute to growth, and improvements in the general government bal-
ance (GGB) are found to be beneficial to growth. The positive coeﬃcient on
the interaction between the time trend and IC1 implies diverging growth rates:
countries with better initial conditions will grow faster than the countries with
more adverse initial conditions.
The level of the reform index is positively related to current real GDP-
growth. When a reversal occurs, however, the feedback eﬀect from growth to
reform disappears. We cannot reject that β1+β2Di,t is equal to zero when Di,t
= 1.4 A country’s freedom status (FS) is positively associated with progress in
reform. The time interacted IC1 has a statistically significant negative impact
on reform, oﬀsetting the divergent direct impact of IC1 on growth. Lagged
growth has a negligible negative impact on reform. Higher FDI inflows do not
induce more reform (other than via their impact on GDP growth).
For the determinants of FDI, we find a significant positive impact of the
stock of reform and an upward time trend. Countries that have better natural
resources receive more FDI inflows. Current real GDP growth does not seem to
aﬀect FDI inflows, but lagged growth does. We also tested whether a reversal
would have an impact on FDI-inflows. The results presented in Appendix 2.B
show that there is no significant impact.
For the simulations in the next section we use a mildly simpler model. Since
FDI inflows do not cause extra reform eﬀorts beyond their impact through
GDP growth, we drop inflows as explanatory variable in the reform equation.
We also drop the current level of reform and current real GDP growth as a
determinant of FDI inflows, because they are highly insignificant. We also
drop the insignificant interactions with IC2, which is in line with Falcetti et al.
(2002) who also find that only their first principal component is significant.
steps of about 13 , 1.3 would make the lowest value at which a reversal could occur.
4χ2-stat. = 0.15, p-value = 0.69
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The specification used for the simulation is presented below:
∆GDPi,t = −10.79
(−1.56)
RIi,t + 11.17
(3.19)
RIi,t−1 + 7.25
(2.56)
∆RIi,tDi,tRIi,t−1
+0.86
(6.08)
tIC1 + 0.17
(2.07)
GGBi,t + 5.41
(3.22)
fdii,t
R2= 0.51; χ2 = 345.8
∗∗∗
; n = 253; panel DW = 1.87
RIi,t =
µ
0.058
(13.48)
− 0.068
(−2.72)
Di,t
¶
∆GDPi,t − 0.004
(−1.19)
∆GDPi,t−1
+0.76
(2.78)
FSi,t − 0.03
(−3.71)
tIC1 (2.3)
R2=0.73; χ2 = 871.8
∗∗∗
; n = 253; panel DW = 1.91
fdii,t = 0.50
(4.20)
RIi,t−1 + 0.01
(1.97)
∆GDPi,t−1 + 0.60
(3.55)
NATRES + 0.15
(5.85)
t
R2= 0.84; χ2 = 1303.8
∗∗∗
; n = 253; panel DW = 1.73
2.3 Gradualism versus big bang
We now investigate the implications of the empirical results in the previous
section for the choice of reform speed. We simulate output paths under a grad-
ualist and a big bang strategy, both with and without reversal. The eﬀect of
reform on real GDP is referred to as the ’welfare eﬀect’5. We think of a big
bang strategy as a strategy that immediately implements a large amount of
reform and quickly hits the ceiling of maximum reform. A gradualist strategy
consists in smaller reform steps and takes a longer period to attain full reform.
Obviously, many diﬀerent approaches to shifting an indicator from 1 to 4.3 in
nine periods are possible. We focus here on the two stylized strategies, grad-
ualism and big bang, that have been prominent both in theoretical literature
and policy advice and try to shape the reform paths to the image that advisors
and researchers would have in mind.
5A social welfare function that is linear in real GDP would allow to use these terms
interchangeably.
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2.3.1 Simulation results
The estimates of model (2.3) are now employed to simulate real economic
growth under GR and BB for the average transition country. When simulat-
ing the model for a specific reform path, we are especially interested in the
uncertainty surrounding the reciprocal influence of growth and reform on one
another. This means that we are interested in capturing parameter uncertainty,
rather than uncertainty that follows from possible shocks to real GDP from
outside the model. In order to take this type of uncertainty into account and
to create confidence bounds, we simulate the model as follows. From regression
(2.3) we retrieve the vector of point estimates of the parameters, z, and the
covariance matrix, Ψ. We then draw 15000 parameter sets from a multinormal
distribution N (z,Ψ) and solve the model for each of the parameter sets.6 In
the figures below we present averages and the 5th and 95th percentiles. For
the exogenous variables and the initial values, we take the sample averages.
Therefore the underlying baseline path where no reform shocks are added to
the model is an outcome that results from diﬀerent approaches to reform, and
includes countries that not yet finished transition.7 The baseline path also re-
flects that the first steps in the direction of a market economy were relatively
easy to take, for it implies an increase of the reform indicator to 1.8 in the first
year of transition.8 Because (2.3) is estimated in growth rates, we construct
one-period ahead confidence bounds around the output paths in the figures
below. We do this by taking the previous period’s implied average index as
given and applying the 5th and 95th percentile of this period’s growth rate to
it. This is in line with the estimation in growth rates that takes the previous
period’s output level as given.
Exogenous reform
In order to compare the two theoretical approaches advocated in the literature,
we assume in a first step that the government can implement the reform path
6In 356 parameter settings (±2.5% of the total) the model becomes explosive and results
in dependent variables that reach for +∞ or -∞. Rather than putting restrictions on the
draws from the multinormal distribution, we exclude these parameter settings values when
calculating the mean and percentiles.
7The upper part of table 2.3 in Appendix 2.C lists the reform levels and growth rates
implied by the baseline path.
8This obviously also depends on the definition of the indicator by the EBRD.
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Figure 2.1: Simulated real GDP with exogenous reform paths - no reversal
versus reversal at t+ 2 (90% confidence intervals in top panels)
of her choice without worrying about the feedback eﬀects. In terms of (2.3)
this is done by disregarding the RI-equation and assuming exogenous reform
paths reflecting the big bang and gradual approach to reform. The lower
left panel of figure 2.1 shows the reform paths in the no-reversal case. The
reform paths reflect the standard picture in the literature that would come
to mind when discussing gradualism and big bang. In particular a big bang
strategy immediately implements a large amount of reform and hits the ceiling
of maximum reform after four years of transition in t+3. Under a gradualist
strategy on the other hand reform steps are smaller, and only in t+8 a reform
level comparable to a market economy is attained. The diﬀerence between the
two reform paths is thus the reform speed, the eventual level of reform is the
same. The implied output paths are shown in the upper left panel of figure
2.1. Flat lines represent gradualism and diamond lines represent big bang in
both panels. Both output paths are surrounded by a 90% confidence interval.
We repeat this exercise for the case of a reform reversal. We assume a
reversal to a specific level of the reform index, which is our interpretation of
the return to a conservative platform (see Dewatripont and Roland, 1995).
CHAPTER 2. TALE OF THE TORTOISE AND THE HARE 48
Specifically we assume at t+2 a return to a level of the reform index of 2,
which implies that there is a small reversal for gradualism and a large one for
big bang. We assume that the government does not switch its strategy after
reversal. Therefore, after the reversal, the reform steps from the beginning of
transition are applied to complete the reform path.9 Should we assume equal
evolutions of the reform index after the reversal, the resulting growth rates
under both strategies would be more or less equal and this would imply a
disadvantage for the big bang strategy (provided no further reversals occur).
Simulations for reversals at t+3 and t+4 give comparable results. Simulating
reversals even later in transition becomes trivial. In these cases the diﬀerence
between big bang and gradualism in terms of the magnitude and hence the cost
of reversals becomes smaller and smaller. This derives from the assumption
that both gradualism and big bang arrive at full reform after 8 years. The
specific reform paths in the presence of a reform reversal at t+2 are shown
in the bottom right panel of figure 2.1. We again use these reform paths to
simulate economic growth. The implied output paths are shown in the upper
right panel of figure 2.1.
In the no reversal case (the left panel) the real GDP-path is initially lower
for big bang (diamond line) because of higher adjustment costs, but after
four years (at t+4 ) the big bang path starts to exceed the gradualist path10
(the flat line). The lower bound for the BB-path is just below the upper
bound for the GR-path in t+8. From t+6 onwards the mean of each simulated
strategy is outside the confidence bounds of the other. In the right panel
with a reversal at time t+2 the situation is quite diﬀerent: under a big bang
strategy, the reversal comes at a large cost. The loss of growth is so massive
that the higher growth rates later in transition induce only a negligible catch-
up eﬀect and the gradualist output level is not reached in our time window.11
The confidence intervals of big bang and gradualism cross only at the end of
9For the big bang case the no reversal path is t-1=1.0; t=2.0; t+1=3.3; t+2=4.0;
t+3=4.3. By applying the same reform steps as in the no reversal case, only starting
at a level of 2.0 rather than at 1.0, we obtain: t+2=2.0; t+3=3.0; t+4=4.3. The same logic
applies to the gradualist path after reversal at t+2.
10Assuming that once a score of 4.3 is reached the ’traditional’ growth literature takes
over, BB will be ahead of GR for a few more years before catch-up.
11Allowing a faster reform evolution in the big bang case implies higher growth rates at
the end of the time window, but it also implies lower growth rates just after the reversal
compared to gradualism. The big bang strategy results then in a more pronounced U-shaped
pattern, but gradualism still runs ahead at t+ 8.
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Figure 2.2: Simulated growth with endogenous reform - no reversal versus
reversal at t+ 2 (90% confidence intervals in top panels)
transition. Intuitively, big bang reforms may lead quickly to a high stock of
reform, which is good for growth, but this is counterbalanced by the fact that
a reversal to a conservative platform will be larger and hence much more costly
for big bang than for gradualism.
If it is known beforehand whether a reversal will occur or not and there is
no uncertainty regarding the output paths, the choice between big bang and
gradualism is trivial for a policymaker that maximizes long term economic
welfare: without reversal, the big bang strategy will be applied as shown in
the left panel of figure 2.1; with a reform reversal, the gradualist strategy is
preferred, as shown in the right panel of figure 2.1.
Endogenous reform
The results are even stronger if reform is endogenous. The distinction between
the gradualist and big bang reform paths is now established by adding reform
shocks to the second equation of (2.3). These reform shocks reflect the poli-
cymaker’s preferences regarding reform speed. In the no reversal case we add
reform shocks to obtain a full transition path that is comparable to the exoge-
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nous reform paths shown in the lower left panel of figure 2.1. In the case of a
reversal we apply the same shocks as in the no reversal case, the only diﬀerence
is a negative shock at t+2.12 In Appendix 2.C we present detailed tables of
these shocks and their implied growth rates and reform levels together with
their confidence bounds.
The lower left panel of figure 2.2 shows the big bang and gradualist strate-
gies without reversal, the lower right panel shows the strategies with reversal.
The implied output path for the no reversal case (upper left panel) is fairly
similar to the one in figure 2.1. Again the lower bound for the BB-path is
just below the upper bound for the GR-path and from t+6 onwards the mean
outcome of each strategy is outside the bounds of the other. Whereas the
mean in the case of exogenous reform does not exceed 100 (the starting value
of the index), the mean reaches about 115 when reform is endogenous. The
simulated output paths in case of a reversal are also comparable to those in
figure 2.1. However, the confidence intervals of big bang and gradualism do
no longer cross at the end of the time window (upper right panel) and the
big bang path significantly remains below the gradualist path. The results
with endogenous reform therefore strengthen the case for gradualism. A final
remarkable result is that in the big bang case full reform is not attained in
t+8. This is because of the lower shocks in the big bang case near the end of
transition (cf. table 2.4 in Appendix 2.C). Our results still hold, however, if
we apply the gradualist shocks to the big bang path after the reversal (cf. BB’
in table 2.4 in Appendix 2.C).
In figure 2.3 we only apply reform shocks (the policymaker’s preferences)
until the reversal and let reform evolve endogenously afterwards. Table 2.3
in Appendix 2.C lists the shocks underlying figure 2.3. The resulting reform
and growth paths reveal some further properties of the model. It is especially
noteworthy that the eﬀect of a shock phases out and the model quite quickly
returns to its no-shock baseline. A higher level of current reform implies ceteris
paribus a decrease in the growth rate, which in turn implies lower current
reform, and so on. Clearly, this is what makes the model stable. Should both
reform and growth concurrently influence one another positively, the model
would be instable. From the panels on the right in figure 2.3 one can nicely
infer that after an exogenous reversal the system does not slide back into the
12A reversal thus does not alter the policymaker’s preferences.
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Figure 2.3: Simulated growth with endogenous reform (initial shocks only) -
no reversal versus reversal at t+ 2 (90% confidence intervals in top panels)
unreformed planned economy through further endogenous reversals, but rather
evolves to the baseline. This is fairly intuitive. The point estimate of the eﬀect
of lagged GDP growth on reform is nearly zero and insignificant. Therefore,
there is no channel of negative impact on reform in the year following the
reversal via the strong negative growth rate induced by the reversal the year
it occurs. A return to communism could therefore only originate from the
impact of the decrease in the stock (i.e. the lagged level) of reform in the
year following the reversal on the growth rate that then would transmit itself
(via the second equation) to further lower reform. We cannot reject, however,
that the impact of current growth on reform is zero in case of a reversal.13
Therefore exogenous reversals do not trigger a self-reinforcing slide-back to
communism via further endogenous reversals. A second reversal could only
come from either an adverse external shock or an adverse change in one or
more exogenous variables. The estimations thus reflect reality where a slide-
back into communism is not observed.
13It cannot be rejected that 0.058− (0.068 ∗Di,t) equals zero if Di,t = 1.
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2.3.2 Aggregate Uncertainty
In Dewatripont and Roland (1995) the government faces a decision under un-
certainty on the choice of the speed at which some reform package is im-
plemented. A policy package contains two reforms that can be implemented
either simultaneously at high speed (big bang) or step by step at low speed
(gradualism). Once implemented the speed of implementation does no longer
aﬀect the net present value of the reform package (in terms of welfare say),
but the costs beared during the transitional period diﬀer depending on i) the
choice of policy speed and ii) whether or not a reversal is necessary. Without
uncertainty the outcome of the package would be known in advance and it
would either be rejected in case of a negative outcome or implemented as a big
bang when the outcome is positive. Because partial reform, i.e. implementing
only one of both reforms in the package, is costly because of complementar-
ities, gradualism is no option without uncertainty. In the case of aggregate
uncertainty, however, the ideal policy package is not known and a reversal of
an inaccurate package (with negative net present value) cannot be ruled out.
Dewatripont and Roland (1995) point to the crucial role of reversal costs in
this case. If there are no costs of reversing, big bang will be optimal because
there are no costs of experimenting. If a reversal is costly and the option of
early reversal is exercised with positive probability (which is likely in case of
aggregate uncertainty) gradualism will dominate.
In our framework uncertainty means that policymakers have imperfect in-
formation about the type of reform best fit for their country.14 Some reform
steps may turn out to be inappropriate or inconsistent with other reforms.
Reversals are then interpreted as a normal component of the trial and error
process in search of the appropriate market economy model. We focus on a
government that at the start of transition needs to make a choice between a
gradualist and a big bang strategy as depicted in figures 2.1 and 2.2. The
choice will then depend on the expected probability of a future reversal (hence
aggregate uncertainty), i.e. the probability of ending up in the right panel
of these figures. The degree of uncertainty can be understood as a barrier to
immediate big bang reform.
14Market economies are characterised by a set of core characteristics but many varieties
exist. A score of 4.3 on RI can be interpreted as ’a score equivalent to a market economy’,
without telling the exact type.
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criterion\timing of reversal t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
1. GDPT 0.52 0.41 0.43
2.
PT
t=−1GDPt 0.29 0.26 0.31
3.
PT
t=−1 0.95
t+1GDPt 0.24 0.22 0.28
Table 2.1: Minimum probability assigned to reversal to prefer gradualism to
big bang
Assume that policymakers are risk-neutral, benevolent social welfare plan-
ners and that reform policies are decided at the beginning of transition in
function of ex ante expectations about future reform reversals. Without un-
certainty, there will be no reversals and immediate big bang15 is optimal. The
level of aggregate uncertainty in the eye of the policymaker will therefore de-
termine her choice.
Table 2.1 reports the minimal ex ante probabilities a policymaker should
assign to a reversal in a specific year in order to prefer gradualism at the start
of transition.16 The probabilities are based on model (2.3) with endogenous
reform as in figure 2.2. We consider three possible criteria policymakers may
use to make this choice. In line 1, the policymaker focuses on the GDP-level
at the end of transition T 17. If policymakers only care for the level of real
GDP at the end of transition, the expected probability of reversal should be
about 0.5 to opt for gradualism. In line 2 (3) the policymaker focuses on
the cumulated (cumulated discounted) GDP-levels until the end of transition
T. Even lower ex ante reversal probabilities (not higher than 0.31) now tilt
the policymaker’s decision in favour of gradualism. The reversal probability
needed to prefer gradualism will increase if the reversal is expected later than
t+4. Indeed, further down in transition the levels of reform converge, and so
15Immediate big bang means that reform immediately jumps to full reform (reform index
4.3). This leads to maximum economic growth because the stock eﬀect.dominates and is
immediately maximized.
16Underlying RI-paths are obtained by taking the no reversal-path from figure 2.2 until
the time of the reversal and completing it with the simulated endogenous reform path; we
always simulate until 6 years after the reversal. The reform paths in the no reversal case
are extended by adding extra years with a score of 4.3 which implies for these year identical
growth rates for both GR and BB; criterion: line 1 - GDP-level at the end of transition, line
2 (3) - cumulative (cumulative discounted) GDP-levels until the end of transition.
17The end of transition is defined as the second year with a score of 4.3 for the reform
indicator for gradualism, the slowest reform policy. This allows the stock eﬀect of reform to
mature. See also the notes with table 2.1.
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do the costs of reversal that drive the diﬀerence between gradualism and big
bang in our simulation. This can also be seen from the bottom left panel in
figure 2.2. Initially the big bang reforms run ahead, but from t+4 onwards the
reform gap narrows and the costs of reversal converge, essentially because big
bang reforms have hit the ceiling of maximum reform. Also, the weight of the
initial adjustment cost of a big bang reform in cumulated GDP decreases if
we are further down the road of transition. It is concluded that, if policymak-
ers care about cumulated or cumulated discounted welfare during transition,
then relatively low levels of aggregate uncertainty, as reflected in the expected
probability of reversal, are suﬃcient to tilt the balance in favour of gradualism
for the average transition country. If policymakers care only about economic
welfare at the end of transition, reversal probabilities of about 0.5 are needed
to guide them towards gradualism.
Given the complexity of the transition process, the case for gradualism
seems therefore rather strong for the average transition country and it may take
hard-nosed reformers to opt for a big bang strategy. The economic intuition is
simple: if you don’t know which way to run, it may be wise to run a bit slower
in order to limit the cost of having to return on your steps.
2.3.3 Politics
In the previous paragraph we looked at a benevolent, risk-neutral, social wel-
fare planner whose horizon extended to the end of transition. Policymakers
are, however, subject to political constraints that may give rise to political
cycles in policy making (see Alesina and Roubini, 1992; Persson and Tabellini,
2000). Political constraints make politicians prefer current to future welfare to
an extent that exceeds the normal discount factor. The reason is that future
welfare may only be enjoyed after the next election and may therefore not be
included in the politicians’ utility function. The standard democratic politi-
cal cycle spans 4 years at best, but in transition countries it was on average
even shorter. Since reform packages have an impact on future real GDP, their
design by politicians in transition countries is subject to severe political con-
straints (see Dewatripont and Roland, 1992). We will address this problem
in a very simple and intuitive way, assuming that policymakers are politicians
that care about the opinion of voters at the expected time of election, rather
than maximize some criterion at the end of transition.
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As a starting point assume that voters, and hence politicians, care for
aggregate economic welfare, i.e. the level of real GDP, at the time of the
election. Assume also that at the time of the policy decision, the time of
elections is a maximal span of 4 years away. So the only thing that matters is
the ex ante expected economic welfare at t+4 under both policy scenarios. In
the reversal case (see right panel of figure 2.2) gradualism dominates big bang,
while in the no-reversal case (left panel of figure 2.2) real GDP under big bang
exceeds that of gradualism only from t+4 on.18 If the elections take place prior
to t+4, then policymakers will always prefer gradualism to big bang, even if
the probability of a reversal is zero. Should the first elections take place at
t+4, we calculated that the ex ante expected probability of a reversal at time
t+2 should be below 0.12 for big bang to be preferable. For reversals at time
t+3 and t+4 the respective values are 0.09 and 0.08.
Alternatively we could assume that voters have a memory and thus care
about cumulated economic welfare until the time of election. The positive
results of the big bang strategy will then materialize even later in transition.
Our calculations (not reported here) indicate that cumulated welfare under
a big bang policy only exceeds that of gradualism in t+6. Even if the first
elections were to take place only in t+6, extremely small reversal probabilities
would still be suﬃcient for gradualism to be preferred. For reversals at t+2 the
probability should be less than 0.04; at time t+3 and t+4, the corresponding
values are 0.03 and 0.02. In short, if you take into account political cycles,
tiny levels of policy uncertainty are suﬃcient to tilt the balance in favour of
gradualism and big bang strategies seem to belong to the realm of the unreal.
These results prompt policymakers to opt for gradualism, unless they do not
care for their political survival.
However, diﬀerences in economic welfare may be the wrong political cri-
terion. Since voters only observe the outcome of the chosen strategy, not of
the alternative, they are imperfectly informed too and therefore not able to
compare both strategies’ economic welfare. Because it is clearly observed, the
turning point from negative to positive growth might be a better criterion
for voter behaviour, and hence policymakers’ behaviour. Assume that vot-
18Taking into account confidence bounds, the mean of BB is outside the confidence bound
around the mean of GR only in t+ 5, and vice versa. Taking into account both confidence
bounds it takes until t+8 for BB to outrun GR significantly. Therefore risk-averse politicians
would be very unwise to opt for big bang.
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t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4 t+ 5 t+ 6
No reversal
Big bang -17.9 -16.7 -4.8 4.3 9.2 10.2 11.1
Gradualism -13.7 -10.5 -5.4 -2.2 -0.8 3.3 5.6
Table 2.2: Real GDP growth rates implied by the simulations
ers leave the incumbent policymakers in power only if the turning point has
been reached by the time of the election. Fidrmuc (2000) finds statistically
significant associations between unemployment and voting in Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and the Slovakia. Jackson et al. (2003) find that Polish re-
gions with higher levels of new firm and job creation return larger votes shares
for the economically liberal UD+KLD pseudo-coalition in 1993 and for the
UW that was in power in 1997. These votes come at the expense of both the
post-communist and right wing and trade union parties. Hence voters react
to economic outcomes they experience. In our setting we do not have unem-
ployment nor firm or job creation, but these are strongly related to positive
economic growth. It is therefore not unwise to assume that voters vote for the
incumbent if the economy has turned to positive growth and for the opposition
otherwise. This behaviour can be labelled myopic because voters do not take
into account the growth eﬀects of alternative policies. Instead their choice is
based solely on economic outcomes actually observed.
Table 2.2 reveals that the big bang strategy now oﬀers better prospects for
re-election. Indeed, in the no reversal case big bang achieves positive growth
rates before gradualism does, while in the reversal case growth rates are com-
parable (cf. tables 2.3 and 2.4 in Appendix 2.C).19 More importantly, in the no
reversal case big bang policies deliver positive growth rates within the standard
political cycle of four years, while gradualist policies fail to do so.
Thus, although the short-sightedness of policymakers drives them towards
gradualism, their awareness of imperfect information in the voter’s eye has a
countervailing eﬀect and may encourage them to gamble for a big bang without
a reversal. This table does not bring good news for incumbent policymakers
in an average transition country. If voters are myopic, gradualist policymakers
are not re-elected and big bang policymakers are also set to loose power in case
19Should a big bang strategy imply that -after the reversal- reform increases faster than
in the gradual case, growth rates would turn positive earlier also.
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of a reversal. The only way to maintain power is to gamble for a big bang and
to steer clear of major mistakes and the reversals that come with them. But
this may come at a high political and economic cost if a reversal turns out to
be necessary anyhow. Note that one could apply many diﬀerent criterions for
voter behaviour. We choose the criterion of the turning point, because it is
the most favourable to big bang. Even then the prospects for re-election are
not good. Any other criterion is less favourable to big bang, and reinforces the
case for gradualism.
2.4 Conclusions
Our main interest is the relation between the choice of reform speed and eco-
nomic growth. We estimated a system of 3 equations where economic growth,
economic reform and FDI are jointly determined. We found that new reforms
aﬀect economic growth negatively but that the level of past reform leads to
higher growth and attracts FDI. FDI is also attracted by improvements in the
growth rate, but with a lag. This means that the immediate adjustment cost
of new reforms is counterbalanced by a future surge of FDI inflows and higher
future growth through a higher stock of reform. Reform reversals on the other
hand are found to contribute to lower growth.
We use the model to simulate the impact of big bang and gradualist reform
on economic growth. This is only meaningful in the presence of reform rever-
sals. If we know whether a reversal will occur or not, the choice between big
bang and gradualism is trivial for a benevolent policymaker that maximizes
long term economic welfare: without reversal, the big bang strategy will be
applied, with a reform reversal, the gradualist strategy is preferred. In the
presence of uncertainty about the appropriate reform path and hence rever-
sals, relatively small ex ante reversal probabilities suﬃce to tilt the balance in
favour of gradualism for a benevolent policymaker.
If policymakers are short-sighted because of political cycles they will never
prefer big bang strategies to gradualism. Because of higher initial adjustment
costs of a big bang strategy, the potential benefits from reform and FDI only
materialize after the elections. The only possible countervailing argument stems
from voter myopia. If voters react only to the economy’s turning the corner, a
big bang policy may oﬀer better prospects for re-election. Still voter myopia
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brings mainly bad news for policymakers. Gradualist policymakers are never
re-elected. Big bang policymakers are unable to maintain power in case of a
reversal. The only way to stay in power is to gamble for a big bang and then
to have the luck not to make any major mistakes and hence avoid a reversal.
But this may come at a high political and economic cost if a reversal occurs
anyhow. All in all, it is not surprising that political instability has been a
typical feature in transition and developing countries alike, and that economic
reform is generally hard to achieve, for the political fruits of economic reform
may be bitter.
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Appendix 2.A Data Issues
Especially early in transition the decline in output is believed to be overesti-
mated. Since statistical systems were originally designed to collect information
from state-owned enterprises they probably failed to capture large parts of the
emerging private sector. Additionally, the use of pre-transition relative prices
resulted in low weights for newly emerging activities (Berg et al., 1999). Fur-
thermore, both newly emerging activities and existing firms had an incentive
to underreport output and sales to avoid taxes and regulation. Studies that
use adjusted GDP data conclude that their results on growth determinants are
not sensitive to the corrections to the data (See e.g. Loungani and Sheets, 1997
and Selowsky and Martin, 1997). Bearing these caveats in mind, we proceed
using oﬃcial data.
The aggregate reform index (RI) is constructed as a weighted average of
eight transition indexes as found in the EBRD’s Transition Report. The in-
dexes can take values between 1 and 4.3 with steps of about 1
3
. A score of
4.3 is a situation comparable to a market economy; a value of 1 denotes a
centrally planned system. These indicators reflect the progress of reform with
respect to i) price liberalization (weight 0.3), ii) trade and foreign exchange
liberalization (weight 0.3), and iii) privatisation, restructuring and financial
market reform (weight 0.4) (see also De Melo et al. (1996)). The former two
are directly available from the EBRD Transition Report, the latter is the av-
erage of six indices. A reversal is defined as a drop in the aggregate reform
index, i.e. RIt-RIt−1<0. Clearly, the transition indexes are not perfect since
they are subjective ratings. The ratings reflect the EBRD’s assessment of both
the eﬀectiveness and extensiveness of policy measures, based on sometimes in-
complete or imperfect information. Moreover macroeconomic performance has
often already been observed at the moment of assessment, which is a source of
possible endogeneity.
All data were rearranged in ’transition timing’. In order to identify com-
mon elements across countries of the post-communist economic cycle, we have
to take into account the cycle’s diﬀerent starting points. Transition year 1 (t)
is then defined as the year in which communism and central planning were
definitively abandoned. This is 1990 for Croatia, Hungary, FYR Macedonia,
Poland and Slovenia; 1991 for Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Re-
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public and Romania. For the Baltic States and the countries of the Former
Soviet Union 1992 is taken to be the first year of transition.
Description
∆GDP Real GDP growth, domestic currency, annual percentage change
FB Fiscal balance, consolidated balance of general government,
variable is negative if the balance is in deficit
INF End year inflation, transformed as ln(1+(Inflation/100))
RI Reform index, see paper/Appendix A for construction
D Reversal dummy =1 if RIt-RIt−1<0
IC1,2 Initial condition clusters
FS Freedom Status, average of political rights and civil liberties indexes;
index ranges from 1 (free) to 7 (not free), original rating is inversed and
rescaled (1=free; 0.14=not free)
see also www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology.htm
FDI FDI inflows in millions USD
Data Sources
∆GDP IMF, World Economic Outlook Database
FB EBRD Transition Report
INF EBRD Transition Report
RI Own calculations based on indicators in EBRD Transition Report
D idem
IC1,2 De Melo et al. (1997)
FS Freedom House
FDI UNCTAD online FDI Database
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Appendix 2.B Reform Reversals and FDI In-
flows
∆GDPi,t = 6.45
(0.49)
− 19.69
(−1.74)
RIi,t + 15.82
(3.06)
RIi,t−1 + 10.76
(2.38)
∆RIi,tDi,tRIi,t−1
+0.93
(5.20)
tIC1 − 0.08
(−0.32)
tIC2 + 0.27
(2.91)
GGBi,t + 5.82
(2.50)
FDIi,t
R2= 0.40; χ2 = 287.5∗∗∗; n = 253
RIi,t = 1.84
(7.85)
+ 0.055
(12.31)
∆GDPi,t − 0.003
(−1.21)
∆GDPi,t−1
+1.00
(3.21)
FSi,t − 0.03
(−4.14)
tIC1 + 0.005
(0.44)
tIC2
R2= 0.75; χ2 = 817.6
∗∗∗
; n = 253
FDIi,t = − 0.59
(−0.70)
+ 1.22
(3.54)
RIi,t + 1.13
(4.20)
NATRES + 0.14
(5.06)
t
− 0.01
(−1.14)
∆GDPi,t − 0.31
(−1.14)
∆RIi,tDi,tRIi,t−1
R2= 0.83; χ2 = 1275.6∗∗∗; n = 253
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Appendix 2.C Shocks and implied growth rates
and reform
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present a detailed overview of the results of the simulations
with endogenous reform. Table 2.3 starts with the no-shocks baseline result.
Further we present the results for the gradualist and big bang strategy with
only shocks in the initial periods. Table 2.4 shows the same strategies, where
the shocks now have been chosen in such a way that transition is completed
at the end of the period. A simulation is presented by the shocks added to
the second equation in (2.3) in the first line, followed by three lines where the
mean of reform (RI mean) is surrounded by the 5th (RI low) and 95th (RI
high) percentiles from the 15000 repetions of the model, and finally three lines
with the mean, 5th, and 95th percentiles of GDP growth rates (GDP mean,
GDP low, and GDP high respectively). Figure 2.3 again shows a four-panel
graph, but now of the reform and output paths simulated with initial shocks
only in table 2.3.
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  t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 
Baseline shock 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 RI low 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 
 RI mean 1.9 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 
 RI high 2.2 2.8 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.9 
           
 GDP low -20.2 -16.0 -11.4 -8.1 -5.9 -4.4 -3.0 -1.9 -0.7 
 GDP mean -15.9 -9.7 -4.2 -0.5 2.0 3.8 5.3 6.6 8.1 
 GDP high -10.6 -1.8 4.6 9.0 11.8 13.9 15.7 17.2 18.8 
No reversal           
BB shock 0.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 RI low 1.8 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 
 RI mean 2.1 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 
 RI high 2.4 3.9 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8 
 GDP low -22.8 -26.1 -9.1 -2.6 -3.2 -3.5 -3.1 -2.5 -1.5 
 GDP mean -18.0 -17.0 -3.9 0.8 2.1 3.0 4.2 5.2 6.5 
 GDP high -12.2 -5.8 0.6 4.8 8.8 11.4 13.4 15.0 16.5 
GR shock -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 RI low 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 
 RI mean 1.7 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 
 RI high 1.9 2.6 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.9 
 GDP low -17.7 -16.6 -12.6 -8.8 -6.3 -4.5 -3.1 -2.0 -0.7 
 GDP mean -13.9 -10.7 -5.6 -1.3 1.6 3.6 5.3 6.6 8.0 
 GDP high -9.2 -3.5 3.0 8.0 11.4 13.7 15.5 17.1 18.8 
Reversal           
BB shock 0.3 1.3 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 RI low 1.8 2.8 1.3 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 
 RI mean 2.1 3.3 2.0 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 
 RI high 2.4 3.9 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.8 
 GDP low -22.8 -26.1 -23.4 -11.9 -8.2 -6.0 -4.3 -3.1 -1.8 
 GDP mean -18.0 -17.0 -13.5 -7.5 -2.7 0.6 2.9 4.6 6.2 
 GDP high -12.2 -5.8 -6.2 -3.0 3.8 8.7 12.0 14.3 16.1 
GR shock -0.3 -0.1 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 RI low 1.5 1.9 1.8 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 
 RI mean 1.7 2.2 2.0 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
 RI high 1.9 2.6 2.2 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.9 
 GDP low -17.7 -16.6 -8.8 -10.3 -7.2 -5.1 -3.5 -2.2 -0.9 
 GDP mean -13.9 -10.7 -4.4 -6.8 -1.7 1.8 4.2 5.9 7.5 
 GDP high -9.2 -3.5 -0.4 -2.5 5.4 10.5 13.7 15.9 17.9 
 
Table 2.3: Shocks to the baseline and implied growth rates and reform: Initial
shocks
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  t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 
No reversal          
BB shock 0.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 
 RI low 1.8 2.7 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
 RI mean 2.1 3.3 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
 RI high 2.4 4.1 4.9 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 
 GDP low -23.6 -27.6 -17.9 -9.1 -4.1 -3.0 -1.9 -1.0 0.1 
 GDP mean -17.9 -16.7 -4.8 4.3 9.2 10.2 11.1 12.0 13.1 
 GDP high -10.7 -2.5 13.0 23.3 27.8 28.2 28.9 29.7 30.5 
GR shock -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 
 RI low 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 
 RI mean 1.7 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.3 
 RI high 2.0 2.7 3.2 3.7 4.0 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.3 
 GDP low -18.5 -17.7 -13.7 -11.6 -9.4 -7.7 -6.2 -5.0 -3.1 
 GDP mean -13.7 -10.5 -5.4 -2.2 -0.8 3.3 5.6 7.7 10.2 
 GDP high -7.8 -1.5 5.4 10.0 14.4 18.1 21.5 24.8 28.2 
Reversal           
BB shock 0.3 1.3 -1.0 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 
 RI low 1.8 2.8 1.3 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 
 RI mean 2.1 3.3 2.0 3.2 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2 
 RI high 2.4 3.9 2.5 3.6 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.8 
 GDP low -22.8 -26.1 -23.4 -20.5 -10.2 -5.9 -3.3 -1.5 0.1 
 GDP mean -18.0 -17.0 -13.5 -15.0 -2.7 3.0 6.4 8.5 10.2 
 GDP high -12.2 -5.8 -6.2 -8.6 7.0 14.5 18.8 21.3 23.2 
GR shock -0.3 -0.1 -1.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 
 RI low 1.5 1.9 1.8 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.8 
 RI mean 1.7 2.2 2.0 2.7 3.2 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.3 
 RI high 1.9 2.6 2.2 3.0 3.6 4.1 4.4 4.8 5.1 
 GDP low -17.7 -16.6 -8.8 -11.8 -9.0 -6.9 -5.1 -3.6 -1.6 
 GDP mean -13.9 -10.7 -4.4 -8.0 -2.8 1.1 4.2 6.6 9.2 
 GDP high -9.2 -3.5 -0.4 -3.3 5.3 11.3 15.8 19.3 22.8 
BB' shock 0.3 1.3 -1.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 
 RI low 1.8 2.8 1.3 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 
 RI mean 2.1 3.3 2.0 2.7 3.1 3.5 3.8 4.0 4.3 
 RI high 2.4 3.9 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.4 4.7 5.0 
 GDP low -22.8 -26.1 -23.4 -13.3 -9.9 -7.8 -6.0 -4.6 -2.7 
 GDP mean -18.0 -17.0 -13.5 -8.8 -3.9 -0.2 2.7 5.1 7.7 
 GDP high -12.2 -5.8 -6.2 -4.0 3.6 9.6 14.1 17.6 21.1 
 
Table 2.4: Shocks to the baseline and implied growth rates and reform: Full
transition shocks
Chapter 3
How to Catch Foreign Fish?
FDI and Privatisation in EU
Accession Countries
––––––––––––––––––
This chapter presents a partial adjustment approach to FDI stocks and its de-
terminants. In this framework the observed FDI stock is the result of two driving
forces. First, the stock converges towards its equilibrium level, even without policy
changes. Second, the equilibrium level itself is driven by changes in its determi-
nants. By means of a dynamic panel data analysis we examine the determinants
of investment by ‘old’ EU-members in ten countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. We find a rapid adjustment towards equilibrium. Traditional variables, such
as market potential, trade integration, and relative unit labour costs, are fairly sta-
ble as determinants of equilibrium FDI stocks in transition economies. Institutional
development in all its forms is a robust determinant of the optimal level of FDI.
The relationship between FDI and the privatization process is complex. Non-direct
privatization schemes negatively aﬀect the speed of adjustment towards the equilib-
rium, whereas current direct privatization strategies positively aﬀect the equilibrium
level of FDI. Privatization history increases equilibrium FDI, independently of the
method applied.
––––––––––––––––––
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3.1 Introduction
Attracting FDI is high on the priority list of many policy makers because FDI
is widely regarded as an amalgamation of capital, technology, marketing, and
management, especially in developing economies (cf. chapter 4). Policy makers
therefore have a genuine interest to know the factors that attract FDI. From a
theoretical point of view it is necessary to identify the conditions under which
foreign investment will take place, because of the costs inherent to entering
new markets and producing abroad (Markusen, 1995). Although considerable
work has been done, there is no consensus model providing the basis for em-
pirical work. The questions and the analytical approaches to answer them are
drawn from diﬀerent subfields of economic theory. Some approaches stem from
the larger field of macroeconomics, some relate to general equilibrium trade
theory, and some are more closely related to the theory of the firm, the latter
using the tools of game and information theory (see Markusen and Maskus,
2001). The macro-approach typically consists in estimating the eﬀect of po-
tential determinants of FDI by regressing some transformation of FDI on a set
of independent variables which on theoretical grounds would likely aﬀect the
profitability of investment. These variables reflect or aﬀect the local market
potential, the cost of production, and the general business environment. Fol-
lowing the growing literature that relates institutions to economic outcomes,
we add institutional development to the list of determinants. Institutions have
become an important aspect of the locational advantages of a potential host
country (see for example Kinoshita and Campos, 2003, or Bevan et al., 2004).
We examine the determinants of foreign direct investment into the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) by EU member states. Prior to
1990 the scope for FDI was extremely limited in Central and Eastern Europe.
The sudden collapse of the central planning system opened these countries to
foreign investment resulting in a continuous flow of investment to the CEECs.
The specific nature of the transition process makes CEECs perfectly suited
for analysing the impact of institutional changes on foreign investment. The
considerable variation in the speed and the nature of institutional development
across CEECs enables this analysis. Especially the organization of the priva-
tization process of formerly state-owned enterprises deserves a closer look, for
it has been explicitly used as an element in strategies to attract or prevent
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FDI. Hungary, for example, encouraged foreign involvement in the privatiza-
tion process by tailoring privatization schemes to foreigners. Prospective EU
membership and integration in the EU are another ’institution’ that could be
an important determinant of FDI in transition countries. Indeed, Baldwin et
al. (1997) attribute the bulk of the gain from EU membership to increased
investment, coming from both reduced domestic risk and increased FDI flows.
Given the state of economic and institutional development, there exists an
equilibrium level of foreign penetration in an economy. As FDI was zero at
the outset of transition, it is unlikely that the optimal level has been reached
at once. Therefore we think of FDI flows as an adjustment process towards an
equilibrium level of the FDI stock. The observed FDI stock is then the result of
two forces. On the one hand the stock will be evolving towards an equilibrium
level even without policy changes or changes in other determinants. On the
other hand the equilibrium level itself is continuously altered by changes in its
determinants. We specify a partial stock adjustment model that nicely reflects
the main features of the process of FDI inflows, namely i) investment takes
time to adjust towards the equilibrium FDI stock, ii) investment depends on
the actual stock, and iii) the equilibrium stock itself changes with the state of
development. To date the empirical literature has largely ignored the dynamic
aspects of the FDI process in transition countries. Kinoshita and Campos
(2003) and Carstensen and Toubal (2004) are the exceptions. Kinoshita and
Campos (2003) analyse FDI inflows at the country level which results in a more
limited number of cross-section elements. Carstensen and Toubal (2004) also
consider bilateral flows from the EU to the candidate countries. We diﬀer from
their analysis by developing a partial adjustment model into a dynamic panel
setup where we eventually allow the speed of adjustment to the equilibrium to
be influenced by the choice of the privatization strategy. The estimations are
performed using a generalized method of moments (GMM) technique following
Blundell and Bond (1998). We further apply a finite sample correction to the
two step standard errors as suggested by Windmeijer (2000).
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 describes some styl-
ized facts of FDI, the transition process, and the investment flows from the
EU to Central and Eastern Europe. Section 3.3 develops a partial adjustment
model of FDI and introduces the determinants of the equilibrium FDI stock.
The data and estimation procedure are discussed in section 3.4, while section
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 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
EU 96773 72359 76852 110736 249934 683893 374380 
United States 48422 19222 45095 84455 174434 314007 30030 
South & Central 
America 
9701 18446 29702 50198 82040 95358 56019 
South East Asia 22120 30105 65799 88682 90093 138698 88613 
Transition Countries 640 4801 7228 15667 25476 28244 32744 
World 208674 166967 255901 384960 686028 1392957 651189 
source: UNCTAD online database 
Table 3.1: FDI inflows in millions of USD
3.5 contains the results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 FDI and transition
From table 3.1 one can infer that FDI flows have risen substantially throughout
the last decade, although the rise is non-monotonous. This holds both for
the world as a whole, as for the regions displayed in table 3.1. The severe
emerging market crises of the late 1990s did apparently not seriously aﬀect
the level of worldwide FDI-inflows even in the emerging regions. It merely
temporarily slowed down the growth rate of inflows in South East Asia (it
did aﬀect the distribution across countries and regions though). The world
economic slowdown and the worsening of the international climate after the
events on September 11 2001 yielded substantially lower inflows in 2002. In
2002 the worldwide inward FDI stock amounted to 7122 billions of USD, which
exceeds the 1990 level of 1954 billions of USD with 265%. FDI stocks in
transition countries have continuously been rising to date. In 2002 the total
inward FDI stock in transition countries was worth 213 billions of USD.
Figure 3.1 presents a relative perspective and shows the percentages of
total world inward FDI attracted by diﬀerent regions. Together with table
3.1, this picture illustrates that FDI is mainly an intra-industrialised countries
phenomenon. The EU and the US account for more than 50% of total FDI.1
Emerging regions as South America and South East Asia (including China)
lost track after the emerging market crises in 1997-1998, while the EU became
popular as a safe haven. These international trends seem not to have aﬀected
1The EU figures do, however, include intra-EU FDI flows.
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of total world inward FDI received by diﬀerent regions
(Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD)
transition countries, since their share of total FDI has been small, yet relatively
stable throughout the last decade (cf. the continuous increase in table 3.1).
Absolute FDI inflows into transition countries have risen steadily since the
start of transition as can be inferred from table 3.1. At the same time there has
been substantial variation across countries. From figure 3.2 one can infer that
countries in Central and Eastern Europe have received the bulk of FDI inflows
in the region. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are the top receivers.
The FDI flows into the countries of the former Soviet Union have been much
smaller, except for Russia and some countries with abundant natural resources
such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Therefore we restrict our attention to the
ten accession countries, eight of which by now have joined the EU.
Already early in transition it became clear that most of the Central and
Eastern European countries -in contrast to those of the former Soviet Union-
were redirecting their economy towards Western Europe and the EU. Their
increasing integration with the EU resulted in a stream of FDI flows from
the EU. This stream reflects a continuous adjustment towards a desired equi-
librium FDI stock by EU-countries in these newly emerging economies that
almost since the start of transition have been expected to join the E(M)U
sooner or later. Table 3.2 gives an overview of the importance of the EU coun-
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Figure 3.2: FDI Inflows in transition countries in selected years in bln. USD
(Source: UNCTAD)
tries as source countries for inward FDI stocks in nine CEECs in 2000.2 The
EU accounts for about 80% of the stock of inward investment in most coun-
tries. The exceptions are Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania. For Bulgaria, other
important source countries -apart from the US in the last line of table 3.2- are
Cyprus (9.6%), Russia (6.7%), Switzerland (3.8%) and the Bahamas (3.7%).
For Latvia, Estonia and Russia are the other important sources (11.2% and
6.0% respectively). In the case of Lithuania, FDI is spread out more equally.
Switzerland, Norway, and Estonia are the larger source countries, all three
accounting for about 5% of the inward FDI stock. Overall Germany is the
most important investor in Central and Eastern Europe. The Netherlands are
at least an equally important source for four of the more advanced transition
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic), but only
play a minor role in the other countries. Austria is an important investor in
its neighbouring countries. The Baltic States are strongly linked with Scan-
dinavian countries. Denmark, Finland and Sweden account for nearly 70% of
the FDI stock in Estonia, 30% in Latvia, and 42% in Lithuania.
Finally, table 3.3 presents macroeconomic figures for the year 2000 for the
countries in our analysis. Poland has the largest inward FDI stock, followed by
2There were no data available for Romania.
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Bulgaria Czech 
Republic
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia Host
Source 1999 2000 2001 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
          
Austria 5.6 11.1 0.2 12.2 0.5 0.7 3.3 14.5 45.6 
Belgium 6.2 5.4 0.3 5.3 - 4.1 2.5 1.6 1.3 
Denmark 0.1 1.2 3.4 0.5 10.5 18.3 2.5 - 1.5 
Finland - 0.6 25.4 1.6 6.2 6.0 0.6 - - 
France 2.7 4.3 0.9 6.5 - 1.1 12.5 3.2 10.7 
Germany 19.3 25.5 2.6 25.8 11.1 7.4 19.0 28.7 12.5 
Italy 1.7 0.8 0.6 2.7 0.1 0.2 4.4 1.5 5.4 
Netherlands 3.7 30.1 4.0 22.5 2.8 1.1 26.1 24.4 3.0 
Portugal 0.1 - - 0.1 - 0.1 0.5 - - 
Spain 2.6 0.2 - 0.4 0.1 - 1.9 - - 
Sweden 0.3 1.4 39.5 0.9 12.6 17.3 3.5 - 0.5 
UK 11.0 4.8 3.2 1.1 5.0 6.7 3.3 3.2 3.6 
Total 53.3 85.4 80.1 79.6 48.9 63.0 80.1 77.1 84.1 
US  12.0 6.5 9.5 8.2 9.4 9.8 9.6 6.8 3.9 
Source: World Direct Investment Report
Table 3.2: Percentage of inward FDI stock in transtion countries originating
from 12 EU-countries and the US
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
FDI stock FDI stock 
per capita
GDP  
per capita
Monthly 
gross 
wage 
Private 
sector 
share 
Country 
risk 
Transition 
index 
        
Czech Republic 21644 2107 5423 342 80 61.67 3.3 
Hungary 19804 1987 4636 319 80 63.54 3.6 
Poland 34227 870 4300 347 70 62.63 3.4 
Slovakia 4634 858 3752 246 80 50.70 3.1 
Slovenia 2809 1413 9534 710 65 70.11 3.2 
        
Estonia 2645 1898 3761 302 75 55.02 3.3 
Latvia 2084 860 3250 236 65 52.60 2.9 
Lithuania 2334 632 3252 252 70 50.45 3.1 
        
Bulgaria 2716 398 1547 125 70 41.13 2.8 
Romania 6480 290 1649 130 60 35.21 2.7 
Inward FDI stock in millions of USD, UNCTAD FDI Database; FDI stock per capita in USD, UNCTAD FDI 
Database; GDP per capita in USD, World Economic Outlook Database, IMF; Monthly gross wages in 
manufacturing in euro, ILO Handbook of Labour Statistics; Private sector share in GDP, EBRD Transition 
Report; Country Risk, Euromoney magazine;  Transition index: average of EBRD reform indicators, EBRD 
Transition Report. 
Table 3.3: Overview of macroeconomic situation in 10 Central and Eastern
European Countries
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the Czech Republic and Hungary. The other countries are far behind in absolute
figures. Looking at per capita figures the ranking changes. The Czech Republic
and Hungary are still on top of the list, but Poland drops to fifth place, only
just in front of Latvia and the Slovak Republic. Eyeballing columns 2 and
3 immediately suggests a positive relation between income and FDI stocks,
lending some credibility to the market seeking hypothesis. The FDI per capita
figures further reveal that Bulgaria and Romania are the worst performers.
This can be related to the other columns in table 3.3: both countries are
perceived as more risky than the others (see column 6, a higher score means
a less risky country), and their transition index has fallen behind (column 7),
which is also reflected by the somewhat smaller share of the private sector in
GDP (column 5). This is a first indication that institutional development might
be important to attract FDI. On the other hand, average gross monthly wages
are much lower in Bulgaria and Romania (see column 4). Ceteris paribus, this
should help them to attract more FDI, unless the lower wage levels correspond
to lower productivity levels. Slovenian wages on the other hand are very high
compared to the other countries.
3.3 A partial stock adjustment model
Given the state of development of an economy, there is an equilibrium level of
foreign presence. We think of FDI flows as an adjustment process of the FDI
stock towards this equilibrium. In a partial stock adjustment model i) the rate
of growth of a variable Y is -ceteris paribus- proportional to the stock of Y
and ii) the rate of growth is -ceteris paribus- proportional to an equilibrium
value, Y ∗. The law of growth of Y can be written as:
dY
dt
= κY (Y ∗ − Y ) 0 < κ < 1 (3.1)
Some rewriting shows that the percentage rate of growth is a linear de-
creasing function of Y :
dY
Y dt
=
d lnY
dt
= κ (Y ∗ − Y ) (3.2)
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Chow (1967) indicates that an analytically more convenient expression is
d lnY
dt
= λ (lnY ∗ − lnY ) 0 < λ < 1 (3.3)
⇔ dY
dt
= λY (lnY ∗ − lnY ) (3.4)
The percentage rate of growth is now a linear decreasing function of ln (Y ).
The analytical convenience of the second formulation rests on the fact that
we can replace (3.3) relatively easy by its discrete version.3 The latter implies
approximating the derivative of ln (Y ) by ln (Yt) − ln (Yt−1) and the existing
stock Y by Yt−1 (see Chow, 1967 and Cheng and Kwan, 2000).
Replacing Y with the FDI stock, we obtain
d lnFDIi,t
dt
= α (lnFDI∗i − lnFDIi,t−1) (3.5)
dFDIi,t
dt
= αFDIi,t (lnFDI∗i − lnFDIi,t−1) (3.6)
(3.5) says that the percentage change of the FDI stock is proportional to
the gap between lnFDI∗i and lnFDIi,t−1. Since d lnFDIi,t = dFDIi,t/FDIi,t,
we can infer from (3.6) that the rate of change of the FDI stock is proportional
to the existing stock, holding the gap constant. Here we assume that the
equilibrium level, FDI∗i , is unaﬀected by FDIi,t.
4 In the absence of other
constraints, the equilibrium level of the FDI stock would otherwise be either
zero or infinity. The term lnFDI∗−lnFDIi,t−1 implies that the self-reinforcing
eﬀect of FDIi,t diminishes as the actual stock approaches the equilibrium stock.
It thus captures a process of gradual adjustment towards the equilibrium stock
3The solution to the diﬀerential equation (3.1) results in the so-called logistic curve, while
the solution of the diﬀerential equation (3.4) gives the so-called Gompertz or loglog curve. In
further stages of the process, i.e. for larger values of Y , a given increment in Y will dampen
the rate of growth more for the logistic hypothesis than for the Gompertz hypothesis and
the Gompertz rate of growth will be closer to a constant than the logistic rate of growth.
A further diﬀerence between the two formulations arises in terms of the point where the
maximum growth rate is reached. By setting derivatives with respect to Y equal to zero,
one can infer that the maximum growth rate occurs at Y = 0.5Y ∗ for the logistic case and
Y = e−1Y ∗ = 0.37Y ∗ for the Gompertz case. Furthermore the growth driven by (3.2) is
symmetric around 0.5Y ∗, while the decline in the Gompertz case is much more gradual.
Although this is more in line with adjustment processes in reality, the main reason to prefer
the Gompertz formulation is its analytical convenience.
4In order to have agglomeration eﬀects the opposite should hold.
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and is in line with the investment literature, which argues that the desired
capital stock is attained gradually rather than instantaneously (Cheng and
Kwan, 2000). The actual path of adjustment is thus the result of the interaction
of the positive feedback eﬀect with the distance between the FDI stock and its
equilibrium.
For empirical purpose we switch to the discrete version of (3.5) and ap-
proximate the derivative of ln (FDIi,t) by ln (FDIi,t) − ln (FDIi,t−1). With
fdii,t = ln (FDIi,t) we have
fdii,t − fdii,t−1 = α (fdi∗i − fdii,t−1) (3.7)
fdii,t = (1− α) fdii,t−1 + αfdi∗i (3.8)
From (3.8) we can infer that the observed FDI stock at time t reflects the
impact of two driving forces. First, the ’positive feedback’ eﬀect propels the
stock towards its equilibrium level, even without changes in other determinants.
Note that for the process to be stable (1− α) needs to be a positive fraction.
Second, during the course of transition the determinants of the equilibrium
level of FDI have changed. Consequently, the equilibrium level itself must also
have shifted over time, and should get a time indicator, i.e. fdi∗i,t.
In order to be able to estimate (3.8) we need to specify the determinants
of equilibrium FDI. According to the type of FDI diﬀerent factors might be
decisive for the choice of location. Resource seeking investors will be attracted
to locations with ceteris paribus low labour costs and good access to trans-
port possibilities to the relevant markets. For market seeking investors local
demand factors will be more important. Other factors might matter to both
types of investors. Generally, any factor that aﬀects the relative profitability
of an investment location will also determine the equilibrium level of FDI. The
importance of the following variables has been highlighted by earlier work5:
the market size of the host country, the country’s openness to trade, wage
costs adjusted for the quality of labour, and the riskiness of a location (spe-
cially for emerging markets). Chakrabarti (2001) performed an extreme bound
analysis for a large cross-section of countries and found strong support for the
5See e.g. Bevan and Estrin (2000), Bevan et al. (2004), Carstensen and Toubal (2004),
Chakrabarti (2001) and references therein, Cheng and Kwan (2000), Garibaldi et al. (2001),
Holland and Pain (1998), Kinoshita and Campos (2003), and Resmini (2000).
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explanatory power of host country market size. Other determinants are more
sensitive to the conditioning information set. Chakrabarti (2001) further finds
that a country’s openness to trade, followed by wage costs, is more likely to
be correlated with FDI than other determinants.
The specific nature of the transition process brings along some further less
standard determinants. First of all the key institutions underlying a market
economy had to be put in place. Since the speed and approach of the institu-
tional development diﬀered widely among CEECs, institutional development
may have constituted a decisive factor in the location choice of foreign investors
in the region. Because of this variation in institutional development, transi-
tion countries make an ideal environment to test the impact of institutional
development on FDI-patterns. Especially the privatization of state-owned en-
terprises stands out as an institutional change that is very likely to have borne
a considerable impact on FDI. The methods of privatization varied widely
across countries and embodied substantial diﬀerences in the openness of the
process to foreigners. Three broad categories of privatization methods can be
distinguished, namely insider, voucher and direct sales privatization. Insider
privatization is not conducive to foreign investment as the local firm is ’sold’
to a combination of management and employees. These insiders have been
very reluctant and slow to transfer their controlling powers to outside owners
(see for example Filatotchev et al., 1999, for Russia). Voucher privatization
allows citizens to trade vouchers (which they received for free) for shares in
companies at primary privatization auctions. Citizens can do so directly or via
intermediaries (for example the investment funds in the Czech Republic). In a
later phase foreign investors can then buy shares from the new private owners
on the secondary market. Direct privatization sales where state firms are sold
for cash to the highest bidder have in general been most open to foreign par-
ticipation. In many cases foreigners had equal access to the auctions, or even
were explicitly targeted as potential bidders as was the case in Hungary (see
State Audit Oﬃce, Hungary, 2001 for an overview of the role of foreigners in
Hungary’s privatization process).
Finally, during the 1990s, the Member States of the European Community
and later the EU involved the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in an
accession process. Since EU membership implies certain standards in terms
of macroeconomic stability, institutional and legal environment and political
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stability, the key announcements in the EU accession process may also have
aﬀected foreign investment. For example, lowered trade barriers between ac-
cession countries and the EUmight be relevant for resource seeking investment.
3.4 Data and estimation procedure
The dataset contains bilateral FDI stocks in billions of 1996 EUR. The host
countries are the eight new member states of the EU6, Bulgaria and Roma-
nia. The source countries are twelve of the current EU member states.7 The
data are drawn from the European Union Foreign Direct Investment Yearbook
2001 supplemented with data from the OECD International Direct Investment
Statistics Yearbook. We do not have data for all possible country pairs and
end up with 99 combinations. The data period covered is 1992-2000 for most
of the cross-sections, but not for all. Depending on the explanatory variables
used the total number of observations is about 600.
As measure for market potential we use real GDP in EUR, calculated as
GDP in USD multiplied by the euro-dollar exchange rate, deflated by euro
prices. These series are drawn from the IMF International Financial Statistics
database (IFS). The cost of labour in the host countries is measured by average
monthly wages in manufacturing, converted to euro. Average monthly wages
are obtained from the ILO handbook of labour statistics, exchange rates are
taken from IFS. Given a certain discrepancy in labour quality across countries
wage levels are probably not the right criterion for investors and should be
corrected for the quality of labour. One may argue that foreign firms will be
interested in wage levels rather than in unit labour costs because they bring
their own productivity enhancing technology with them. Unit labour costs,
however also reflect how well workers will be able to cope with for example
new machinery. Therefore we consider unit labour costs as an alternative to
wages. Unit labour costs are calculated as average monthly wages divided by
productivity, in turn calculated as GDP divided by employment. The latter
again is taken from IFS. We expect a negative impact of unit labour costs.
Given that we consider bilateral flows, we further transform the variable by
6Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and
Slovenia.
7Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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making the ratio of host country unit labour costs to source country unit labour
costs. Since we expect the ratio to be smaller than one, the larger it is, the
smaller the diﬀerence between host and source country unit labour costs.8 As
the ratio gets bigger, FDI should decrease. The expectation of a negative sign
therefore remains valid.
Gravity models of international trade suggest that the distance between
two countries can serve as a proxy for transportation (and informational) costs.
The smaller the distance, the larger the expected trade volume between two
countries. With respect to FDI, distance between host and source may reflect
opposing eﬀects. The greater the distance, the more incentives there are to
relocate production facilities to the host country and to replace exports with
FDI. However, in case of resource seeking FDI with the intention of export-
ing from the host to the source country distance will have the opposite eﬀect.
Therefore we abandon distance and introduce bilateral trade between host and
source country as explanatory variable. This variable, labelled integration, is
exports from source to host plus imports by source from host as a percent-
age of host country GDP. Bilateral exports and imports are taken from the
IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. The variable measures the importance of
the source country as trading partner for the host country and reflects the
degree of integration with individual (old) EU-members. At the same time it
also controls for the size of the source country, since other things equal the
host country will have more bilateral trade with a larger source country. A
significant positive coeﬃcient indicates that for source countries that are more
important trade partners, the FDI stock of the source in the host is likely to be
larger. Note that the variable has little to say about whether FDI and trade
are substitutes or complements. Moreover, the substitution-complementarity
issue is likely to diﬀer across industries (Lipsey, 1991): complementarity stems
primarily from increases in demands for intermediates in vertical relationships,
and substitution emerges from trade displacement among final goods.
Investment decisions in emerging markets are also influenced by country
risks. Risk ratings are provided on demand by specialized firms. These ratings
are quite comprehensive and cover a broad range of underlying economic and
political performance indicators. To the extent that we control for these factors
in the regression, risk perception should no longer matter. Nevertheless it is
8Should the ratio be larger than one, the opposite would hold.
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interesting to see whether these ratings add to the explanatory power of our re-
gressions. We use the average of the country risk ratings published twice a year
by Euromoney. Because a higher value indicates less risk, a positive relation
with FDI inflows can be expected. In the specific case of transition coun-
tries the perceived country risk is highly correlated with progress in reform.
Resmini (2000) concludes that the path and the pace of structural reforms
have been crucial for attracting FDI (her sample covers 1990-95). According
to Kinoshita and Campos (2003) trade liberalization and a reduction in cap-
ital controls are most relevant to foreign investment among all the available
indices of structural reform. If trade is positively associated with FDI, a more
liberal trade regime will induce FDI. On the other hand, if FDI is motivated
by avoiding trade restrictions, reduction of these restrictions will not induce
more FDI. Restrictions to currency convertibility hamper import of inputs and
repatriation of profits, phenomena that typically come along with FDI. In the
empirical analysis we test for an eﬀect of the progress in diﬀerent areas of
reform. In order to do so, the liberalization indicators taken from the yearly
Transition Report, issued by the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (EBRD), are added to the regressors. With respect to progress in
the privatization process we use more detailed measures than the liberaliza-
tion indicator from the Transition Report. We use separate indices for insider,
voucher and direct privatization. The variables take the value 1 if the method
concerned was the primary privatization method in a given year, 0.5 if it was
the secondary, and 0.25 if was the tertiary method.9 The indicator takes into
account whether privatization actually occurred or not. The data are taken
from Garibaldi et al. (2001), and are updated with information from several
recent issues of the Transition Report.
The time-varying equilibrium level of FDI, fdi∗i,t can then be written as
fdi∗i,t = β
0Xi,t (3.9)
9For example in given year in specific country direct sales were commonly used for pri-
vatization, but also some voucher schemes were applied. Direct would then be 1, V oucher
0.5, and Insider 0. Should only direct sales have been used, Direct would be 1, V oucher
0, and Insider 0. If no privatization took place, all three variables equal zero. For a given
year and a given country, it is not possible that 2 variables obtain the same score, except
zero.
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whereXi,t is a vector of the determinants of fdi∗i,t discussed above. Substituting
in (3.8) gives
fdii,t = (1− α) fdii,t−1 + αβ0Xi,t (3.10)
⇔ fdii,t = α (β0Xi,t − fdii,t−1) + fdii,t−1
This is equivalent to the following error-correction representation where the
imposed restriction follows from the assumption of the partial stock adjustment
model.
∆fdii,t = α (β
0Xi,t−1 − fdii,t−1) + αβ0∆X∗i,t
For estimation we consider the following reparametrisation of (3.10). This
is a dynamic panel regression with a lagged dependent variable on the right-
hand side.
fdii,t = δfdii,t−1 + γ0Xi,t + uit (3.11)
uit = ηi + νit
The OLS estimator of (3.11) is inconsistent because the lagged dependent
variable is positively correlated with the error term (ηi+νit) due to the presence
of the individual eﬀects. Though the within estimator eliminates this source
of inconsistency by transforming the equation to eliminate ηi, it introduces a
non-negligible correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable
and the transformed error term. This then gives rise to a new source of in-
consistency (see Nickell, 1981). Arellano and Bond (1991) propose to apply a
GMM-estimator on the first-diﬀerenced version of (3.11).
∆fdii,t = δ∆fdii,t−1 + γ0∆Xi,t +∆ui,t (3.12)
where the cross-section specific eﬀects are eliminated by first-diﬀerencing.
The transformed specification suggests an instrumental variables approach.
fdii,t−2 is correlated with fdii,t−1 − fdii,t−2, but not with ∆ui,t = νi,t − νi,t−1
under the assumption of no autocorrelation in the level residuals.10 Provided
T ≥ 3, the two period lagged level of the dependent variable can be used
10The only further assumption required is that the initial conditions fdii1 are uncorrelated
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to identify α. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the following extended list
of instruments for the first-diﬀerenced equations. More precisely, rather than
using only fdii,T−2 as instrument for the first-diﬀerenced equation in period
T , fdii1, fdii2, ..., fdii,T−2 are available as instruments.
E (fdii,t−s∆νit) = 0 t = 3, ..., T and s ≥ 2 (3.13)
In the case of multivariate analysis the explanatory variables can be used
as additional instruments. For strictly exogenous variables x, both past and
future values are valid instruments. In the case of reverse causality, x is said to
be only weakly exogenous or predetermined. Then only suitably lagged values
of x qualify as valid instruments. This gives rise to the following moment
conditions. For the strictly exogenous variables, ei,t−s, in Xi,t
E (ei,t−s∆νit) = 0 t = 3, ..., T and all s (3.14)
and for predetermined variables, pi,t−s, in Xi,t
E (pi,t−s∆νit) = 0 t = 3, ..., T and s ≥ 2 (3.15)
The first-diﬀerenced GMM estimator has been found to have poor finite
sample properties (bias and imprecision) when the lagged levels of the series
are only weakly correlated with subsequent first diﬀerences, so that the in-
struments available for the first-diﬀerenced equations are weak (Blundell and
Bond, 1999). This is the case in our dataset as the correlation between ∆fdii,t
and fdii,t−1 is only -0.36.11 Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest to augment the
first-diﬀerenced moment conditions by the following level moment conditions
to improve the eﬃciency of the GMM-estimator.
E ((ηi + νit)∆fdii,t−1) = 0 for t = 3, ..., T (3.16)
Level moment conditions for the explanatory variables can be added accord-
with the subsequent disturbances, i.e.
E (fdii1νit) = 0 for i = 1, ..., N and t = 2, ..., T
11The correlation for the main explanatory variables is: -0.07 for GDP of the source
country, -0.28 for relative unit labour costs, and 0.21 for the integration variable.
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ingly:
E ((ηi + νit)∆ei,t−s) = 0 t = 2, ..., T and all s (3.17)
for strictly exogenous x, and for predetermined x
E ((ηi + νit)∆pi,t−s) = 0 t = 3, ..., T and s ≥ 1 (3.18)
The GMM estimation based on the moment conditions (3.13)-(3.18) can
be performed in one step or in two steps. The diﬀerence between both esti-
mators is that the one-step estimator is asymptotically eﬃcient only under
homoskedasticity of the νit, while two-step estimator does not require ho-
moskedasticity to be asymptotically eﬃcient. Nevertheless, a lot of applied
work has focused on the one-step GMM estimator rather than the two-step
version because the two-step weight matrix depends on estimated parameters.
This makes the usual asymptotic distribution approximations less reliable for
the two-step estimator. Simulation studies have shown that the asymptotic
standard errors tend to be much too small. Equivalently the asymptotic t-
ratios are much too big when using the two-step estimator, whereas the equiv-
alent tests based on the one-step estimator are quite accurate. Windmeijer
(2000) provides a formal analysis of the issue, and proposes a finite sample
correction for the asymptotic variance of the two-step GMM estimator. We
use the two-step estimator and present corrected standard errors.12
The overall validity of the moment conditions is checked by the Hansen
test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis of no misspecification
is rejected if the minimized GMM criterion function registers a large value com-
pared with a χ2-distribution with the degree of freedom equal to the diﬀerence
between the number of moment conditions and number of parameters. The
key identifying assumption that there is no serial correlation in the νit distur-
bances can also be tested. If the level residuals are indeed serially uncorrelated,
then, by construction, the first-diﬀerenced residuals in (3.12) would follow an
MA(1) process which implies first-order autocorrelation, but no higher order
autocorrelation. Based on the first-diﬀerenced residuals, the Arellano-Bond
m1 and m2 statistics test the null hypotheses of zero first- and second-order
12In a comparable analysis Carstensen and Toubal (2004) present highly significant coef-
ficients. As they do not deal with the issue of the standard errors, some caution may be
warranted.
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autocorrelation, respectively (see Arellano and Bond (1991) for further de-
tails). An insignificant m1 or significant m2 will issue warnings against the
likely presence of invalid moment conditions due to serial correlation in the
level residuals.
3.5 Empirical results
Tables 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 contain the empirical results. The tests for first and
second order autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentifying restric-
tions are satisfactory in all cases. We do not report p-values for the m1-test
because they are all smaller than 0.01. The displayed coeﬃcients in the ta-
bles are based on the reparametrisation in (3.11) and thus show δ and γ0. To
interpret the estimated coeﬃcients in the original model we need to perform
some recalculations. To derive the speed of adjustment, α, we subtract the
estimated coeﬃcient of lagged FDI (δ = 1 − α), from 1. In order to retrieve
the impact of the determinants on the equilibrium level of FDI, i.e. β0s in
(3.9), the estimated coeﬃcients γ0 (= αβ0; cf. (3.11)) are divided by 1 minus
the coeﬃcient of lagged FDI (1− δ = α). Below, we interpret results in terms
of the original framework and the impact of the variables is calculated accord-
ingly. Table 3.4 contains a set of basic results with the traditional determinants
of FDI included among the explanatory variables. In table 3.5 we present a
more detailed analysis of the impact of privatization strategies on FDI. Table
3.6 is concerned with the eﬀect of diﬀerent institutions. And finally, table 3.7
presents some additional robustness checks.
3.5.1 Basic results
Table 3.4 contains a first set of results. Specification [1] presents results for the
more traditional model. In addition to the lagged FDI stock, following from the
partial adjustment specification, we use four variables as determinants of the
equilibrium stock: GDP, relative unit labour costs, the risk indicator, and the
integration variable. From specification [1] in table 3.4 we see that the lagged
FDI stock is statistically significant in explaining the current FDI stock. The
point estimate of 0.75 implies an adjustment speed of 0.25. Specifications [2]
to [9] result in an adjustment speed of about 0.3. The latter value implies an
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 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
FDIt-1 .750 .702 .700 .709 .712 .698 .704 .693 .699 
 (20.88) (15.86) (16.06) (17.34) (17.63) (16.34) (17.65) (14.46) (16.15) 
GDPt .317 .364 .367 .325 .349 .324 .349 .365 .384 
 (4.98) (4.63) (4.74) (4.19) (4.90) (4.37) (4.87) (4.40) (5.36) 
Integrationt .024 0.29 .028 .026 .028 .029 .029 .029 .029 
 (4.06) (4.17) (4.29) (4.34) (4.37) (4.72) (4.57) (3.82) (4.38) 
Relative unit  -.614 -.724 -.790 -.765 -.743 -.771 -.741 -.863 -.908 
labour costt (-1.93) (-1.93) (-2.14) (-2.33) (-2.29) (-2.31) (-2.32) (-2.28) (-2.35) 
Riskt .153 .149 .156 .146 .144 .156 .143 .174 .033 
 (2.46) (2.17) (2.27) (2.46) (2.33) (2.43) (2.25) (2.54) (0.21) 
Privatisation          
insidert  -.124        
  (-1.31)        
vouchert  -.137        
  (-1.46)        
directt  .195 .215 .199 .188 .218 .178 .192 .201 
  (2.21) (2.50) (2.24) (2.15) (2.52) (2.17) (2.06) (2.33) 
nondirectt   -.145 -.065 -.082 -.064 -.068 -.154 -.163 
   (-2.00) (-0.91) (-1.27) (-0.81) (-1.05) (-2.13) (-2.17) 
Extra market     .017 1.666 .018 3.905   
  potentialt†    (1.04) (0.58) (1.92) (1.67)   
EU accession          
Essen         .527 
         (0.83) 
Agenda 1        .073  
        (1.23)  
Agenda 2        .033  
        (0.46)  
          
N 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 
M1 -4.05 -3.93 -3.89 -3.89 -3.92 -3.87 -3.90 -3.83 -3.93 
M2 -1.13 -1.10 -1.10 -1.08 -1.09 -1.13 -1.12 -1.15 -1.05 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.29) 
Hansen χ² 93.32 93.34 93.55 91.51 93.67 95.23 91.25 93.64 93.47 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (0.97) (0.96) (0.95) (0.97) (0.63) (0.63) 
†Extra market potential: [4] sum of GDP of neighbouring countries; [5] distance weighted sum of GDP of 
neighbouring countries; [6] ‘infrastructure’ weighted sum of GDP of neighbouring countries; and [7] 
distance and ‘infrastructure’ weighted sum of GDP of neighbouring countries; 
 
Table 3.4: Basic results
adjustment path as shown in figure 3.3 where the equilibrium value is assumed
to be 5.0213 and the starting value is set at zero. The adjustment is quite
rapid and after five periods about 80% of the initial gap is closed already.14 As
equilibrium is quickly reached our focus on the determinants of the equilibrium
FDI stock is warranted.
The significant positive impact of GDP suggests that the market access
mechanism is present. A 1% increase in GDP results in an increase of 0.317/(1-
0.75)=±1.27% of the equilibrium FDI stock. The integration variable is sta-
tistically significant and is positively signed. An increase in trade intensity
13This is about the average value of the natural logarithm of the stock of FDI for the
period 1995-2000 for the average bilateral country pair. This makes EUR 148.4 billion.
14A solution to fdit+1 − (1− α) fdit = αfdi∗ is fdit = A (1− α)t + fdi∗. For the initial
level at t = 0 we have fdi0 = A + fdi∗. The initial gap thus equals A. The gap will be
halved when fdit − fdi∗ = 12A. With α = 0.3 this is the case after 1.94 period.
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Figure 3.3: Adjustment path towards the time-invariant equilibrium
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[1] in table3.4 (billions of EUR)
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between host and source is accompanied by an increase in the FDI stock of the
source in the host. An increase of 10%-point in trade integration is associated
with an increase of about 0.96% of the FDI stock. Relative unit labour costs
have the expected impact. As the gap between host and source country unit
labour costs becomes smaller, i.e. an increase in the relative unit labour costs,
the FDI stock is negatively aﬀected. If for example the relative unit labour
costs increase from 0.4 to 0.5, the equilibrium FDI stock decreases with 0.24%.
The risk variable is significant and has the expected sign. An increase in the
risk variable with 1%, i.e. a reduction of the risk, increases the FDI stock
with about 0.612%. Figure 3.4 plots the actual FDI stock and the equilibrium
implied by specification [1] for the average bilateral country pair. The equilib-
rium stock increases rapidly to about EUR 200 bln. and falls back a little to
stabilise around EUR 185-190 bln..
In [2] we add the privatization strategy used by the host country to the
explanatory variables. We consider three categories of privatization: direct,
voucher and insider privatization. Direct privatization has a significant positive
impact on FDI, whereas insider and voucher privatization are negative but
not significant. Because point estimates are not that diﬀerent we reran the
regression combining voucher and insider privatization into the category non-
direct privatization. Specification [3] seems to suggest that countries that used
a non-direct method as primary strategy on average have a logarithmic current
equilibrium FDI stock that is 0.58 lower, or a stock that is 1.79 billion EUR
lower. Alternatively, this can be interpreted that non-direct privatization as
secondary method reduces the positive impact of the direct strategy that has
been used as primary method. Though significant here, further results cast
some doubt on the robustness of this finding.
Specifications [4] to [7] test for an additional dimension of a country’s mar-
ket potential. In [4] and [5] we add the sum of the GDPs of the neighbouring
transition countries to the other left hand side variables, the diﬀerence between
[4] and [5] is that in [5] the respective GDPs are weighted by the inverse of the
distance between the host country capital and the neighbour countries’ capi-
tals. While the conclusions with respect to the core variables arising from [3]
remain unaﬀected, the extra market potential does not seem to add to a coun-
try’s attractiveness. In [6] and [7] we use infrastructure as an additional weight
to determine the potential arising from neighbouring countries. Infrastructure
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is defined as the ratio of kilometres of paved roads over country surface. The
underlying assumption is that countries that are connected through a better
road network are more easily accessible and therefore constitute a bigger mar-
ket potential. In [6] the infrastructure weighted GDP of neighbouring countries
is significant at the 5%-level. In [7] the distance and infrastructure weighted
additional market potential is significant at the 10%-level. The main conclu-
sions with respect to the other variables are unaﬀected.15
Finally, in [8] and [9] we introduce EU integration announcement variables.
The variables AG1 and AG2 in [8] reflect the division between first and second
wave accession countries, identified in the Agenda 2000 document of the Euro-
pean Commission. The decision was taken at the Amsterdam 1997 IGC. AG1
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the period 1997-99 for the first
wave countries, AG2 is defined along the same lines but for second wave coun-
tries.16 Both variables are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Noteworthy is
that AG1 is much larger and closer to significance than AG2. The ESSEN-
variable in [9] reflects the launch of the pre-accession strategy at the Essen
European Council in December 1994. The variable takes the value of 1 from
1995 onwards. As can be seen from table 3.4, we neither find a significant im-
pact for this variable. This is in line with Bevan and Estrin (2000) who find no
announcement eﬀects for the level of FDI. Only after switching to changes in
inflows and considering only announcement eﬀects for Visegrad countries they
find some impact. Does this mean that EU integration bore no eﬀect at all on
FDI? Clearly not, EU integration probably aﬀected institutional development
(think of the Copenhagen criteria). Moreover in this sample we only have data
on accession countries and no other transition countries that integrated less
with the EU.17 Furthermore, almost immediately after the start of transition
it became clear that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would, if not
join the EU, than at least focus on the EU-countries as main trading partners
and ease trade relations with the EU. Therefore our panel may be too limited
15We also tested the EBRD index of trade and foreign exchange, import duties, and taxes
on international trade as other possible weights along the lines of infrastructure. These were
never significant but again left the core (qualitatively) unaﬀected.
16The first wave countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia;
the second wave roup consists of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and the Slovak
Republic. In 2000 eight of the ten applicants were announced to be entering the EU in 2004.
The diﬀerence between first and second wave then disappears. Bulgaria and Romania will
enter the EU in a later stage.
17This is also the case in Bevan and Estrin (2000).
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to observe an eﬀect.
3.5.2 FDI and privatization
In table 3.5 we investigate the relationship between privatization and FDI
more thoroughly. Since most of the enterprises were state-owned at the outset
of transition, their privatization potentially oﬀered opportunities for brown-
field FDI. A broad array of privatization techniques was used across countries.
During transition, countries switched methods or used combinations of meth-
ods. As we confirmed in table 3.4 not all methods allowed for FDI equally
well. Clearly, not only current privatization eﬀorts bear an impact on the
equilibrium stock, but the entire history of the privatization process is likely
to influence the current (equilibrium) level of the FDI stock. Therefore we
introduce the cumulative direct and non-direct indices, one period lagged to
account for history. From [1] in table 3.5 one can infer that both the direct
and non-direct privatization history have a significant positive impact. Since
we cannot reject their impact to be equal, we re-estimate with [2] as result.
Privatization history, independent from the method used, has a positive im-
pact on the FDI stock. This probably reflects that privatization is only the
first step in a series of changes in ownership, so that eventually the opportu-
nities for foreigners to invest are no longer related to the privatization method
used. This is in line with the findings of Frydman et al. (1996) that not the
privatization method per se, but the resulting ownership type is decisive for
firm performance.
The relationship between FDI and privatization may be even more complex.
We did not find a concurrent impact of non-direct privatization. Nevertheless,
voucher and insider privatization schemes may have served as a dissuasive sig-
nal, because they were partly induced by the fear of selling out to foreigners.
This may lead foreign investors to postpone or even restrain them from their
planned investment. Furthermore, non-direct methods resulted in natives own-
ing the firms. Especially insider privatization resulted in a sort of entrenchment
as insiders clung to the control over the firm and blocked restructuring. New
investors will then also be less eager to invest because the scope for positive
externalities from domestic firms is smaller. This suggests that rather than
aﬀecting the equilibrium itself, non-direct methods of privatization slow down
the adjustment to the equilibrium. We test this by transforming (3.11) as fol-
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 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
FDIt-1 .628 .626 .654 .694 .642 
(11.57) (11.86) (13.24) (10.75) (11.81) 
FDIt-1*direct   -.007 -.011  
  (-0.32) (-0.64)  
FDIt-1*nondirect   -.038 -.023 -.041 
  (-1.99) (-2.07) (-2.62) 
GDPt .434 .432 .421 .407 .437 
(4.72) (4.78) (5.38) (4.87) (4.64) 
Integrationt .038 .037 .040 .036 .039 
 (4.44) (4.29) (4.20) (3.62) (3.91) 
Relative unit -1.189 -1.260 -1.316 -1.076 -1.180 
  labour costt (-2.85) (-2.85) (-2.78) (-2.36) (-2.18) 
Riskt .127 .150 .161 .110 .130 
 (1.66) (1.94) (2.53) (1.71) (1.72) 
Privatisation      
directt .165 .199 .179 .218 .224 
(1.83) (2.13) (1.78) (2.00) (2.03) 
nondirectt -.007 -.058 -.007 .016 -.027 
(-0.10) (-0.74) (-0.08) (0.20) (-0.33) 
Cumulative .062     
directt-1 (2.26)     
Cumulative .057     
nondirectt-1 (2.35)     
Cumulative  .055 .053 .052 .050 
direct-nondirt-1  (2.66) (2.96) (2.60) (2.44) 
      
N 579 579 579 579 579 
M1 -3.70 -3.70 -3.73 -3.76 -3.64 
M2 -1.10 -1.11 -1.18 -1.04 -1.19 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24) 
Hansen χ² 91.60 93.94 93.50 92.79 93.77 
 (0.69) (0.62) (0.95) (0.95) (0.60) 
 
Table 3.5: FDI and privatisation schemes
lows, where we also allow for the possibility direct privatization schemes serves
as a positive signal to foreign investors, speeding up adjustment to equilibrium.
fdii,t = δ (1 + κ1 nondirectt−1 + κ2 directt−1) fdii,t−1 (3.19)
+γ0Xi,t + εit
⇔ fdii,t = δfdii,t−1 + δκ1 nondirectt−1fdii,t−1 (3.20)
+δκ2 directt−1fdii,t−1 + γ
0Xi,t + εit
Columns [3] and [4] in table 3.5 present results. They confirm our hypoth-
esis that the use of non-direct methods slows down adjustment. The point
estimate is small but significant. The coeﬃcient of lagged FDI varies between
0.6 and 0.7 and is reduced by about 0.04. Direct privatization does not seem
to aﬀect the speed of adjustment. Results with respect to the other variables
remain unaﬀected. In column [4] we consider privatization strategies of the
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Figure 3.5: Impact of non-direct privatisation on the adjustment path to the
time-invariant equilibrium
last 2 years, rather than just last year. The dampening impact on the speed of
adjustment is now significant at the 5%-level. Since the no privatization obser-
vations are limited, the correlation between direct and non-direct is fairly high,
therefore [5] excludes the impact of direct privatization on the speed of adjust-
ment. The significance level of the interaction term increases to the 1%-level.
Based on specification [3], figure 3.5 plots the impact of non-direct privati-
zation in a given year or period on the adjustment path to a time-invariant
equilibrium level of about EUR 148.4 bln. (cf. supra). The closer to the equi-
librium the larger the impact. This can also be seen from (3.20): the impact
is δκ1 nondirectt−1fdii,t−1. This implies that the impact on the adjustment
path is related to the level of fdii,t−1. Now, the closer to the equilibrium, the
higher fdii,t−1 will be. Hence, a larger impact when closer to the time-invariant
equilibrium. Figure 3.5 further reveals that a prolonged period of non-direct
privatization considerably slows down catch-up to the equilibrium.
Summarizing, our evidence suggests that current direct privatization has
an immediate positive eﬀect on the equilibrium level of FDI, while current
non-direct privatization negatively slows down adjustment to equilibrium. Pri-
vatization history positively aﬀects the equilibrium level of FDI independently
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of the method used.
3.5.3 FDI and institutions
Following the increasing literature that relates institutions to economic out-
comes, institutions increasingly are stressed as potential locational advantages
(see e.g. Kinoshita and Campos, 2003, Bevan et al., 2004). The risk variable
already picked up the general institutional context to some extent. In the pre-
vious section we also elaborated on the complex relationship between FDI and
privatization, one of the important institutional reform areas. However, the
entire institutional framework of the socialist economies had to be rebuilt from
scratch. This process resulted in wide variety of approaches across countries.
The EBRD provides indicators of progress in diﬀerent areas of institutional
reform in its yearly Transition Report. This allows us to test which insti-
tutions matter to foreign investors and which not. We therefore replace the
risk indicator with various indicators of reform. Since foreign investors face
costs for adaptation to an incomplete institutional environment, we expect the
forerunners to have attracted more investment.
In addition to the average level of reform we test for the impact of reform
in the following areas: prices, trade and foreign exchange, competition policy,
banking reform, and reform of non-banking financial institutions. Table 3.6
presents results for these diﬀerent institutions. The average reform indicator
used in column [1] is a simple average of the EBRD indicators, excluding the
indicators for small and large scale privatization since we already extensively
control for privatization eﬀorts. We find a significant positive coeﬃcient. An
increase of 1% in the level of average reform is associated with an increase
of 1.34% in the FDI stock. This points to the crucial role of the stage of
development of institutions in attracting FDI, for in quantitative terms the
point estimate of the coeﬃcient implies a large positive contribution to FDI.
The creation of markets has been one of the core elements of the transi-
tion to a market economy. In this respect, the liberalization of prices in both
domestic and international markets was one of the crucial reform steps. As
foreign investors usually prefer to operate on competitive domestic markets,
price liberalization creates new business opportunities for them. The abolition
of exchange restrictions and multiple exchange rates allows to repatriate prof-
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 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5]  [6] 
FDIt-1 .622 .680 .661 .670 .673 .691 
 (12.13) (13.58) (12.22) (12.10) (14.33) (13.02) 
FDIt-1*direct -.011 -.019 -.002 -.010 -.016 -.012 
 (-0.48) (-0.84) (-0.08) (-0.46) (-0.71) (-0.48) 
FDIt-1*nondirect -.039 -.042 -.037 -.042 -.041 -.043 
 (-2.26) (-2.58) (-1.94) (-2.29) (-2.20) (-2.28) 
GDPt .423 .389 .422 .410 .429 .451 
 (5.13) (5.14) (5.24) (4.65) (5.75) (6.66) 
Integrationt .039 .037 .039 .039 .039 .038 
 (3.82) (3.72) (4.01) (3.62) (4.39) (3.68) 
Relative unit -1.119 -1.663 -1.140 -.720 -.970 -.567 
Labour costst (-2.37) (-4.07) (-2.71) (-1.92) (-2.30) (-1.75) 
Privatisation       
directt .183 .127 .202 .242 .171 .302 
 (1.90) (1.26) (1.94) (2.35) (1.60) (2.58) 
nondirectt -.009 -.025 .004 .027 -.019 .080 
 (-0.11) (-0.33) (0.05) (0.35) (-0.24) (0.93) 
cdirnondirt-1 .040 .044 .047 .039 .036 .051 
 (2.18) (2.36) (2.60) (1.88) (2.05) (2.18) 
Institution† .506 .912 .352 .301 .416 -.177 
 (2.05) (3.71) (2.32) (1.78) (1.82) (-0.80) 
       
N 579 579 579 579 579 579 
M1 -3.73 -3.85 -3.78 -3.72 -3.81 -3.79 
M2 -1.07 -1.02 -1.03 -0.98 -1.18 -1.09 
 (0.28) (0.31) (0.30) (0.33) (0.236) (0.28) 
Hansen χ² 91.44 89.12 93.38 92.57 91.03 90.05 
 (0.96) (0.97) (0.94) (0.95) (0.96) (0.97) 
† Institutions used in: [1] Average refom (excl. privatisation) ; [2] Price reform; [3] 
Trade & foreign exchange reform; [4] Competition policy reform; [5] Banking reform; 
and [6] Reform of non-banking financial institutions 
 
Table 3.6: FDI and institutional development
its and reduces transaction costs.18 For both price reform and trade & foreign
exchange reform, we find strongly significant positive coeﬃcients (see columns
[2] and [3]). This reflects that it is more interesting to invest in markets that
have been liberalized and where there is free competition. Further, bureau-
cratic interference in business transactions that is subject to clear rules and
regulation reduces institutional uncertainty. This applies notably to competi-
tion policy, which is important to protect consumers but can also be (ab)used
to inhibit foreign entry. Regulatory policy is of particular concern for investors
in industries with incumbent national monopolists (for example telecommuni-
cations). As old monopolies are broken, new possibilities are oﬀered to foreign
investors. Initially neglected, the design and implementation of competition
policy has proven to be a complex process, that lagged the liberalization of
markets for goods and services. In addition to the mere existence of rules, en-
18Established foreign-owned firms that benefit from barriers to entry, however, will oppose
this type of reform.
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forcement is necessary as well. Weak enforcement of regulatory policies tends
to favour incumbent firms or firms with access to political and bureaucratic
decision makers. Changes in competition policy therefore may change the rel-
ative competitiveness of firms operating in a given market and thus provide
opportunities for entry of foreign firms with a competitive advantage. The
results in [4] show a positive eﬀect of improvements in competition policy. It
is significant at the 10%-level.
Progress in establishing financial infrastructure and capital markets facili-
tates access to complementary local financing for foreign investors and reduces
transaction costs for local financial services. Further, better access to local
finance helps to reduce the exposure to the exchange rate risk. A better fi-
nancial architecture reduces the risk concerning the stability of the payment
system and the risk of a banking crisis. Local customers are also more likely
to gain access to bank credit. This can accelerate demand for goods that are
often bought on credit, e.g. up-market consumer durables. Financial reform
should thus increase business opportunities for foreign investors. We find that
banking reform in [5] is significant at the 10%-level. A smoother working fi-
nancial sector thus seems to increase the attractiveness of a location. Reform
of non-banking financial institutions, on the other hand, is of no importance
to foreign direct investors as appears from [6].
3.5.4 Robustness
We make a final round of robustness checks by replacing some of the core
variables with suitable proxies. In column [1] of table 3.7 we replace our
comprehensive risk indicator with its subcomponent that only reflects political
risk. Our previous results are confirmed. We already indicated that the risk
variable to a large extent accounts for progress in the transition to a market
economy as well. In table 3.6 we tested the eﬀect of progress in diﬀerent reform
areas on FDI. In column [2] of table 3.7 we propose another variable that
proxies progress in market reform. The private sector share in GDP (taken
form the EBRD Transition Reports) not only measures progress in reform
but probably introduces a further element in the sense that investors find it
more attractive to do business with private firms. The private sector share
exhibits a significant, positive relationship with the FDI stock. Results with
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 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
FDIt-1 .673 .660 .714 .756 
(12.77) (11.12) (15.64) (18.32) 
FDIt-1*direct -.017 -.004 -.004 -.015 
(-0.71) (-0.17) (-0.14) (-0.51) 
FDIt-1*nondirect -.043 -0.38 -.037 -.041 
(-2.31) (-2.12) (-1.76) (-1.88) 
GDPt .405 .418 .429 .272 
(4.98) (5.13) (6.20) (4.19) 
Integrationt .038 .041 .034 -.028 
 (3.96) (3.71) (4.18) (-0.54) 
Relative unit -1.306 -1.228 -.107 -.579 
  labour costt (-2.71) (-2.60) (-2.21) (-1.64) 
Riskt .257 .148 .222 .222 
 (2.07) (2.67) (1.94) (2.15) 
Privatisation     
directt .204 .181 .179 .139 
(2.00) (1.74) (1.85) (1.53) 
nondirectt .010 -.006 -.006 .033 
(0.13) (-0.07) (-0.08) (0.46) 
Cumulative .045 .041 .014 .026 
direct-nondirt-1 (2.59) (2.33) (1.02) (1.49) 
     
N 579 579 533 579 
M1 -3.80 -3.71 -3.94 -4.01 
M2 -1.07 -1.08 -1.11 -1.25 
 (0.29) (0.28) (0.27) (0.21) 
Hansen χ² 89.52 87.90 91.94 92.88 
 (0.97) (0.98) (0.99) (0.95) 
[1] uses political risk instead of total risk; [2] uses the private sector 
share in GDP instead of risk; [3] uses skill-corrected wages instead of 
relative unit labour costs; and [4] includes the GDP of the source country 
instead of bilateral trade as a percentage of host country GDP  
 
Table 3.7: Additional checks by replacing core variables with suitable proxies
respect to the other variables are unaﬀected with the exception of the measure
for direct privatization, which is now only borderline significant at the 10%-
level. This is not surprising in the sense that current privatization implies
an immediate increase in the private sector share. Estimation [3] replaces
the relative unit labour costs with a skill corrected wage measure. The latter
is constructed as wages in euro divided by a skill measure, in turn defined
as EDU
3+EDU2
EDU3+EDU2+EDU1 where EDU
x is gross education enrolment with x = 3
denoting tertiary education, 2 secondary education, and 1 primary education.
The proxy is significant and has the expected negative sign. The eﬀect of
non-direct privatization on the intensity of the speed of adjustment is still
significant, but only at the 10%-level. Privatization history loses significance.
Finally, in [4] the integration variable is replaced by the real GDP of the
source country in euro. Source country GDP itself is insignificant in explaining
FDI stock. The privatization variables lose significance at conventional levels,
except for the eﬀect on the eﬀect on the speed of adjustment that remains
significant at the 10%-level. Relative unit labour costs are also no longer
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significant.
Overall, our findings suggest that the traditional variables are fairly stable
as determinants of FDI stocks in transition economies. A general measure for
progress in reform is also robust to variations in the other explanatory vari-
ables. The same holds for the impact of non-direct privatization on the speed
of adjustment of FDI to its equilibrium level. There are good indications that
direct privatization strategies and privatization history contribute to higher
FDI stocks, although the evidence is not as convincing as for the impact on
the speed of adjustment.
3.6 Conclusions
Given the state of institutional and economic development, there is an equi-
librium level of foreign involvement in an economy. The collapse of the central
planning system initiated a flow of foreign investment to the CEECs. We think
of FDI flows as an adjustment process towards the equilibrium level of the FDI
stock. The observed FDI stock then reflects the impact of two driving forces.
First, there is a ’positive feedback’ eﬀect that drives the stock towards its
equilibrium level, even without changes in other determinants. Second, during
the course of transition the determinants of the equilibrium level of FDI have
changed. As a result the equilibrium level itself has shifted over time. A partial
stock adjustment model nicely encompasses these features and gives rise to a
dynamic panel estimation.
We find that adjustment towards equilibrium is rapid. As equilibrium is
quickly reached a focus on the determinants of the equilibrium FDI stock is
warranted. We investigate the factors that hamper or encourage FDI for a
dataset of bilateral FDI stocks of old EU-members in ten CEECs. We com-
bine a group of traditional factors with a group of institutional factors induced
by the transition process. With respect to the traditional determinants, market
potential and trade integration with the source country are positively related
to the equilibrium FDI stock. Higher relative unit labour costs vis-a-vis the
source country are associated with a lower equilibrium level of foreign presence.
Lower perceived riskiness is associated with more FDI. In the case of transition
countries perceived riskiness to a large extent reflects progress in institutional
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development. We find that progress in almost all reform areas, as measured
by the EBRD liberalization indicators, is associated with a better FDI record.
Non-banking reform is the only exception. The relationship between FDI and
privatization is investigated more thoroughly. Our results suggests that cur-
rent direct privatization has an immediate concurrent positive eﬀect on the
equilibrium level of FDI, whereas non-direct privatization schemes slow down
adjustment to the equilibrium. Finally, privatization history positively aﬀects
the equilibrium level independently of the method applied.
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Chapter 4
Conditional Spillovers from FDI
within and between Sectors:
Evidence from Romania
––––––––––––––––––
Many countries have tailored their policies to attract as much foreign investment
as possible hoping to gain access to technologies and skills not yet available to them.
The strong belief in the advantages of foreign investment is however in stark contrast
with the sobering empirical evidence. This paper argues that previous research on
spillovers from foreign to domestic firms i) has been looking for them in the wrong
place; ii) has to a large extent neglected conditionalities; and iii) has failed to
take into account non-linearities. We extend the analysis to spillover eﬀects across
industries and we consistently find that intersectoral spillovers are much larger than
sectoral spillovers. Our results also show that non-linearities need to be taken into
account and that the direction and magnitude of spillovers depend on absorptive
capability, export orientation, import competition and sectoral competition. The
debate on the direction and magnitude of spillovers from foreign firms to local firms
has only one good answer: it all depends and it depends in a way that makes
economic sense.
––––––––––––––––––
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4.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) provides a crucial source of investment finance
to many a developing country. During the 1990s FDI even became the largest
source of financing for developing economies (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). The
most important role attributed to FDI is however not investment finance but
technology transfer. Technology should be understood in the broad sense,
not only including new production technologies and products, but also orga-
nizational and managerial practices and other tacit and codified know-how.1
Multinational companies (MNCs) bring with them some amount of proprietary
technology that constitutes their firm-specific advantage and allows them to
compete successfully with indigenous firms that have the superior knowledge of
local markets, consumer preferences, and business practices (Markusen, 1995).
It is often hoped and believed that technology transfer will go beyond host firms
and spill over to domestic firms as well. Many emerging market economies have
tailored their policies to attract as much as possible foreign investment hoping
to gain access to technologies and skills that are not yet available to them.
Strong beliefs in the positive eﬀects of FDI are however in stark contrast
with the sobering empirical evidence (Rodrik, 1999). The eﬀects of FDI are
manifold and have proven to be diﬃcult to disentangle empirically. From their
meta-study Görg and Strobl (2001) conclude that the diﬀerent results in the
empirical literature with respect to the existence and the direction of spillovers
to domestic firms in the same sector are due to using industry-level data ver-
sus firm-level data, to cross-section versus panel data analysis, and to diﬀerent
measures of foreign presence (thus spillovers) at the industry level. The evo-
lution of econometric techniques and the availability of firm-level panel data
allowed to overcome some of the problems of the earlier literature but the ev-
idence is still ambiguous. Recently, two possible explanations for the mixed
evidence have gained attention. First, the idea that "it has always been there,
you just have to discover it" has made way for the theoretical understanding
that positive spillovers from foreign investment are not necessarily to be ex-
1There are oﬀ course other vehicles of technology transfer such as foreign trade and
licensing. Licensing is likely to be less eﬀective because the technology as a final product
is detached from its developers. Trade may work as a channel of technology transfer either
through importing intermediate products and capital equipment or through learning-by-
exporting into industrial countries (Damijan et al., 2003). However, the most eﬀective
method of technology transfer seems to be FDI.
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pected. The failure to detect unambiguously positive eﬀects may therefore not
be due to the lack of the proper data or techniques but may instead simply
reflect reality. This calls for more theoretical and empirical work to disentangle
the various partial eﬀects of foreign investment on local firm productivity to
improve our understanding. Therefore the focus of attention is shifting to the
identification of those region-, industry- and firm-characteristics that determine
the occurrence and direction of spillover eﬀects. Second, researchers may sim-
ply have been looking in the wrong place to detect spillovers. Indeed, rather
than being confined to intrasectoral phenomena, the significant technology
spillovers may run across sectors and stem from intersectoral linkages between
foreign and domestic firms. The rediscovery2 of these intersectoral eﬀects has
resulted in a number of studies identifying positive backward spillovers.
This paper on FDI spillovers in Romania contributes to the literature in
several ways. i) Methodologically we contribute to the literature by using the
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology. This semi-parametric technique
corrects for endogeneity of input selection and allows us to obtain consistent
estimates of capital and labour intensities. From the estimation, a measure
of total factor productivity, the diﬀerence between actual and predicted out-
put, is recovered. A fixed eﬀect estimator is then applied to relate total factor
productivity to diﬀerent measures of foreign presence and some other control
variables. This allows us to control for time invariant determinants of produc-
tivity across firms that are also potentially correlated with foreign presence
variables. Further, it addresses the investor selection bias that arises because
foreign investment typically goes to the more productive sectors. ii) Many
studies analyse which region-, industry-, and firm-specific characteristics FDI
spillovers depend on (see section 4.4), but most studies fail to take the in-
teraction eﬀects between these characteristics into account. We will devote
explicit attention to possible interactions. iii) In the large majority of studies
spillover eﬀects are restricted to be linear. We will allow non-linear eﬀects. iv)
Most studies assume that spillovers only occur within the same sector. The
few studies that analyse spillovers across sectors use input-output tables of
only one year, while firms are observed over many year in a panel framework.
This will bias the results, certainly in countries where the industrial structure
2See McAleese and McDonald (1978) and Lall (1980) for early analyses of intersectoral
eﬀects. Since then, theoretical work on linkage eﬀects has been undertaken, but empirical
research, until recently, has been scarce.
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is subject to fast and abrupt changes. We will analyse spillovers both within
and between sectors and will use a series of input and output tables to take
into account changes in economic structure. v) The data on foreign owner-
ship are usually only available for one year, while in reality they may change
quickly. We use dynamic ownership data, which allows to identify the change
in ownership over time. In short, in our dataset both ownership and economic
structure are time-varying.
Below we review the various spillover eﬀects analysed in the literature (sec-
tion 4.2) and the empirical evidence found in the literature (section 4.3). Sec-
tion 4.4 discusses possible characteristics FDI spillovers may depend on. Sec-
tion 4.5 lays out the data sources and the estimation strategy. Results are
presented in section 4.6 and we conclude in section 4.7.
4.2 Spillovers of foreign investment to local
firm productivity
4.2.1 Direct and indirect eﬀects
First, foreign firms are expected to be more productive than domestic firms
because they would not enter the local economy otherwise. This is referred to
as the ’direct’ eﬀect of FDI. MNCs possess intangible productive assets such
as managerial skills, reputation, and technological know-how. Therefore they
are able to compete successfully with local firms who have superior knowledge
of local markets, consumer preferences and business practices (Blomström and
Sjöholm, 1999). It is hard for MNCs to license their intangible productive
assets to a host country firm because they are not easily codifiable in the
form of patents and blueprints and diﬃcult to value. They can however be
transferred at reasonable cost to subsidiaries in the host country, i.e. foreign
investment (Teece, 1977). This implies that foreign ownership is expected to
raise the productivity of the firm that receives the investment.
Local firms may also be aﬀected by foreign presence through indirect of
’spillover’ eﬀects. Clearly, if foreign aﬃliates are located in foreign enclaves and
operate in isolation from local firms, there will be no or limited spillovers. If
there is interaction between foreign-owned and local firms, there are a number
of channels through which FDI aﬀects the performance of host country firms.
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Transmission mechanism Effect  
Intrasectoral   
Demonstration effects • Imitation of MNC technology and processes + 
 • Difficulties in absorption due to lack of technological 
capability 
- 
Labour market effects • Hiring of MNC-trained staff with improved human 
capital 
+ 
 • ‘Poaching’ of better staff by MNC; skill mismatch when 
hiring MNC-trained staff; upward pressure on wage 
costs 
- 
Competition effects • Increased competition by MNC entry forces local firms 
to become more efficient and reduce costs 
+ 
 • Domestic firms are pushed up their average cost curve 
because loss of market share to MNC 
- 
   
Intersectoral   
Backward linkages • Explicit assistance by upstream MNC (new 
management practices (HRM; JIT); technology transfer) 
to upgrade quality/lower cost of products; quality 
standard requirments 
+ 
 • Difficulties in integrating new technology within 
existing practices  
- 
Forward linkages • Purchase of improved intermediate products, 
technological upgrading of own products 
+ 
 • Incapable of using more advanced/complex inputs; 
rising costs of domestic suppliers (due to MNC 
competition) are passed on 
- 
 
Table 4.1: Overview of spillovers
Two major channels of spillovers have been identified: horizontal spillovers to
local competitors and vertical spillovers to local suppliers and customers linked
to the foreign firm in the production chain. Table 4.1 summarizes the diﬀerent
mechanisms and their possible impact put forward in the literature. Figure
4.1 illustrates how these spillovers run through the host economy’s production
chain.
4.2.2 Horizontal spillovers
FDI could generate a beneficial transfer of know-how and technology from
MNCs to local firms in the same sector. Teece (1977) describes various chan-
nels through which this technology diﬀusion eﬀect may run. The two main
channels are labour turnover from foreign firms’ trained workers to local firms
(see also Fosfuri et al., 2001) and imitation of nearby technology (the demon-
stration eﬀect). Further, foreign firms may bring along professional services as
accounting and consulting firms whose services become available to domestic
firms as well. On the other hand, informed MNCs will obviously attempt to
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final goods 
raw materials 
# Foreign# Domestic # Domestic 
Sector A 
Horizontal spillover
Forward 
spillover 
(δAB) 
Sector B
Sector C 
Sector D
Sector E 
Backward
spillover 
(αAE) 
Forward
spillover 
(δAC) 
Backward
spillover 
(αAD) 
Spillover Goods flow
Figure 4.1: Spillovers through the host economy’s production chain
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minimize technology leakage to local competitors, and may even refrain from
entering if they fear that their technology will be easily open to copying. MNCs
may not bring their state-of-the-art technology with them but technology only
slightly ahead of the host country technology frontier in order to minimize
leakage (see Glass and Saggi, 1998). The scope for horizontal spillovers may
therefore be rather limited. Labour market dynamics may also entail some
negative spillovers, such as the brain drain of local talent to foreign-owned
firms to the detriment of local firm productivity (Blalock and Gertler, 2003)
and an increase in wages for all firms that does not reflect improvements in
productivity as MNCs often pay higher wages (Aitken et al., 1996).
The entry of MNC aﬃliates also disturbs the existing market equilibrium
and stimulates competition. This increased competition provides another im-
portant channel of spillover eﬀects to local firms (see among others Aitken and
Harrison, 1999, and Glass and Saggi, 2002). Fiercer competition urges host
country firms to use existing technologies and resources more eﬃcient, or to
adopt new technologies and organizational practices. Considering the typi-
cal characteristics of a multinational entrant (scale economies, more advanced
technology, high initial capital), they are able to enter even sectors with high
entry barriers and can raise competition where domestic entry cannot (Blom-
ström and Kokko, 1998). The latter type of sectors are typically characterized
by high concentration and ineﬃciency due to the limited competition. Foreign
entry then will force existing domestic firms with some monopoly power to be-
come more eﬃcient. On the other hand, if MNC entry attracts away demand
from domestic competitors, this pushes the latter up their average cost curves
and may ultimately even drive them out of the market if they cannot live up
to the increased competition (the market-stealing eﬀect, see Aitken and Harri-
son, 1999). Empirically, it is very hard to disentangle these partial eﬀects and
therefore the net eﬀect of horizontal spillovers remains uncertain.
4.2.3 Vertical spillovers
Spillovers are not limited to intrasectoral phenomena. In fact the most impor-
tant spillovers may run across sectors. Foreign firms not only compete with
local firms in the same sector, but also interact with local firms that are up-
stream or downstream in the production chain. Figure 4.1 illustrates how to
identify backward spillovers (between a foreign firm and its upstream local sup-
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pliers) and forward spillovers (between a foreign firm and its downstream local
buyer of inputs). Though MNCs may seek to minimize technology leakage to
direct competitors (the horizontal eﬀect), they have an incentive to assist their
local suppliers to deliver high quality inputs, because they can only realize the
full benefits of their investment if the quality of inputs in the host country is
close enough to the quality in the home country, but at lower cost (Blalock
and Gertler, 2003). This incentive should be qualified in at least two cases.
First, provided that the transportation costs between home and host country
are not too high, MNCs may source inputs in their home country, rather than
in the host country. Second, MNCs may cut ties with local suppliers and in-
duce suppliers from their home country to invest in the host country as well,
creating an isolated enclave of mutually linked firms.
If an MNC decides to source locally and assist its suppliers, it will transfer
technology to more than one domestic supplier or encourage technology dif-
fusion upstream in order to circumvent a hold-up problem. The foreign firm
provides a stable demand for inputs to the host country supplier, enabling it
to build a stock of experienced employees and appropriate physical capital. It
is therefore expected that the backward linkage spillovers will boost local firm
productivity and competitiveness. However, domestic firms that cannot live up
to the standards required by the downstream MNC may get hurt by increased
competition of its local rivals that do supply the MNC. Rodriguez-Clare (1996)
shows that the backward linkage eﬀect of multinationals on the host country is
more likely to be favourable if the good that MNCs produce uses intermediate
goods more intensively and if home and host countries are not too diﬀerent in
terms of the variety of intermediate goods produced. If these conditions are
reversed, then MNC investment could even hurt the host economy. Hence, if
intermediate inputs in the host country are still too diﬀerent from intermediate
inputs in the home country (e.g. too low quality), a negative backward linkage
spillover may result.
Figure 4.1 also exhibits an equivalent forward linkage eﬀect, where bet-
ter inputs due to foreign investments aﬀect the productivity of all firms that
use these inputs, also local firms. On the other hand, the inputs produced
locally by MNCs may be more expensive and not adapted to local require-
ments. Therefore foreign investment in input sectors may mainly be beneficial
to already more productive foreign enterprises that are more fit to handle the
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better but more expensive inputs. This will lead to an increased productiv-
ity diﬀerence between local and foreign enterprises in the sector that uses the
input, a negative forward linkage spillover follows.
Markusen and Venables (1999) study the trade-oﬀ between increased prod-
uct market competition (the intrasectoral competition eﬀect), which in their
model is always negative for local firms, and intersectoral linkage eﬀects that
may have a positive eﬀect on local firms. They show how FDI can act as a cat-
alyst for economic development if the linkage eﬀects are suﬃciently strong: for-
eign investors may stimulate demand for locally produced intermediate prod-
ucts. This demand stimulus for higher quality inputs may encourage local
suppliers to invest and produce inputs conform to higher quality standards
(see also Blomström and Kokko, 1998). This has not only a positive eﬀect on
the productivity and the export potential of the local intermediate producers.
It can also stimulate the emergence of more eﬃcient local producers in the
consumer product industry and may ultimately drive the MNCs out of the
local market.
As with the horizontal spillovers above, one can only conclude that it all
depends, and therefore that the net eﬀect of vertical spillovers is uncertain.
4.3 Empirical evidence - Lack of consensus
The list of possible spillover eﬀects in table 4.1 is long and inconclusive about
the sign and the magnitude of FDI spillovers. Which eﬀects matter, in which
direction and to what extent, is ultimately an empirical question. The em-
pirical literature can be classified in three types of studies: i) case studies, ii)
cross-section studies (both at industry and firm-level studies), and iii) panel
studies (mostly firm-level).
Case studies (e.g. Teece, 1977, or Lall, 1980) are very informative and
provide detailed information but they cannot easily be generalized. The studies
that pool data on the industry- or firm-level fall into two categories: cross-
section studies and panel data studies. Caves (1974) and Globerman (1979)
are among the first to test spillover eﬀects statistically. They find positive
horizontal spillovers for a cross-section of industries in Australia and Canada
respectively. Blomström (1986) also finds positive spillovers for a cross-section
of industries in Mexico. This is a feature that can also be inferred from table
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4.2: cross-section studies typically find a positive correlation between FDI and
local firm productivity. Cross-sectional studies, however, cannot diﬀerentiate
a positive FDI-eﬀect from a simple investor selection bias. The latter would
arise if foreign investment would typically go to the more productive sectors.
For example, Harris and Robinson (2002) show that foreign-owned enterprises
tend to acquire the most-productive plants for a panel of UK manufacturing
firms.
Improved detailed data collection has provided research units with large
firm-level datasets. New econometric techniques have made firm level panel
data studies the standard framework to investigate the empirical validity of
FDI spillover eﬀects. Panel data techniques allow to control for investor selec-
tion bias and other unobserved firm-specific eﬀects. Firm level studies typically
make use of an extended production function. Empirical testing of spillovers
is then done by adding an indicator of foreign ownership to a production func-
tion. This approach does not, however, shed light on "how" the spillovers
take place. The evidence arising from panel data studies -after controlling for
selection bias- is still mixed.
For example, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find negative horizontal spillovers
for a panel of Venezuelan firms, while Haskel et al. (2002) find positive hori-
zontal spillovers for the UK. Aitken and Harrison (1999) attribute their result
then to the fact that domestic firms cannot withstand the increased compe-
tition. Konings (2001) finds negative horizontal spillovers in a panel of Ro-
manian firms, but there is no evidence of spillovers in Bulgaria and Poland.
Djankov and Hoekman (2000) find negative spillovers from joint ventures and
FDI together in the Czech Republic (1992-96). With FDI alone however, the
spillover loses magnitude and significance. For a panel of Estonian firms Sinani
and Meyer (2004) confirm the existence of positive spillovers after introducing
technology and competition control variables. Yudaeva et al. (2003) find strong
positive spillovers for medium-sized Russian firms, but negative spillovers for
small firms. Damijan et al. (2003) find positive spillovers for five out of ten
EU-accession states they analyse.
Whereas most studies focused on intrasectoral or horizontal eﬀects, re-
cently an empirical literature focusing on vertical or intersectoral eﬀects has
developed. Firm level panel datasets are then combined with input-output
tables. The latter are used to create linkage coeﬃcients between sectors. The
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Paper Data Aggreg. Country Da Ha Fa Ba 
Developing countries        
Blomström (1986) cs industry Mexico  + na na 
Haddad and Harrison (1993) panel micro Morocco  ? na na 
Kokko (1994) cs industry Mexico  + na na 
Kokko (1996) cs industry Mexico  + na na 
Aitken and Harrison,(1999) panel micro Venezuela  - na na 
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) cs micro Indonesia  + na na 
Sjöholm (1999) cs micro Indonesia  + na na 
Kathuria (2000) panel micro India  ? na na 
Kugler (2001) panel industry Colombia  ? na na 
Blalock and Gertler (2004) panel micro Indonesia  ? na + 
        
Transition countries        
Djankov and Hoekman (2000) panel micro Czech Republic + - na na 
Kinoshita (2001) panel micro Czech Republic ? ? na na 
Konings (2001) panel micro Bulgaria 
Poland 
Romania 
? 
+ 
? 
- 
? 
- 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
Zukowska-Gagelmann (2000) panel micro Poland ? - na na 
Damijan et al. (2003) panel micro 10 EU-candidates + (3)
- (4) 
+ (5) 
- (0) 
+ (2) 
- (4) 
+ (4) 
- (2) 
Yudaeva et al. (2003) panel micro Russia + + - - 
Smarzynska Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2003) b 
panel micro Romania na -/+ na +/- 
Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) panel micro Lithuania ? ? -/? + 
Sinani and Meyer (2004) panel micro Estonia na + na na 
Notes:  
results refer to the main or preferred estimation: + positive and signidicant result; - negative and signidicant 
result; ? insignificant result  
a D: direct effect; H: horizontal spillover; F: forward spillover; B: backward spillover 
b distinction: minority/majority owned foreign firms 
For developed countries see Görg and Greenaway (2003) 
 
Table 4.2: Non-exhaustive overview of papers on spillovers in developing and
transition economies
enriched datasets then allow to test for vertical spillovers. Damijan et al.
(2003) find both positive and negative vertical spillovers for the ten transition
countries they examine. In most countries vertical spillovers are found to be
more important than horizontal spillovers. Schoors and Vandertol (2002) find
for Hungary that intersectoral spillovers are economically much more impor-
tant than sectoral spillovers. Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) analyses Lithuanian
firm-level data. Her results are consistent with the existence of productivity
spillovers from FDI taking place through contacts between foreign firms and
their domestic suppliers in upstream sectors.
A lot of studies only consider domestic firms for the econometric analysis
and thus do not test for a direct eﬀect of foreign investment. Nevertheless,
the studies that do test for the direct eﬀect do not find unequivocally positive
eﬀects. Djankov and Hoekman (2000) find a significant positive impact of FDI
on total factor productivity growth of recipient firms in the Czech Republic,
while Kinoshita (2001) does not, though her sample is much smaller. Konings
(2001) analyses three other transition countries. He finds that foreign firms
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do not perform better in Bulgaria and Romania, but do so in Poland. He
suggests that it may take time for ownership eﬀects to have eﬀect on firm
performance. Yudaeva et al. (2003) find that foreign owned firms in Russia
are more productive than domestic ones, but that poor progress of reform in
the region of location negatively aﬀects productivity of foreign owned firms.
Damijan et al. (2003) find a significant positive direct eﬀect of FDI only in
three out of the ten transition countries they examine, in four countries the
eﬀect is negative.
4.4 Conditional spillovers
Recently the literature has come to the understanding that the existence, di-
rection and magnitude of spillovers may depend on sectoral, regional and firm-
specific characteristics. If this is true, aggregate studies are bound to find
insignificant or biased results. This leads us to focus on characteristics that
make domestic firms sensitive to spillovers. This can be achieved by interact-
ing a measure of foreign presence with the variable reflecting the characteristic
or by splitting the sample depending on the level of the characteristic under
scrutiny. Absorptive capability, openness, sectoral competition and concen-
tration, ownership type (especially in transition economies), majority versus
minority foreign ownership, and firm size have all been suggested as charac-
teristics that aﬀect FDI spillovers.
4.4.1 Absorptive capability
Findlay (1978) constructs a dynamic model of technology transfer through FDI
from developed to developing countries. He argues a positive connection be-
tween the distance to the world’s technological frontier and the rate of growth.
The result form Findlay’s model is that, for a given amount of foreign pres-
ence, spillovers are larger the larger the technology gap between foreign and
domestic firms. The further you are behind, the more there is to gain. How-
ever, the technology gap is also an expression of the absorptive capability of
domestic firms. This changes the interpretation completely. It implies that the
bigger the gap, the harder it will be to absorb the technology and managerial
practices of foreign firms.
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Many empirical studies lend support to the last hypothesis. Blomström
(1986) finds that foreign entry is related to structural changes in that part
of the sector that uses ’modern’ technology. This is a first reference to the
importance of the technology gap in the sense of absorptive capability. When
the initial diﬀerence in technology between the foreign firm and the domestic
firm is large and human capital is poor, the foreign firm is likely to suﬀocate
local unproductive competitors (the market-stealing eﬀect). However, if the
technology gap is not small and human capital is well developed, the increased
competition may stimulate a productivity catch-up by local firms. The direc-
tion of the horizontal competition eﬀect therefore depends on the absorptive
capacity of the local firm, as measured by its level of technology and quality
of human capital. Sjöholm (1999) finds for Indonesian firms that high tech-
nology diﬀerences give rise to large spillovers, although results are sensitive
to the choice of technology gap measure. Kokko et al. (1996) analyse hor-
izontal spillovers in a cross-section of Uruguayan plant-level data. They use
two subsamples based on the technology gap between foreign and domestic
firms. Horizontal spillovers are positive and significant only in the sub-sample
of plants with small or moderate technology gaps vis-a-vis foreign firms. Small
or moderate technology gaps seem to identify cases where foreign technologies
are useful for the local firms, because the local firms possess the skills needed
to apply or learn the foreign technologies. Large gaps, on the other hand, may
signal that foreign technology is not relevant (because diﬀerent product vari-
eties or qualities are produced), or that local technological capability is so weak
that foreign technologies can neither be used nor learned by the local firms.
Firm level R&D is also related to absorptive capability. Cohen and Levinthal
(1989) point out that R&D not only stimulates innovation but also increases a
firm’s absorptive capability, i.e. its ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit
outside knowledge. Kinoshita (2001) and Sinani and Meyer (2004) also men-
tion that the eﬀects of foreign investment may depend on R&D investment by
the local firm.
The results in the empirical literature lend support to the absorptive ca-
pability hypothesis, but fail to take into account possible non-linearities. Ob-
viously, if a firm is too far behind, it will not be able to absorb because it
lacks the skills to do so and negative spillovers will follow. If a firm is too
close to the foreign technology frontier however, spillovers are also likely to be
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small because there is not a lot to gain through spillovers. Moreover, Aitken
et al. (1996), Fosfuri et al. (2001), and Glass and Saggi (2002) claim that
foreign firms pay higher wages to stimulate the movement of skilled labour
from domestic to foreign firms. These highly qualified employees are likely to
be drained from the domestic firms closest to the foreign technology frontier.
This suggests that absorptive capability may aﬀect spillovers in a non-linear
way, with the positive eﬀects of spillovers mainly accruing to host country
firms not too far behind and not too close to the eﬃciency frontier. Measuring
absorptive capability is also quite problematic. The literature has employed
the following measures of technology gap: i) diﬀerent industries’ capital inten-
sities; ii) amount of patent fees in diﬀerent industries or equivalent measures of
R&D intensity; iii) diﬀerence in labour productivity in foreign and domestic
firms; iv) the level of intangible fixed assets; v) firm specific distance to an
estimated eﬃcient frontier. Each version comes with its problems. We use a
new and unbiased definition of absorptive capability (cf. infra).
4.4.2 Openness
Export-oriented firms produce for foreign markets so that they already have
contact with foreign firms, new technology and higher competition. This pro-
vides them with additional channels to learn and absorb spillovers. On the
one hand, this reduces the scope for spillovers, but on the other hand export-
oriented firms are probably better ’equipped’ to absorb new technology. Their
absorptive capability will be higher on average and therefore a market-stealing
eﬀect is not likely. It is to be expected therefore that sectoral spillover eﬀects
are less important in very open sectors, because both the negative and the
positive eﬀects of sectoral spillover are less likely to occur. Schoors and Van-
dertol (2002) find that spillover eﬀects vary strongly with openness. Sinani
and Meyer (2004) also find that trade orientation matters for spillovers. As
regards import competition, Sjöholm (1999) finds for Indonesian firms that
domestic competition rather than openness to import competition aﬀects FDI
spillovers.
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4.4.3 Sectoral competition
Predictions from the theoretical literature concerning the eﬀect of competition
on productivity are not univocal. Wang and Blomström (1992) stress the im-
portance of competition for FDI spillovers. High competition forces the foreign
subsidiaries to bring in relatively new and sophisticated technologies from the
parent company in order to retain their market shares. The conclusion is that
the tougher the competition, the more technology will be brought in by the
MNC aﬃliate and the larger the potential for spillovers will be. The reverse
reasoning also applies and reinforces the argument. Kokko (1994, 1996) ex-
amined the eﬀect of FDI on productivity in diﬀerent manufacturing sectors.
A high technology gap in combination with a low degree of competition was
found to prevent spillovers. There is however a serious identification problem
in examining productivity levels, as foreign firms may locate in highly pro-
ductive sectors. Nickell (1996) finds evidence of a generally positive impact of
competition on productivity growth in his empirical analysis. Sjöholm (1999)
finds in an Indonesian dataset that high sectoral competition (measured by
a Herfindahl index) raises the magnitude of FDI spillovers, suggesting that
the degree of competition aﬀects the choice of technology transferred to the
multinational’s aﬃliate, and hence the potential for spillovers.
4.4.4 Firm size
If larger firms have more resources to exploit innovative opportunities, they
should be able to benefit more from foreign technology. On the other hand
small and medium sized firms are often important sources of innovation. Small
firms make important contributions to innovation because they are less bu-
reaucratic and they exploit innovations that are too small to interest large
firms (Sinani and Meyer, 2004). This could be specifically true in Romania,
where most large enterprises are former state enterprises that are often not
well equipped to quickly adopt new technologies or adapt their structure.
4.4.5 Level of foreign ownership
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) suggest that the spillovers through technology
diﬀusion and learning may be larger with larger local participation in the for-
eign firms, because this facilitates access to the technology. However, foreign
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firms with a larger local participation have less control over profits and their
proprietary knowledge. This may restrain them to bring in state-of-the-art
technology, thereby reducing the scope for spillovers. In their cross-section
analysis of Indian firms, Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) find that establish-
ments with minority and majority foreign ownership indeed diﬀer in the de-
gree of FDI spillovers. Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu (2003) perform
the same test in a panel of Romanian firms. They find that positive horizontal
spillovers originate frommajority owned foreign firms, because they bring more
advanced technology with them, while minority-owned foreign firms are asso-
ciated with negative horizontal spillovers. With respect to backward spillovers,
the direction of the eﬀect switches. Minority-owned foreign firms give rise to
positive backward linkages, while majority-owned foreign firms give rise to neg-
ative spillovers. This is most likely due to the firms with local participation
sourcing their inputs locally. These findings are confirmed for Lithuania in
Smarzynska Javorcik (2004). Partial ownership generates positive backward
spillovers, full ownership no backward spillovers.
4.5 Empirical approach, data, and variables
4.5.1 Empirical approach
In line with earlier literature we will start from a standard production func-
tion and then introduce variables reflecting foreign presence. When estimating
production functions, the problem arises that firms react to firm-specific pro-
ductivity shocks that are not observed by the researcher. Firms that have a
large positive productivity shock may respond by using more inputs. Here,
one has to make the distinction between freely variable inputs, in particular
labour and materials, that react concurrently to productivity shocks, and state
variables such as capital that react with a lag. Griliches and Mairesse (1995)
provide a detailed account of the problem and make the case that inputs should
be treated as endogenous variables since they are chosen by a firm based on
its productivity, which is observed by the producer but not by the econometri-
cian. To the extent that this is true OLS estimates of production functions will
yield biased estimates of factor shares, and, by implication, biased estimates
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of productivity.3
Some studies attempt to correct for the simultaneity bias by assuming that
the unobserved firm heterogeneity can be captured by a time-invariant fixed
eﬀect or by using instrumental variables. However, both approaches rely on
the simplifying assumptions of time-invariance of the firm-specific eﬀect in
the former case and no serial correlation of the productivity shocks in the
latter and are, therefore, not entirely satisfactory. Therefore we employ in a
first step the semi-parametric approach suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996)
and modified by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). This method allows for firm-
specific productivity diﬀerences that exhibit idiosyncratic changes over time.
To illustrate the insights of the method we start with the following production
function that will be estimated sector by sector. Estimation therefore will
deliver sector-specific labour and capital intensities.
∀j : lnV Airt = β0 + βl lnLirt + βk lnKirt + ωt + ηt (4.1)
where subscripts irt stand for firm i and region r at time t, and j stands for
sector j. V A stands for real value added of the firm, L is the freely variable
input labour andK is the state variable capital. The error has two components,
the transmitted productivity component given as ω, and η, an error term that
is uncorrelated with input choices. The key diﬀerence between ω and η is that
the former is a state variable and hence impacts the firm’s decision rules. ω is
not observed by the econometrician, but the firm immediately adjusts it freely
variable input L to it. We focus on value added rather than sales because it
is a better measure of firm performance. Consider the following version where
small cases refer to variables in logs and firm and region subscripts have been
dropped.
vat = β0 + βllt + βkkt + ωt + ηt (4.2)
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) start by assuming that the demand for the
intermediate input, materials mt, depends on the firm’s state variables kt and
ωt:
mt = mt (kt, ωt) (4.3)
Making mild assumptions about the firm’s production technology, it can be
3In particular the coeﬃcient of labour is biased upwards, while the capital coeﬃcient is
biased downwards.
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shown that the demand function is monotonically increasing in ωt. This al-
lows inversion of the intermediate demand function, so ωt can be written as a
function of kt and mt.4
ωt = ωt (kt,mt) (4.4)
The unobservable productivity term is now expressed solely as a function of
two observed inputs. Following Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) make a final identification restriction by assuming that productivity is
governed by a first-order Markov process:
ωt = E [ωt|ωt−1] + ξt (4.5)
where ξt is an innovation to productivity that is uncorrelated with kt (but not
necessarily with lt; this is part of the source of the simultaneity problem). The
estimation routine itself starts with transforming (4.2).
vat = β0 + βllt + βkkt + ωt + ηt (4.6)
= βllt + φt (kt,mt) + ηt
where
φt (kt,mt) = β0 + βkkt + ωt (kt,mt) (4.7)
By substituting a third-order polynomial approximation in kt and mt for
φt (kt,mt), it is possible to consistently estimate parameters as
vat = δ0 + βllt +
3X
g=0
3−hX
h=0
δghk
g
tm
h
t + ηt (4.8)
where β0 is not separately identified from the intercept of φt (kt,mt). This
completes the first stage of the estimation routine from Levinsohn and Petrin
4Due to possible correlation with labour and capital, direct FDI participation in the firm
may distort the estimation. We focus, however, on domestic firms only. What about the
spillovers defined in section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3? Since we estimate a production function for
each sector separately and because the spillover variables are sector-specific, there is only
variation in the time dimension. The correlation between labour and capital on the one hand
and spillover variables on the other hand is fairly low (below 0.2 for almost all spillovers
in all sectors). Furthermore, the possible correlation will to some extent be accounted for
in the analysis. If ωt is a function of foreign presence, this will be reflected in material
input choice because mt = mt (kt, ωt (foreign)). The inverted function then reads ωt =
ωt (kt,mt (foreign)).
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(2003), from which an estimate of βl and an estimate of φt (up to the inter-
cept) are available. The second stage of the estimation procedure begins by
computing the estimated value for φt using
bφt = cvat − bβllt (4.9)
= bδ0 + 3X
i=0
3−iX
j=0
cδijkitmjt (4.10)
For any candidate values β∗k , on can compute (up to a scalar constant) a
prediction for ωt for all periods t using
bωt = bφt − β∗kkt (4.11)
Using the bωt’s for all t, a consistent (non-parametric) approximation toE [ωt|ωt−1],
say E
h
\ωt|ωt−1
i
, is given by the predicted values from the regression
bωt = γ0 + γ1bωt−1 + γ2bω2t−1 + γ3bω3t−1 + εt (4.12)
Given bβl, β∗k, and E h\ωt|ωt−1i the sample residual of the production function
can be written as
\ηt + ξt = vat − bβllt − β∗kkt − E h\ωt|ωt−1i (4.13)
The estimate bβk of βk can then be defined as the solution to5
min
β∗k
X
t
³
vat − bβllt − β∗kkt −E h\ωt|ωt−1i´2 (4.14)
Since each of the two main stages of estimation involves a number of prelim-
inary estimators, the covariance matrix of the final parameters must account
for the sampling variation introduced by all of the estimators used in the two
stages. Although deriving an analytic covariance matrix may be feasible, this
calculation is not trivial. Instead Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) substitute com-
putational power for analytic diﬃculties, employing the bootstrap to estimate
standard errors.6
5A golden section search algorithm is used to minimise (4.14).
6Given the use of panel data, sampling occurs with replacement from firms, using the
entire time series of observations for that firm in the bootstrapped sample when the firm’s
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From the estimation we recover a measure of total factor productivity, tfp
as follows
∀j : tfpirt = vairt − bβllirt − bβkkirt (4.15)
which is the diﬀerence between the actual value added and inputs multiplied
by their respective coeﬃcients. We use it in the estimation of (4.16) where we
relate total factor productivity to the measures of foreign presence, a concen-
tration index, and sector, region, and time dummies (αj, αr, and αt). Note
that we use all sectors in the estimation of (4.16), whereas (4.15) is based on
a sector-specific estimation.7
tfpijrt = αi + α1f (FDI) + α2Concj + αj + αr + αt + εijrt (4.16)
Concentration -Conc in (4.16)- is the sectoral Herfindahl concentration
index. Nickell (1996) points out that the theoretical literature is inconclusive
about the impact of competition on productivity. In his empirical analysis he
finds a positive impact of competition on firm performance, if this is the case
α2 can be expected to be negative. f (FDI) covers diﬀerent transformations of
the horizontal and vertical spillovers (see sections 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 4.5.2 below),
conditioned on the characteristics discussed in section 4.4. This involves several
rounds of regressions.
A first set of regressions will, in line with earlier literature test for the level
eﬀect of horizontal and vertical spillovers. In a second set of regressions we
introduce quadratic terms to allow non-linear spillover eﬀects. Further sets of
regressions will deal with firm and industry characteristics that are possibly
decisive for the occurrence and direction of spillovers. Conditioning can be done
either through interacting the spillover variables with the characteristics or by
splitting the sample in subsamples based on cutoﬀ values for the characteris-
tics.8 When combining characteristics, a sample-split will ease comparison and
ID-number is randomly drawn. A bootstrapped sample is complete when the number of
firm-year observations (closely) equals the number of firm-year observations in the original
sample. The variation in the point estimates across the bootstrapped samples provides an
estimate for the standard errors of the original point estimates. (see Petrin et al., 2004)
7Also note that (4.5) is an empirical approach used for identification within a sector,
whereas (4.16) is a structural approach applied to the entire dataset.
8Obviously, the latter strategy is equivalent to transforming the characteristic under
scrutiny into one or more dummy variables according to the categories one defines and
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interpretation. The former strategy is appropriate when one expects a continu-
ous relationship between the characteristic and the spillover eﬀect, whereas the
latter is more focused on ’breaks’ in the relationship. We consider interaction
eﬀects with absorptive capability and in further rounds of regressions we test
whether the found FDI spillovers depend on competition from imports, export
orientation, and sectoral concentration by splitting up the sample in a novel
way. Finally, we verify whether the found eﬀects depend on firm size and the
degree of foreign ownership respectively.
4.5.2 Data description and variable definitions
Romanian firm-level data for 1996-2001 are drawn from the Amadeus database
provided by Bureau Van Dijk. Sectoral price level data for manufacturing at
Nace9 2-digit level taken from WIIW Industrial database and from the Statis-
tical Yearbook of the Romanian National Statistical Oﬃce. They are used to
appropriately deflate the raw data (see below for details). Our sectoral clas-
sification follows the classification used in the Romanian input-output tables.
Appendix A describes the sectors and links them to the Nace classification
scheme. The whole series of Amadeus DVDs is used to reconstruct a database
of time-specific foreign entry in local Romanian firms.10 Since ownership infor-
mation is gathered at irregular intervals rather than continuously monitored,
we do not have ownership information for all years for all firms. Because of
the irregular intervals ownership changes show up only ex post in the database.
Therefore we choose to fill the gaps with the information from the following
year for those firms whose ownership structure has not been investigated every
year. Input-output tables for the period 1998-2001 are obtained from the
Romanian National Statistical Oﬃce. Both the ownership data and the input-
output tables are necessary for the construction of the FDI spillover measures
(cf. infra). In addition the ownership data gives us the degree of foreign own-
ership, while the input output tables give us the information on the sectoral
level of import competition and export orientation.
Value added is calculated as real output Y , measured as sales deflated
by producer price indices of the appropriate Nace sector minus real material
interacting all explanatory variables with the dummies.
9Nomenclature générale des activités économiques dans les Communautés européennes.
10A DVD includes only the most recent ownership information.
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inputM , measured as material costs deflated by a weighted intermediate input
deflator where the sector-specific weighting scheme is drawn from the input-
output tables. Labour L is expressed as the number of employees. Real capital
K is measured as fixed assets, deflated by the average of the deflators for the
following five Nace-sectors: machinery and equipment (29); oﬃce machinery
and computing (30); electrical machinery and apparatus (31); motor vehicles,
trailers, and semi-trailers (34); and other transport equipment (35). This
approach follows Smarzynska Javorcik (2004). Concentration, Conc, is the
Herfindahl concentration index defined at the sectoral classification found in
the appendix.11 αj, αr, and αt are 101 sector, 41 region, and 4 annual time
dummies respectively.
f (FDI) in (4.16) is a shorthand for all possible spillover eﬀects from FDI,
conditioned on the criteria discussed in section 4.4. The variables, Horizontal,
Forward, and Backward are proxies for the spillover eﬀects of FDI on firm
productivity as illustrated in figure 4.1. Horizontal is a proxy for the foreign
presence sector j at time t. It is defined as the share of foreign firms’ output
in total sector output.
Horizontaljt =
P
i∈j Foreignit ∗ YitP
i∈j Yit
(4.17)
Horizontal can be varied with diﬀerent interpretations of Foreign. The most
crude measure is a dummy, say Fijrt, that takes the value 1 if there exist
foreign participation over 10% in a firm. Alternatively, the Amadeus data-
base allows to use a variable that indicates the share of a firm’s total equity
owned by foreign investors, FShareijrt. It is diﬃcult to state a preference
for one or the other. Focusing on shares implicitly implies the assumption
of a linear relation between the sophistication of technology brought in and
the level of participation. The use of a dummy on the other hand completely
ignores any possible relation. We have a small preference for the dummy over
the percentage bearing in mind that the idea behind spillovers is that foreign
firms are technologically more advanced than domestic firms. Nevertheless, we
present evidence for both. A middle way classification is obtained by using
several dummy variables that indicate whether the foreign involvement consti-
11The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of the firms in
a sector.
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tutes minority, majority or full ownership (FFULijrt; FMAJijrt; FMINijrt).
This gives rise to three separate horizontal measures and consequently three
backward and forward measures (cf. infra). We will apply this classifica-
tion as additional test. The higher the value of output of foreign firms and
-depending on the interpretation of Foreign- the higher the share of foreign
equity in foreign enterprises, the higher the value of Horizontal. Alternatively
Horizontal can be defined in terms of the share of foreign employment in total
employment. We use both definitions in various specifications.
Backward and Forward are the basic measures for vertical spillovers.
Backward is used to test whether MNCs that source inputs locally trans-
fer technology to their suppliers. In principle we want to know the share of
a firm’s output that is sold to foreign-owned firms. Information this detailed
is not available in our dataset, however. Moreover, the share sold to foreign
firms is likely to be endogenous if the latter prefer to buy their inputs from
the more productive domestic firms. We proxy the share of a firm’s output
sold to foreign firms with the share of the sector’s output sold to foreign firms
in diﬀerent downstream markets. This makes endogeneity unlikely as MNCs
cannot easily switch between sectors for their inputs. The input-output tables
tell us the amount that sector j supplies to its sourcing sectors k. We also
know the share of output in all sectors k that is produced by foreign owned
firms, i.e. Horizontalkt. If we assume that a firm’s share in sectoral use of a
particular input is proportional to its share in total sector output, then we can
measure the share of a sector’s output sold to foreign firms as:
Backwardjt =
X
k if k 6=j
αjktHorizontalkt (4.18)
where αjkt is the proportion of sector j’s output supplied to sourcing sector
k. The αs are calculated from the input-output tables. We explicitly ex-
clude inputs sold within the firm’s sector (k 6= j) because this is captured by
Horizontal.12
12Consider the following example to clarify the definition a bit more: consider three sectors
j, k1, and k2. Suppose that half of the output of j is purchased by k1 and the other half by
k2. Further suppose that no foreign firms are active in k1, but half of the output of k2 is
produced by foreign firms. The backward variable for sector j then becomes: (0.5 ∗ 0.0) +
(0.5 ∗ 0.5) = 0.25. It is now easily seen that the value of Backward increases with foreign
presence in the sectors k that source inputs from j and with the share of output of sector j
supplied to industries with MNC presence.
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full sample domestic sample
N mean st. dev. N mean st. dev.
real output 244261 9.088 2.043 215702 8.898 1.944
real materials 245680 8.231 2.310 216923 8.081 2.239
real capital 243118 7.199 2.490 214358 6.945 2.373
labour 227937 1.771 1.451 200659 1.627 1.325
absorptive capability 227937 0.161 0.186 200659 0.149 0.173
Herfindahl 244261 0.025 0.046 215702 0.024 0.043
output based
horizontal 244261 0.256 0.156 215702 0.248 0.153
backward 244261 0.258 0.074 215702 0.257 0.076
forward 244261 0.304 0.073 215702 0.305 0.073
employment based
horizontal 227937 0.189 0.148 200659 0.183 0.145
backward 227937 0.223 0.086 200659 0.222 0.087
forward 227937 0.246 0.074 200659 0.247 0.074
Table 4.3: Summary statistics for the full and domestic sample
Forward captures the idea that domestic firms who buy inputs from foreign
firms might benefit from higher quality inputs and might benefit from demon-
stration eﬀects. Making the same assumptions as above we define Forward
as:
Forwardjt =
X
l if l 6=j
δjltHorizontallt (4.19)
here δjlt are coeﬃcients that indicate the share of sector j inputs purchased
from upstream sectors l. The δs are again obtained from the input-output
tables. Again, we exclude inputs purchased within the firm’s sector (l 6= j)
because this is captured by Horizontal.13
As indicated above we will consider the interaction of absorptive capability
(AC) with Horizontal, Backward, and Forward. Since we have no read-
ily available measure for AC, we need to construct a measure. Absorptive
capability should reflect the relative technical capabilities of a domestic firm
vis-a-vis the foreign firms. Therefore we apply the Levinsohn-Petrin technique
on earlier years (to avoid endogeneity) on the full sample of both domestic and
13Consider the following example for three sectors j, l1, and l2. Suppose j buys 75% of
its inputs with l1 and the remaining 25% with l2. Further suppose that 10% of l1’s output
is produced by foreign firms, and half of the output of l2 is produced by foreign firms. The
backward variable for sector j then becomes: (0.75 ∗ 0.10) + (0.25 ∗ 0.50) = 0.20.
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 output employment 
 dummy percentage dummy percentage 
horizontal -0.044 0.148 0.585 0.900 
 [1.02] [2.69]*** [16.65]*** [17.26]*** 
backward -1.011 -1.312 -1.260 -1.378 
 [21.12]*** [21.53]*** [27.10]*** [22.25]*** 
forward 3.250 4.203 2.491 5.111 
 [50.68]*** [53.67]*** [40.35]*** [49.24]*** 
Herfindahl -1.231 -1.167 -1.390 -1.244 
 [8.64]*** [8.19]*** [9.90]*** [8.88]*** 
Observations 192851 192851 192851 192851 
Number of  firms 72365 72365 72365 72365 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
Table 4.4: Horizontal and vertical spillovers: level eﬀects
foreign firms to create total factor productivity measures ϕ for all firms. We
then define in (4.20) the absorptive capability of a firm as the distance between
its own productivity level and the ’foreign frontier’. The latter is defined as the
mean productive eﬃciency of the top quartile of foreign firms (above the 75th
percentile in θ) in industry j. The higher the value of AC, the more advanced
the firm.
ACijrt =
ϕijrt
ϕj,FOR|θ>0.75
(4.20)
Table 4.3 gives summary statistics for the variables described above. Note-
whorty is that the output based measures for spillovers are larger than the
employment based measures. This is due to the fact that some domestic firms,
especially in manufacturing, tend to be overstaﬀed, a heritage from the com-
munist era.
4.6 Results and interpretation
Table 4.4 shows how firm productivity is explained by spillover eﬀects. In
column 1 and 3 the measures of foreign presence are based on the dummy-
version of (4.17), (4.18) and (4.19); in columns 2 and 4 the percentage-versions
are used. Columns 1 and 2 show results for the output based measures, 3
and 4 for the employment based counterparts.14 The first result that catches
14We performed the regressions with only manufacturing sectors as well, results are not
presented here, but available on demand.
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 output employment 
 dummy percentage dummy percentage 
horizontal -0.500 -0.021 1.098 1.080 
 [4.82]*** [0.17] [13.35]*** [10.69]*** 
horizontal² 0.484 0.000 -0.939 -0.000 
 [3.62]*** [0.81] [8.40]*** [3.91]*** 
backward -0.735 -1.171 -2.858 -4.034 
 [5.09]*** [6.37]*** [23.77]*** [26.30]*** 
backward² -0.498 0.410 4.253 9.340 
 [1.47] [0.71] [14.85]*** [19.41]*** 
forward 10.332 15.535 4.815 9.954 
 [44.07]*** [57.67]*** [21.97]*** [35.14]*** 
forward² -12.422 -27.637 -4.572 -16.146 
 [31.39]*** [43.96]*** [11.69]*** [19.90]*** 
Herfindahl -1.028 -0.849 -1.370 -1.080 
 [7.19]*** [5.96]*** [9.73]*** [7.71]*** 
Observations 192851 192851 192851 192851 
Number of firms 72365 72365 72365 72365 
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
Table 4.5: Horizontal and vertical spillovers: non-linear eﬀects
the eye is the dominance of intersectoral spillovers over sectoral spillovers. It
cannot be rejected that vertical eﬀects are economically more important than
horizontal eﬀects. This conclusion is supported in all the following results.
Clearly research on spillovers needs to be re-oriented in this direction. The
horizontal spillovers, the eﬀect of the presence of foreign firms in the sector,
remain unclear in table 4.4 because the direction and significance of horizontal
spillovers is not consistent across specifications. This fits the ambiguous results
in the literature. There is however a consistent positive forward spillover eﬀect
to local enterprises in all specifications. This means that Romanian firms
benefit from foreign presence in the industries they buy their inputs from. Both
service and manufacturing sectors are found to benefit from foreign presence in
their input sectors, probably through better inputs. The backward spillover,
the eﬀect of foreign presence in the sectors to whom you sell, is negative for
all sectors, although the results are less explicit if we restrict attention to
manufacturing sectors.
In table 4.5 we allow for non-linear eﬀects. The results suggest that spillovers
are highly non-linear indeed. In figure 4.2 we plot the relations found in table
4.5. The vertical lines indicate the 95th percentile of the distribution of the
corresponding spillover. The sign and direction of horizontal spillovers are still
mixed in the specifications considered. The larger and more clearly positive
CHAPTER 4. CONDITIONAL SPILLOVERS FROM FDI 126
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 output employment 
 dummy percentage dummy percentage 
horizontal -0.459 -0.057 0.896 0.874 
 [3.49]*** [0.38] [8.17]*** [6.35]*** 
horizontal² 0.640 0.000 -0.581 -0.000 
 [3.69]*** [2.22]** [3.54]*** [0.89] 
AC*horizontal 0.592 0.442 0.917 0.980 
 [0.76] [0.52] [1.46] [1.30] 
AC*horizontal² -2.273 -0.000 -1.835 -0.000 
 [1.96]* [1.87]* [1.84]* [1.30] 
AC²*horizontal -0.246 -0.316 -0.287 -0.369 
 [0.28] [0.33] [0.40] [0.42] 
AC²*horizontal² 1.243 0.000 0.409 0.000 
 [0.94] [1.05] [0.37] [0.22] 
backward -1.780 -2.844 -3.169 -4.453 
 [8.89]*** [11.41]*** [18.56]*** [20.16]*** 
backward² 3.006 7.327 6.341 12.821 
 [6.39]*** [9.37]*** [15.76]*** [18.40]*** 
AC*backward 8.651 13.108 1.814 2.089 
 [6.88]*** [8.66]*** [1.52] [1.39] 
AC*backward² -30.791 -57.744 -16.691 -26.751 
 [10.46]*** [12.26]*** [5.99]*** [5.55]*** 
AC²*backward -6.939 -9.619 -0.212 0.227 
 [4.97]*** [5.85]*** [0.15] [0.13] 
AC²*backward² 26.327 45.856 12.167 18.050 
 [8.17]*** [9.23]*** [3.76]*** [3.36]*** 
forward 9.728 15.128 3.734 8.461 
 [35.77]*** [47.59]*** [14.55]*** [24.65]*** 
forward² -10.768 -25.682 -1.294 -8.904 
 [22.55]*** [33.29]*** [2.67]*** [8.41]*** 
AC*forward 4.826 2.203 10.301 12.989 
 [3.68]*** [1.40] [8.57]*** [7.45]*** 
AC*forward² -13.429 -12.740 -30.293 -64.140 
 [5.22]*** [3.07]*** [11.24]*** [10.01]*** 
AC²*forward -2.728 -0.370 -8.410 -10.073 
 [1.86]* [0.21] [6.00]*** [4.93]*** 
AC²*forward² 7.344 4.161 23.284 45.869 
 [2.51]** [0.88] [7.21]*** [5.96]*** 
Herfindahl -1.046 -0.876 -1.436 -1.142 
 [7.29]*** [6.09]*** [10.21]*** [8.16]*** 
Observations 192851 192851 192851 192851 
Number of firms 72365 72365 72365 72365 
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 
F tests     
No AC-horizontal 6.09*** 5.92*** 4.69*** 2.16* 
No AC-backward 47.28*** 57.41*** 65.26*** 54.64*** 
No AC-forward 28.08*** 23.12*** 75.30*** 64.21*** 
No horizontal 7.63*** 4.66*** 39.83*** 36.18*** 
No backward 100.58*** 90.99*** 194.55*** 178.43*** 
No forward 604.67*** 812.56*** 306.46*** 442.57*** 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%; F tests: “No AC-X” tests whether all interactions are jointly equal to zero, “No X” tests 
whether the level and the square of X and all interactions are jointly equal to zero. 
Table 4.6: Horizontal and vertical spillovers: non-linear eﬀects conditional on
absorptive capability
CHAPTER 4. CONDITIONAL SPILLOVERS FROM FDI 127
(1) (2)
(3) (4) 
 
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
horizontal backward forward
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
horizontal backward forward
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
horizontal backward forward
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
horizontal backward forward
Figure 4.2: Non-linear intra- and intersectoral eﬀect of foreign participation:
horizontal, backward and forward spillovers (numbers above panels correspond
to column headings in table 4.5; the vertical axis indicates the eﬀect on TFP, the
horizontal axis indicates the level of foreign participation in repectively the own
sector and linked sectors; vertical lines indicate 95th percentile of the distribution
of the corresponding spillover)
eﬀects in the employment specifications (3 and 4) suggest that any positive
horizontal eﬀects run over the labour market, rather than through improved
competition or something of the sort. Forward spillovers consistently show
an inverted U shape in all specifications. The large majority of firms benefits
from foreign presence in their input sectors. Backward spillovers are clearly
negative in the output specifications and show a U-shape in the employment
specifications, which partially corrects the finding in table 4.4 of negative back-
ward spillovers. Apparently, selling to sectors with high foreign presence has
a positive eﬀect on total factor productivity, provided the foreign presence is
high enough. If the foreign presence remains relatively low, the negative eﬀects
are found.
Table 4.6 adds interactions with absorptive capability. The explanatory
power is higher than in table 4.4. The interaction eﬀects with absorptive capa-
bility are significant for all three spillover eﬀects. Still for horizontal spillovers
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Figure 4.3: Forward and backward spillover eﬀects: non-linear eﬀects condi-
tional on absorptive capability
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Figure 4.4: Split-up of sectors based on export orientation, competition from
imports, and sectoral competition (arabic numerals indicates the number of sectors
falling into each category)
there seems to be not really much of interaction with absorptive capability
(relatively low scores on the F-test), and the results are still very mixed across
specifications. The results for backward and forward spillovers are much more
interesting though. We show the implied relations in figure 4.3. Backward
spillovers are very positive if foreign presence in the downstream sector is high
and if the absorptive capability is either low enough or high enough. The last
part of this assertion (positive backward spillovers if absorptive capability is
high enough) supports the theory Rodríguez-Clare (1996). Forward spillovers
also show an interesting though more stable pattern, certainly for the output
definition. Absorptive capability only plays a minor role if foreign presence
is low. With increasing foreign presence the role of absorptive capability in-
creases. Clearly the inverted U-shape found for forward spillovers in figure 4.2
and table 4.4 depends on the level of absorption. The inverted U-shape arises
and becomes more pronounced with higher absorptive capability.
Still the found spillovers may be misspecified, since they may depend on
other factors such as openness (import competition, export orientation) and
sectoral competition, as suggested in the literature. To verify this conjecture,
we split our sample in 8 subsamples as shown in figure 4.4. The level of
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 export import sectoral spillover (dummy/percentage) 
 orientation competition competition horizontal backward forward 
I low low high -***/-*** -***/-*** +***/+*** 
II low high high +***/+*** -***/-*** +***/-*** 
III low low low +/+ -*/-*** +**/+* 
IV low high low +**/+* +/+ -/- 
V high low high -***/-*** +***/+*** +***/+*** 
VI high high high -***/- +***/+** +***/+*** 
VII high low low -**/- -***/-* -*/-*** 
VIII high high low -***/-*** -***/-** -/+ 
 
Table 4.7: Level eﬀects of horizontal and vertical spillovers after sector split-up
sectoral competition is measured by our Herfindahl index (cf. supra). Export
orientation is measured by total sectoral exports as a percentage of sectoral
output. Import competition is measures by imports of products comparable to
the produce of the sector scaled by total sectoral output. Exports and imports
of comparable products are taken from the input-output tables.
Theory leads to some clear predictions. i) Sectors with low sectoral compe-
tition (areas III, IV, VII, and VIII in figure 4.4) should not experience positive
horizontal spillover eﬀects, because they are not used to external competition.
The market stealing eﬀect should therefore dominate, although this may de-
pend on absorptive capability. ii) Horizontal spillovers are expected to be
mainly positive in sectors with high competition, certainly if these sectors are
still relatively closed (areas I, II and V). This has been called the demonstra-
tion eﬀect. iii) Rodriguez-Clare (1996) shows that backward spillover eﬀects
should be positive if the inputs required are not too diﬀerent from the ones
already produced by the local firms. This is likely to be case in the export-
oriented sectors. Firms in these sectors are already used to the required quality
on export markets and will more easily adapt to the demand from foreign firms
in downstream sectors. This will especially be the case when there is high sec-
toral competition (areas V and VI). iv) Better inputs through forward spillover
eﬀects will tend to be beneficial overall. The eﬀect is, however, expected to be
more beneficial to closed sectors than to open sectors. Indeed the presence of
better local inputs should mainly improve productivity in closed sectors. Sec-
tors that export a large share of their produce need to produce high quality and
will have been forced before to buy better foreign inputs if local input quality
is too low. So they will at best only benefit marginally from the better local
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Figure 4.5: Non-linear horizontal and vertical spillovers interacted with absorp-
tive capability after sector split-up - sectors in I and II (absorptive capability
on horizontal axis, spillover eﬀect on vertical axis; top figure is always horizontal,
middle figure backward, and bottom figure forward eﬀect; diﬀerent lines indicate
percentiles of spillover variables: 10th - solid line with triangles, 50th - solid line,
and 90th percentile - solid line with squares; numbers indicate t-stat for level impact
of spillover variable, t-stat for squared impact of spillover variable, and F test for
joint significance of the interactions with absorptive capability)
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forward forward 
1.14 - 0.87 - 1.62 0.91 - 1.25 - 0.13 
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Figure 4.6: Non-linear horizontal and vertical spillovers interacted with absorp-
tive capability after sector split-up - sectors in III and IV (absorptive capability
on horizontal axis, spillover eﬀect on vertical axis; top figure is always horizontal,
middle figure backward, and bottom figure forward eﬀect; diﬀerent lines indicate
percentiles of spillover variables: 10th - solid line with triangles, 50th - solid line,
and 90th percentile - solid line with squares; numbers indicate t-stat for level impact
of spillover variable, t-stat for squared impact of spillover variable, and F test for
joint significance of the interactions with absorptive capability)
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V VI 
  
horizontal horizontal 
1.15 - 1.80* - 3.47** 1.62 - 3.53*** - 2.72** 
  
backward backward 
2.61*** - 2.47** - 3.24** 8.49*** - 7.60*** - 17.64*** 
  
forward forward 
10.51*** - 12.85*** - 13.53*** 7.40*** - 5.11*** - 26.53*** 
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Figure 4.7: Non-linear horizontal and vertical spillovers interacted with absorp-
tive capability after sector split-up - sectors in V and VI (absorptive capability
on horizontal axis, spillover eﬀect on vertical axis; top figure is always horizontal,
middle figure backward, and bottom figure forward eﬀect; diﬀerent lines indicate
percentiles of spillover variables: 10th - solid line with triangles, 50th - solid line,
and 90th percentile - solid line with squares; numbers indicate t-stat for level impact
of spillover variable, t-stat for squared impact of spillover variable, and F test for
joint significance of the interactions with absorptive capability)
CHAPTER 4. CONDITIONAL SPILLOVERS FROM FDI 134
VII VIII 
  
horizontal horizontal 
1.49 - 0.85 - 1.04 2.13** - 1.88* - 2.76** 
  
backward backward 
4.21*** - 4.09*** - 3.49** 1.89* - 0.94 - 1.56 
  
forward forward 
1.61 - 1.31 - 3.07** 1.99** - 2.26** - 0.66 
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Figure 4.8: Non-linear horizontal and vertical spillovers interacted with ab-
sorptive capability after sector split-up - sectors in VII and VIII (absorptive
capability on horizontal axis, spillover eﬀect on vertical axis; top figure is always
horizontal, middle figure backward, and bottom figure forward eﬀect; diﬀerent lines
indicate percentiles of spillover variables: 10th - solid line with triangles, 50th - solid
line, and 90th percentile - solid line with squares; numbers indicate t-stat for level
impact of spillover variable, t-stat for squared impact of spillover variable, and F
test for joint significance of the interactions with absorptive capability)
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inputs. Therefore we expect positive forward spillovers in sectors belonging to
areas I, II, III and IV.
Results are shown in table 4.7 and figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. We repeated
the settings from columns 1 and 2 of table 4.4 for all quadrants in figure 4.4.
Results are summarized in table 4.7. From this table it seems that only the
third prediction is sustained by the data. But this is due to the failure to
take non-linearities and absorptive capacity into account. In figures 4.5, 4.6,
4.7, and 4.8 we show the results of applying the setting from column 1 in
table 4.6 to the 8 quadrants. The figures show for every regression three
subfigures with the horizontal, backward, and forward eﬀect as a function of
absorptive capability. The solid line refers to the eﬀect at the 50th percentile
of the distribution of horizontal, backward, and forward respectively. The
solid lines with triangles and squares refer to the 10th and 90th percentile.
The numbers below each subfigure correspond to the t-statistic for the level
coeﬃcient, the t-statistic for the quadratic coeﬃcient, and the F-test for joint
significance of the interactions with absorptive capability. Inspection of figures
4.5 through 4.8 learns that none of the four hypotheses can be rejected any
longer. In line with hypotheses i and ii horizontal spillovers are found to be
non-positive in the uncompetitive areas III, IV, VII, and VIII; but mainly
positive in the competitive but relatively closed sectors in areas I, II and V.
For sectors in area VI the horizontal eﬀect is nearly zero, except for firms with
high absorptive capability in those sectors with the highest levels of foreign
penetration. The latter firms experience a negative eﬀect. The eﬀect is however
tiny when compared to the other areas (compare the scaling on the vertical axis
with those in the other figures). The backward spillover is positive in the highly
competitive export-oriented sectors in areas V and VI, confirming hypothesis
iii. In area V the most advanced firms benefit the most from foreign presence
in downstream sectors. In area VI, the most competitive sectors in every
respect, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship. The firms with the highest
absorptive capability have less to gain than those with medium absorptive
capability. These firms do benefit the most, however, from the availability of
better inputs as can be seen from the subfigure with the forward spillovers.
For the export-oriented sectors with low competition, the backward spillover
is insignificant for sectors in area VIII and it is largely negative for sectors
in area VII. In the latter area, only firms with medium absorptive capability
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 L < 5 5 < L < 50 5 < L < 100 L > 50 L > 100 
horizontal -0.409 -0.709 -0.658 0.605 0.583 
 [1.90]* [3.43]*** [3.37]*** [1.57] [1.22] 
horizontal² 0.348 1.283 1.280 -1.495 -1.831 
 [1.25] [4.65]*** [4.89]*** [2.82]*** [2.90]*** 
AC*horizontal -3.709 1.067 1.171 -5.078 -4.741 
 [2.50]** [0.95] [1.12] [2.88]*** [2.22]** 
AC*horizontal² 3.393 -2.959 -3.470 7.546 8.959 
 [1.52] [1.78]* [2.24]** [2.87]*** [2.84]*** 
AC²*horizontal 3.908 -0.544 -0.385 4.086 2.862 
 [2.13]** [0.44] [0.34] [2.43]** [1.42] 
AC²*horizontal² -4.299 1.576 1.732 -6.185 -6.150 
 [1.56] [0.84] [1.00] [2.41]** [1.97]** 
backward -1.703 -3.002 -3.007 -2.893 -3.491 
 [5.51]*** [8.65]*** [9.13]*** [3.83]*** [3.99]*** 
backward² 3.581 7.004 6.804 4.564 5.519 
 [4.73]*** [8.75]*** [9.06]*** [3.06]*** [3.19]*** 
AC*backward 14.632 15.821 16.428 10.922 12.110 
 [5.96]*** [7.56]*** [8.53]*** [3.71]*** [3.57]*** 
AC*backward² -57.927 -52.593 -52.251 -17.991 -17.448 
 [9.17]*** [10.60]*** [11.68]*** [3.30]*** [2.88]*** 
AC²*backward -12.254 -11.548 -12.993 -9.065 -8.947 
 [3.75]*** [4.89]*** [6.29]*** [3.40]*** [2.93]*** 
AC²*backward² 55.378 38.939 41.060 14.250 12.379 
 [6.47]*** [6.68]*** [8.43]*** [2.98]*** [2.37]** 
forward 10.900 8.213 7.766 -1.385 -1.539 
 [24.63]*** [17.62]*** [17.75]*** [1.66]* [1.48] 
forward² -11.992 -9.205 -8.684 6.012 6.926 
 [15.80]*** [11.04]*** [11.11]*** [4.16]*** [3.82]*** 
AC*forward 8.544 0.836 -0.418 0.856 -1.236 
 [3.52]*** [0.41] [0.22] [0.26] [0.31] 
AC*forward² -20.291 -5.217 -2.612 -8.915 -8.063 
 [4.09]*** [1.31] [0.71] [1.52] [1.13] 
AC²*forward -7.267 0.681 2.110 0.632 1.992 
 [2.39]** [0.31] [1.05] [0.21] [0.55] 
AC²*forward² 13.472 0.755 -2.176 5.125 4.913 
 [2.11]** [0.17] [0.55] [0.91] [0.73] 
Herfindahl -1.919 -0.060 -0.098 0.409 0.549 
 [7.73]*** [0.27] [0.47] [1.55] [1.66]* 
      
Observations 96936 67824 74615 15222 8728 
Number of firms 45727 28478 30190 5780 3363 
R-squared 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 
      
No AC-horizontal 4.08*** 3.94*** 6.09*** 3.65*** 4.31*** 
No AC-backward 41.13*** 63.49*** 64.15*** 6.22*** 7.40*** 
No AC-forward 13.72*** 6.72*** 7.84*** 2.34** 4.22*** 
No horizontal 6.11*** 6.41*** 7.66*** 5.74*** 6.98*** 
No backward 52.00*** 68.13*** 72.09*** 22.59*** 19.08*** 
No forward 250.68*** 177.23*** 182.11*** 3.95*** 3.30*** 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 4.8: Horizontal and vertical spillovers: sensitivity to firm size
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 full partial majority† minority full majority‡ minority 
horizontal -0.328 -0.903 -0.611 -0.650 -0.190 -0.885 -0.560 
 [3.79]*** [14.55]*** [10.48]*** [5.59]*** [2.12]** [12.77]*** [4.71]*** 
backward -0.299 -1.765 -1.538 2.573 -0.880 -2.605 1.929 
 [2.99]*** [18.58]*** [21.12]*** [9.17]*** [8.12]*** [22.69]*** [6.85]*** 
forward -0.953 4.589 3.631 1.456 -0.613 4.982 2.461 
 [8.35]*** [66.41]*** [53.94]*** [5.68]*** [5.29]*** [68.00]*** [9.62]*** 
Herf3 -0.649 -0.000  -0.000  
 [4.56]*** [10.09]***  [4.58]***  
        
Observations 192851 192851  192851  
R-squared 0.05 0.04  0.05  
        
Equal horizont. 39.37*** 0.11  21.98***  
Equal 
backward 
76.45*** 155.90***  129.39***  
Equal forward 2061.77*** 66.94*** 1082.89*** 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
† majority: foreign share > 50%;  ‡ majority: foreign share > 50% and < 95%    
Table 4.9: Horizontal and vertical spillovers: full versus partial ownership and
minority versus majority ownership
seem to benefit, provided the foreign penetration in downstream sectors is not
too high. It seems therefore that export orientation cannot compensate for the
low sectoral and import competition. The fact that the backward spillover is
insignificant in area VIII with high import, but low sectoral competition, also
lends support to this hypothesis. For the less export-oriented sectors in areas I,
II, and III the backward spillover is largely negative, for area IV, it is positive
but fully insignificant. Non-negative forward spillovers are found for sectors in
areas I, II, III and IV. Generally, the firms with higher absorptive capability
do not benefit less than those with medium to low absorptive capability. The
only odd observation is that forward spillovers tend to be negative in sectors
with high export orientation but low import competition (sectors V and VII).
We have no explanation for this finding.
In two last steps, we verify whether spillovers depend on the scale of the
firm and on the magnitude of foreign presence. Results are shown in table 4.8,
4.9, and 4.10. In table 4.8 we see that mainly horizontal and forward eﬀects
depend on the scale of the firm.15 Horizontal spillovers switch from a U-shape
to inverted U-shape with increasing scale and forward spillovers show exactly
the opposite pattern. The backward spillover pattern seems to be relatively
constant with increasing scale. For small firms the interaction eﬀects with ab-
sorptive capability are strongly present for forward spillovers. Though F-tests
15The results displayed are for the dummy-output based measures of foreign presence.
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 [1] [2] [3] 
 full partial majority† minority full majority‡ minority 
horizontal -0.696 -2.385 -4.387 3.123 -0.797 -3.644 1.727 
 [3.32]*** [10.65]*** [20.80]*** [7.37]*** [3.74]*** [15.47]*** [4.03]*** 
horizontal² 1.793 2.824 6.452 -12.956 1.895 4.690 -8.167 
 [3.79]*** [6.82]*** [19.37]*** [6.97]*** [3.99]*** [10.92]*** [4.39]*** 
AC*horizontal 1.325 -6.545 7.548 -15.808 2.801 0.120 -4.840 
 [1.15] [4.95]*** [6.68]*** [5.94]*** [2.39]** [0.09] [1.84]** 
AC*horizontal² -10.435 7.367 -16.098 28.014 -11.514 -1.646 -13.447 
 [3.82]*** [2.77]*** [8.18]*** [2.10]** [4.20]*** [0.59] [1.02] 
AC²*horizontal -1.915 6.481 -6.361 12.421 -3.283 1.465 3.004 
 [1.48] [4.46]*** [5.11]*** [4.03]*** [2.48]** [0.95] [0.98] 
AC²*horizontal² 8.584 -7.978 12.933 -18.024 9.735 -1.350 17.173 
 [2.80]*** [2.79]*** [6.05]*** [1.11] [3.16]*** [0.44] [1.06] 
backward -4.804 3.330 -1.679 -3.620 -2.942 6.686 -16.850 
 [8.76]*** [5.87]*** [4.24]*** [2.06]** [5.19]*** [9.28]*** [9.33]*** 
backward² 18.711 -11.042 2.304 108.046 9.921 -29.469 243.322 
 [9.61]*** [5.48]*** [2.57]** [6.05]*** [4.82]*** [10.12]*** [12.98]*** 
AC*backward -4.380 20.887 11.154 11.289 2.265 -8.355 63.996 
 [1.44] [6.23]*** [4.80]*** [1.18] [0.71] [2.09]** [6.59]*** 
AC*backward² -23.187 -92.820 -45.803 -238.089 -38.425 5.886 -791.746 
 [2.32]** [7.78]*** [8.68]*** [2.55]** [3.70]*** [0.36] [8.18]*** 
AC²*backward 8.604 -22.032 -10.141 2.447 1.176 2.185 -47.100 
 [2.86]*** [6.45]*** [3.90]*** [0.22] [0.37] [0.54] [4.28]*** 
AC²*backward² 4.881 95.363 40.484 89.788 21.831 18.144 610.160 
 [0.55] [8.16]*** [7.09]*** [0.85] [2.31]** [1.17] [5.63]*** 
forward 14.855 1.938 8.842 30.817 12.281 2.416 15.016 
 [29.46]*** [3.67]*** [23.30]*** [22.02]*** [22.93]*** [4.71]*** [10.50]*** 
forward² -46.350 5.908 -11.880 -245.608 -40.359 4.487 -79.298 
 [31.24]*** [3.81]*** [15.54]*** [18.38]*** [25.53]*** [2.31]** [5.88]*** 
AC*forward -5.595 24.028 24.740 -120.579 15.991 26.718 -83.500 
 [1.71]** [7.52]*** [10.73]*** [11.79]*** [4.51]*** [7.76]*** [8.12]*** 
AC*forward² 5.355 -90.524 -48.091 973.171 -48.126 -117.571 553.493 
 [0.51] [9.76]*** [10.34]*** [9.53]*** [4.34]*** [9.21]*** [5.49]*** 
AC²*forward 5.937 -18.322 -20.960 108.766 -11.316 -22.173 72.173 
 [1.52] [4.93]*** [7.68]*** [8.71]*** [2.67]*** [5.39]*** [5.75]*** 
AC²*forward² -11.261 65.939 38.336 -894.233 30.697 91.729 -508.761 
 [0.89] [6.04]*** [7.01]*** [7.09]*** [2.29]** [5.97]*** [4.09]*** 
Herfindahl -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 [0.36] [6.15]*** [0.18] 
    
Observations 192851 192851 192851 
R-squared 0.08 0.06 0.08 
    
Equal horizontal 35.69*** 48.55*** 25.88*** 
Equal backward 51.06*** 70.95*** 56.60*** 
Equal forward 407.50*** 176.79*** 118.47*** 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
† majority: foreign share > 50%;  ‡ majority: foreign share > 50% and < 95% 
Table 4.10: Horizontal and vertical spillovers: full versus partial ownership and
minority versus majority ownership - interactions with absorptive capability
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reject that all interactions together do not matter for medium and large firms,
one can infer from the individual t-stats that the impact is estimated impre-
cise. In table 4.9 on page 137 we calculate diﬀerent spillovers. In specification
(1) we use a spillover for full ownership (more than 95%) and one for partial
ownership (less than 95%). In specification (2) we use a spillover for majority
ownership (more than 50%) and for minority ownership (less than 50%). Fi-
nally, in specification (3) we use a spillover full ownership (more than 95%), for
a second type of majority ownership (more than 50%, but less than 95%) and
for minority ownership (less than 50%) The results are very intuitive. Fully
owned foreign firms do not generate any positive spillover eﬀects. They prob-
ably have limited or no contacts with local firms and source their inputs either
abroad or with other foreign firms. In the second specification we observe that
we cannot reject that the horizontal spillovers are identical from majority and
minority owned foreign firms. Interestingly, however, in specification (2) and
(3) the backward spillover is positive for spillovers from minority owned for-
eign firms, while it is negative for spillovers from majority owned foreign firms.
This is logical since minority foreign owned firms are dominated by locals and
therefore are much more likely to buy local resources. This leads to positive
backward spillovers. In table 4.10 on page 138 we repeat the regressions of
table 4.9 including non-linearities and interaction terms with absorptive capa-
bility. The resulting spillover eﬀects (figures available on demand) confirm the
findings of table 4.9.
4.7 Conclusions
This paper investigates the spillovers within and between sectors from foreign
to domestic firms for a comprehensive set of Romanian firms. Contrary to most
of the literature our dataset uses a series of input-output tables to take into
account changes in economic structure and it contains dynamic ownership data.
We further contribute to the literature in several ways. We estimate sectoral
production functions using a new and up to date estimation strategy. From
the estimation a measure of total factor productivity is recovered. We then use
the full sample of all firms in all sectors to relate total factor productivity to
diﬀerent measures of foreign presence. Our results highlight the importance of
taking into account non-linearities and conditionalities. The lack of consensus
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on the horizontal eﬀect in earlier studies probably originate from failing to do
so. We allow for a non-linear eﬀect of foreign presence within and between
sectors and show that the eﬀect varies with the absorptive capability of the
firm. Further, we split the sample in a novel way according to the following
criteria: export orientation, import competition and sectoral competition.
Throughout the paper the results illustrate the dominance of intersectoral
spillovers over sectoral spillovers. The interaction eﬀects with absorptive ca-
pability are significant for all three spillover eﬀects. Horizontal spillovers are
found to be non-positive in uncompetitive sectors, whereas they are mainly
positive in the competitive but relatively closed sectors in areas. The back-
ward spillover is positive in highly competitive export-oriented sectors. Firms
in these sectors are already used to the required quality on export markets
and will more easily adapt to the demand from foreign firms in downstream
sectors. This is especially the case when there is high sectoral competition.
For the less export-oriented sectors the backward spillover is mainly negative.
Non-negative forward spillovers are found for almost all sectors. Generally,
the firms with higher absorptive capability do not benefit less than those with
medium to low absorptive capability. Mainly horizontal and forward eﬀects
are found to depend on the scale of the firm. Horizontal spillovers switch from
a U-shape to inverted U-shape with increasing scale, while forward spillovers
show exactly the opposite pattern. The backward spillover pattern seems to
be relatively stable with increasing scale. Finally, regarding the level of foreign
ownership we find that fully owned foreign firms are highly unlikely to gener-
ate positive spillover eﬀects. They probably have limited or no contacts with
local firms and source their inputs either abroad or with other foreign firms.
Horizontal spillovers are identical from majority and minority owned foreign
firms, the backward spillover is positive for spillovers from minority owned for-
eign firms, while it is negative for spillovers from majority owned foreign firms.
This is very logical since minority foreign owned firms are dominated by locals
and therefore are much more likely to buy local resources.
If anything, our results show "beyond any doubt" that spillovers must be
studied between sectors, taking into account non-linearities, and that their
direction and magnitude depends on absorptive capability and other condi-
tions. Indeed we consistently found that intersectoral spillovers are economi-
cally much larger than sectoral spillovers. The debate in the literature on the
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direction and magnitude of spillovers from foreign firms to local firms has only
one good answer: it all depends and, reassuringly, it depends in a way that
makes economic sense.
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Appendix 4.A Industry code conversion
 
CODE INDUSTRY NACE 
01 Vegetal production 01.1 ; 01.3 
02 Breeding 01.2 ; 01.3 
03 Auxiliary services 01.4 
04 Forestry and hunting 02.0 ; 01.5 
05 Logging 2 
06 Fishing and aquaculture 5 
07 Coal mining and processing  10 
08 Extraction of petroleum (including auxiliary services) 11.1 ; 11.2 
09 Extraction of natural gas (including auxiliary services) 11.1 ; 11.2 
11 Ferrous ores quarrying  and processing   13.1 
12 Non-ferrous ores quarrying  and processing 13.2 
13 Extraction of building material ores  14.1 
14 Extraction of clay and sand  14.2 
15 Extraction and processing of chemical ores 14.3 
16 Extraction and processing of salt 14.4 
17 Other non-ferrous ores quarrying  and processing 14.5 
18 Meat  production and processing 15.1 
19 Processing and preserving of fish and fish products 15.2 
20 Processing and preserving of fruits and vegetables 15.3 
21 Production of vegetal and animal oil and fat 15.4 
22 Production of milk products 15.5 
23 Production of milling products, starch and starch products 15.6 
24 Manufacture of fodder 15.7 
25 Processing of other food products 15.8 
26 Beverages 15.9 
27 Tobacco products 16 
28 Textile industry 17 
29 Textile clothing 18.1 ; 18.2 
30 Manufacture of leather and fur clothes 18.3 
31 Footwear and other leather goods 19 
32 Wood processing (excluding furniture) 20 
33 Pulp, paper and cardboard; related items 21 
34 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 22 
35 Coking 23.1 
36 Crude oil processing  23.2 
38 Basic chemical products 24.1 
39 Pesticides and other agrochemical products 24.2 
40 Dyes and varnishes  24.3 
41 Medicines and pharmaceutical products 24.4 
42 Soaps, detergents, upkeeping products, cosmetics, perfumery  24.5 
43 Other chemical products 24.6 
44 Synthetic and man made fibres  24.7 
45 Rubber processing 25.1 
46 Plastic processing 25.2 
47 Glass and glassware  26.1 
48 Processing of refractory ceramics (excluding building items) 26.2 
49 Ceramic boards and flags 26.3 
50 Brick, tile and other building material processing 26.4 
51 Cement, lime and plaster  26.5 
52 Processing of concrete, cement and lime items 26.6 
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55 Metallurgy and ferroalloys processing 27.1 
56 Manufacture of tubes 27.2 
57 Other metallurgy products 27.3 
58 Precious metals and other non-ferrous metals 27.4 
59 Foundry 27.5 
60 Metal structures and products 28 
61 Manufacture of equipment for producing and using of mechanical 
power (except  for plane engines, vehicles and motorcycles) 
29.1 
62 Machinery for general use 29.2 
63 Agricultural  and forestry machinery 29.3 
64 Machine tools 29.4 
65 Other machines for special use 29.5 
67 Labour-saving devices and domestic machinery 29.7 
68 Computers and office means 30 
69 Electric machinery and appliances 31 
70 Radio, TV-sets and communication  equipment and apparatus  32 
71 Medical, precision, optical, watchmaking  instruments and 
apparatus 
33 
72 Means of road transport 34 
73 Naval engineering and repair 35.1 
74 Production and repair of railway transport means and rolling 
equipment  
35.2 
75 Aircraft engineering and repair 35.3 
76 Motorcycles , bicycles and other transport means 35.4 ; 35.5 
77 Furniture 36.1 
78 Other industrial activities 36.2 - 36.6 
79 Electric power production and distribution 40.1 
80 Gas production and distribution 40.2 
81 Production and distribution of thermal energy  40.3 
82 Water collection, treatment and distribution 41 
83 Construction 45 
84 Wholesale and retail 50 – 52 
85 Hotels 55.1 ; 55.2 
86 Restaurants 55.3 – 55.5 
87 Railway transport 60.1 
88 Road transport 60.2 
89 Pipe-line transport 60.3 
90 Water transport 61 
91 Air transport 62 
92 Auxiliary transport activities and travel agencies  63.1 ; 63.2 
93 Tourism agencies and assistance  63.3 
94 Post and mail 64.1 
95 Telecommunication 64.2 
96 Financial, banking and insurance services 65 – 67 
97 Real estate activities  70 
98 Computer and related activities  72 
99 Research and development 73 
100 Architecture, engineering and other technical services 74.2 
101 Other business activities 71 ; 74.1 ; 
74.3 – 74.8 
102 Public administration and defence, compulsory social assistance 75 
103 Education 80 
